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ABSTRACT 
This is a multidisciplinary work that encompasses 
considerations of politics, regulation and technology.  It 
considers the impact of technology on the way in which, 
politically, we are able to regulate technology and how we 
devise policy to guide that regulation.  The added 
complication is that Internet technology knows no jurisdiction.  
The rulemaking established in recent years is globally 
applicable and is carried out without the direct involvement of 
national governments in the key decision making processes, 
particularly in the environment under examination here which 
focuses on the management of the technical resources of the 
Internet. 
In formulating the hypothesis that grounds this work, I 
have focused on two things.  Firstly, that technical regulation 
has political, and therefore, policy implications.  Secondly, 
that where there are policy implications with direct 
commercial impact, we can expect to see the vigorous 
involvement of corporations as they manage the environment 
in which they do business.  These two critical conditions have 
driven the formulation of policies and procedures for making 
decisions about Internet governance.  They have also driven 
the actual decisions which have been implemented, to a 
greater or lesser degree of success. 
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This research contributes to the scholarship in four 
significant ways.  The first is that the Internet Domain Name 
System (IDNS) and its governance present a new perspective 
on the discussion of the globalisation of business regulation.  
The data used to support the analysis has not been collated 
or examined previously and is presented here to illustrate the 
extension of the literature and to frame the hypothesis. 
The second is that I have found that national 
governments have, despite ongoing control within their 
national jurisdiction, little effective influence over the 
management and governance of the Domain Name System 
(DNS) at an international level.  Thirdly, I have found that 
corporations have significant power to determine the way in 
which policies for the management of the technical resources 
of the Internet are discussed, developed to consensus policy 
positions, implemented and reviewed.   
Finally, the research has opened up new lines of inquiry 
into the rise of a new class of bureaucrats, the cosmocrats 
and their cosmocracy, on which further research continues.  
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GLOSSARY2 
3COM 
US network hardware and software corporation that provided financial 
support (US$175,000 loan in 1999) for ICANN during start-up phase.   
AARNET 
Australian Academic Research Network, established under the auspices of 
the Australian Vice-Chancellors Committee (AVCC) to link the major 
Australian tertiary education institutions and other research bodies such 
as the Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation.  
AARNet was sold to national telecommunications carrier Telstra after the 
emergence of the Internet. AARNet managers were influential in technical 
development of the Internet within Australia and overseas. Those 
managers and the AVCC also played a significant role in transition of the 
.au ccTLD regime from one of privately held, publicly funded Internet 
architecture to publicly managed privately commercialised assets. 
JEAN-FRANÇOIS ABRAMATIC  
ICANN Director 1999-2000, Dr Abramatic was formerly Director of 
Development & Industrial Relations at France’s INRIA, Associate Director 
of the MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, author of the French 
Government’s report Le Développement Technique de l’Internet 
(http://mission-dti.inria.fr/) and Chair of the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C). He was selected for the ICANN Board by the Protocol Supporting 
Organization.   
AMADEU ABRIL I ABRIL 
ICANN Director (selected by DNSO); formerly member of DNSO Names 
Council and gTLD-MoU Policy Oversight Committee.  Mr Abril teaches law, 
has a private legal practice (including work as Legal & Policy Advisor to 
domain name registrar Nominalia) and was an executive with the 
European Commission. 
ACSNET 
Electronic network established by the Australian Computer Society (ACS), 
a professional organisation for the IT sector. ACSNet was superseded by 
the Internet; transition from a closed to a public network was reflected in 
ACS involvement in the establishment of .auDA and its precursors. 
                                   
2 This is comprehensive collection of key terms, corporations and individuals.  This 
dramatis personae has not previously been published and provides a guide to a wide 
variety of sources throughout the work. 
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ADDRESS SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION (ASO) 
The ICANN Address Supporting Organization is one of three Supporting 
Organizations (that is, entities that assist, review and develop 
recommendations on Internet policy and structure regarding specific 
areas of ICANN’s activity and that facilitate diverse international 
participation in technical management of the Internet). It names three 
Directors to the ICANN Board.   
ERICK IRIARTE AHON 
Appointed as a member of ICANN At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) in 
2003, Mr Ahon is a computer law specialist from Peru. He was a member 
of the DNSO UDRP Review Task Force and Transfer Task Force, a legal 
advisor for the administrator of the .pe ccTLD and member of the Non 
Commercial Constituency in the DNSO. He was a founder of the Peruvian 
Cybertribunal and Electronical Magazine of Computer Law (REDI).  
http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/tor-udrp/Erick.Iriarte.bio.html   
IZUMI AIZU  
A Member of 1998 ICANN Advisory Committee on Membership and 
appointed as a Member of the At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) in 
2003. Mr Aizu is a former Secretary General of the Asia & Pacific Internet 
Association, member of the UN Digital Opportunities Task Force (DOT 
Force) and the NGO & Academic ICANN Study (NAIS). He has a 
background in advertising and network development.  
http://www.anr.org   
ALTERNATIVE ROOT 
A root system outside what a 1999 ICANN paper characterised as the 
‘one authoritative root’ and thereby not recognised by most personal 
computers, servers or other devices on the Internet.  For example, web 
sites may be inaccessible because of domain name collisions and e-mail 
messages may not be received. Arguments about the technical and 
commercial viability of alternative root schemes were a feature of early 
debate about the legitimacy and operation of ICANN and .auDA, 
encapsulated in Milton Mueller’s landmark Ruling The Root (2002).  
SENATOR RICHARD ALSTON 
Australian Federal Government Senator and Minister for Communications, 
Information Technology & the Arts March since 1996. Alston’s 
Department played a key role in facilitating the establishment of .auDA, 
the centrepiece of the co-regulatory domain administration regime 
discussed in this thesis; in the creation of safety-net electronic addressing 
legislation for the .au space and in support of the ICANN Governmental 
Advisory Committee.  Senator Alston has LLB, LLM, BA, BCom and MBA 
degrees.  http://www.richardalston.dcita.gov.au.   
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AMERICAN REGISTRY FOR INTERNET NUMBERS (ARIN) 
A non-profit membership organization responsible for administration and 
registration of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses in the geographical areas 
previously managed by Network Solutions Inc., including North America, 
part of the Caribbean and sub-equatorial Africa.  http://www.arin.net   
AMERICA ONLINE (AOL) 
ISP business of US AOL Time Warner content and carriage conglomerate. 
AOL provided financial support for ICANN during the start-up phase. 
AOL’s walled garden model, essentially a private network where many 
resources are found through proprietary keywords, predates 
commercialisation of the Internet and search engines such as Google.  
Although the efficacy of that model is now uncertain, consumer 
experience in resource identification on AOL and similar networks 
influenced much writing about the value of domain names and 
requirements for regulation of the DNS.  
MADS BRYDE ANDERSEN  
Danish Member of ICANN Advisory Committee on Independent Review.   
ANTI-CYBERSQUATTING PROTECTION ACT (ACPA) 
1999 US federal legislation, independent of the ICANN UDRP, dealing with 
disputes about rights to domain names in the generic top level domain 
(gTLD) name space and .us ccTLD.  It reflects lobbying by major 
intellectual property interests.  The legislation encompasses penalties for 
cyber-squatting and is considered by industry analysts to have 
significantly reduced speculative investment and trade in domain names. 
ASCEND COMMUNICATIONS 
A US network engineering group (subsequently acquired by Lucent 
Technologies), Ascend provided financial support for ICANN during the 
start-up phase. 
ASIA PACIFIC NETWORK INFORMATION CENTRE (APNIC) 
A non-profit membership organisation responsible for administration and 
registration of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses in the Asia-Pacific region, 
for example, for Japan, China, New Zealand and Australia. 
http://www.apnic.net   
AUCTION 
Online mechanism for the resale of domain names in some gTLDs. 
Domain name auction services may be provided by specialists, for 
example, by major registrars that retail pre-registered or waitlisted 
names, by individual site owners or through sites such as on-line auction 
house, eBay.  Although domain name valuations are sometimes 
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unreliable, public auctions provide an indication of the price at which 
registrants are prepared to buy and sell.  Some sense of the perceived 
value of domain names can then be determined. Major specialist domain 
name auction sites have wound back or abandoned their activities since 
the dot-com downturn of 2000. 
KARL AUERBACH 
US information technologist who has attracted international attention as a 
critic of ICANN, questioning its operation and, more broadly, Internet 
governance issues.  Mr Auerbach was elected as an ICANN At-Large 
Director in 2000.  http://www.cavebear.com   
AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION (ACCC) 
Australian national business regulator, with responsibilities under trade 
practices and telecommunications law. The ACCC has adopted a ‘hands-
off’ approach to overall administration of the .au ccTLD (broadly 
endorsing establishment of .auDA and introduction of competition in 
registrar services), instead concentrating on inappropriate practice by 
some businesses within the Australian domain name industry.  
http://www.accc.gov.au   
AT LARGE 
Participation by the global Internet community, however that is defined, 
in governance of the Internet and specifically in ICANN has been a 
feature of US Government statements about the transition to a privately 
administered international resource. The identification of that community 
and the development of specific mechanisms for participation have been 
one of the most contested aspects of ICANN. There has been similar 
contention regarding the shape, objectives and ongoing operation of 
bodies such as .auDA and CIRA.  Key initiatives in relation to ICANN are 
the attempt to build a substantial At-Large membership, the election of 
At-Large Directors to the ICANN Board, and work by the At Large Study 
Committee (ALSC) and subsequent At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC).  
http://alac.icann.org/  
AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY (ACA) 
The Australian Communications Authority is an Australian Federal 
Government agency responsible to the Minister for Communications, 
Information Technology & the Arts, Senator Richard Alston.  The ACA 
oversees national telecommunications standards and numbering activity 
under the 1997 Telecommunications Act.  As part of the co-regulatory 
regime for management of the .au ccTLD, the ACA has a watching brief 
on .auDA but is not directly responsible for the Australian domain space.  
The ACA has reserve powers to intervene if .auDA fails to perform. 
http://www.aca.gov.au 
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AUSTRALIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS USERS GROUP (ATUG) 
ATUG is an industry body primarily composed of major corporate 
consumers of telecommunication services.  It was influential in the  
deregulation of the Australian telecommunications market and the 
introduction of competition from the mid-1980s onwards.  It was closely 
involved in the establishment of .auDA. http://www.atug.com.au 
.AU DOMAIN ADMINISTRATION LTD (AUDA)  
The .au Domain Administration is the non-government not-for-profit body 
responsible for management of the .au ccTLD. It is the counterpart of 
Canada’s CIRA and the United Kingdom’s Nominet. .auDA is governed by 
an elected Board and has a open membership structure.  It has a formal 
agreement with ICANN regarding management of .au, reflecting the 2002 
re-delegation of responsibility for .au from the previous volunteer 
delegate, Robert Elz. .auDA’s policies and operation have been built 
around a consensus-based and transparent regime founded on stability 
and competitive provision of services.  http://www.auda.org.au. 
AUSTRALIAN VICE-CHANCELLOR’S COMMITTEE (AVCC) 
The AVCC is the peak body of executives of Australian tertiary education 
institutions, embracing over 40 institutions.  The Committee was closely 
involved with the establishment and growth of AARNet, the Australian 
Academic Research Network (subsequently transferred to 
telecommunications group Telstra). Some observers have argued that the 
AVCC has, on occasion, sought to act as a spoiler in the establishment of 
.auDA (and its predecessor, ADNA). Its interests are evident in friction 
with the Federal education department over the .edu 2LD (which unlike 
the .edu gTLD embraces primary and secondary schools) and more 
recently in proposals for new 2LDs aimed at marketing universities as 
destinations for fee-paying overseas students.  http://www.avcc.edu.au 
JOHN PERRY BARLOW  
Prominent cyber-libertarian, Berkman Fellow and author of the 1996 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.   
BELL ATLANTIC 
US telecommunications company (now Verizon) that provided financial 
support for ICANN during the start-up phase.  
BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY 
An adjunct of the Harvard University Law School, the Berkman Center has 
been the source of some of the most important writing about Internet 
governance, in particular the shape of intellectual property and domain 
name regimes.  See for example, studies by Jonathan Zittrain, Charles 
Nesson and Ben Edelman of online civil society and the operation of 
ICANN. The Center has provided technical support for ICANN meetings, 
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hosts an archive of ICANN proceedings and is associated with influential 
Internet policy sites.  http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ 
TIM BERNERS-LEE  
Academic regarded as the ‘father of the Web’. Author of Weaving The 
Web (1999). Member of the ICANN Independent Review Committee 2001.   
VITTORIO BERTOLA  
Appointed as a member of the ICANN At-Large Advisory Committee 
(ALAC) in 2003, Mr Bertola is a businessman and technologist active in 
ISOC’s Italy chapter and as Chair of the governing panel of 
ICANNAtLarge.org.  He was a candidate in the 2000 At-Large election and 
founder of a body bidding to operate the .eu registry.  
http://www.bertola.eu.org   
CARL BILDT  
Former Swedish Prime Minister, UN Special Envoy to the Balkans, Chair of 
the European Space Agency’s Wise Mens’ Group on Space issues, Chair of 
Nordic Ventures Network venture capital association, past Chair of the 
International Democrat Union and a member of advisory boards that 
range from RAND Europe to the Aspen Institute Italy. He was Chair of 
ICANN At-Large Study Committee 2001-02. 
http://www.atlargestudy.org/draft_final.shtml & http://www.bildt.net. 
WILLIE BLACK 
After service as administrator of the United Kingdom’s academic research 
network (a counterpart of Australia’s AARNet) as head of UKERNA, Dr 
Black became the first Managing Director and later Chairman of the .uk 
domain registry, Nominet.  He has attracted attention as an exponent of 
‘West-West’ tensions in global DNS governance, articulating the views of 
some ccTLD managers regarding ICANN’s responsibilities and the power 
of the ICANN ccTLD lobby vis-à-vis gTLD managers. 
http://www.nominet.org.uk/index.html 
ROBERT BLOKZIJL 
Selected for the ICANN Board by the Address Supporting Organization, Dr 
Blokzijl was an ICANN Director from October 1999 until 2002.  He was a 
founding member and Chair of RIPE, instrumental in the creation of RIPE 
NCC in 1992 as the first Regional Internet Registry.  
http://www.icann.org/biog/blokzijl.htm  
BOSTON WORKING GROUP (BWG) 
The Boston Working Group involved participants in the IFWP who met in 
Boston in September 1998, in response to proposals by IANA and 
Network Solutions Inc regarding establishment of ICANN.  The Group 
argued that the draft ICANN articles of incorporation were inconsistent 
with the IFWP consensus points and the US government National 
 xii 
Telecommunications & Information Administration White Paper. The 
Group embodied criticisms about the role of ICANN Supporting 
Organizations and the operation of the ICANN Board.  http://mama-
tech.com/boston/ 
BROWSER 
A World Wide Web client that displays HTML or other code in a user-
friendly format.  Browsers utilise the DNS to identify online resources on 
the basis of domain names rather than Internet Protocol Numbers 
(numerical addresses), for example by user entry of the URL for a web 
site or a particular web page. Browsers are independent of tools such as 
search engines and directories. 
J BECKWITH [BECKY] BURR 
US Department of Commerce representative closely involved in the 
transition to ICANN administration.  Detailed correspondence found at 
http://www.icann.org/correspondence/icann-to-doc-19july99.htm.  Burr 
is now at Washington law firm, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering.  
http://www.wilmercutler.com. 
DIANE CABELL 
Harvard academic, member of 1998 ICANN Advisory Committee on 
Membership.  http://www.mama-tech.com/ 
IVAN MOURA CAMPOS 
An ICANN Director (At-Large) from 2000, Dr Moura Campos is a former 
Professor of Computer Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais, 
Director of Special Research Programs at Brazil’s National Research 
Council, Secretary for Science & Technology with the state government of 
Minas Gerais and Chair of the Internet Steering Committee of Brazil.   
GERALDINE CAPDEBOSCQ  
ICANN Director from October 1998 until November 2000, Ms Capdeboscq 
was a senior executive with French information technology group, Bull.  
http://www.icann.org/biog/capdeboscq.htm 
CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (CDT) 
US civil society and online liberties advocacy group.  http://www.cdt.org 
CENTR 
Organization of European Union domain name registrars. 
http://www.centr.org 
 xiii 
VINTON CERF  
ICANN Director and Chair from 2000, Dr Cerf is a senior executive with 
MCI WorldCom. He was a co-designer of the TCP/IP communications 
protocol. He was founding President and a Chair of the Internet Society, 
and Vice President of the US Corporation for National Research Initiatives. 
Dr Cerf is a colleague of Jonathan Postel and Steve Crocker.  
http://www.icann.org/biog/cerf.htm and 
http://www.worldcom.com/cerfsup   
LYMAN CHAPIN 
Selected by the Address Supporting Organization, ICANN Director from 
2001.  A former Chief Scientist at BBN Technologies and NextHop 
Technologies, Mr Chapin is a former Chair of the Internet Architecture 
Board and ANSI and ISO standards groups concerned with network & 
transport layer standards. He was a founding trustee of the Internet 
Society.  http://www.icann.org/biog/chapin.htm 
CIRA 
Non-government body regulating the .ca ccTLD; Canada’s equivalent to 
.auDA.  http://www.cira.ca 
CISCO SYSTEMS 
US Internet router giant that provided financial support (US$150,000 
loan) for ICANN during the start-up phase.   
CIVIL SOCIETY 
“Civil society” is a general term which is defined well at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm.  In the 
ICANN context, ‘civil society’ refers generally to the work of consumer, 
privacy, online democracy advocates such as Jamie Love 
(http://www.cptech.org/jamie/), Dori Kornfeld 
(http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/workshops/LA/rodin.html) & the 
work of the Markle Foundation (http://www.markle.org/) 
CLIENT 
Software on the Web, such as a browser, editor or search robot, that 
reads or writes information on the World Wide Web. 
JONATHAN COHEN  
Selected by the Domain Name Supporting Organization as an ICANN 
Director, Mr Cohen is also the Senior Managing Partner of the Shapiro 
Cohen law group, based in Ottawa.  He was first President of the ICANN 
Intellectual Property Constituency; he previously participated in the 1997 
WIPO-IAHC meetings in Geneva. He is actively involved in intellectual 
 xiv 
property organisations such as INTA. 
http://www.shapirocohen.com/jcohen.htm  
COMPAQ 
US-based computer company, now part of Hewlett-Packard, that formerly 
owned the Altavista search engine and that provided financial support for 
ICANN during the start-up phase.   
GEORGE CONRADES  
An ICANN Director from 1998 to 2000, Mr Conrades is the former Chair 
and CEO of Akamai Technologies, President of GTE Internetworking and 
CEO of BBN, and a former IBM senior executive (including membership of 
IBM’s Corporate Management Board).   
CONSTITUENCIES 
As of October 2002 the ICANN Domain Name Supporting Organization 
(DNSO) consisted of the Names Council, several Constituencies and a 
General Assembly. Each constituency is self-organised. The initial 
constituencies consist are found at 
http://www.icann.org/general/support-orgs.htm.  Any group of 
individuals or entities may petition the ICANN Board for recognition as a 
new or separate constituency. 
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT 
A type of contractual agreement often used by the United States National 
Science Foundation (NSF) that facilitates cooperation between private 
organisations and the US Government for the purposes of encouraging 
development of new technology with the ultimate goal of turning that 
technology over to the private sector. Network Solutions Inc (NSI) 
entered into a cooperative agreement with the NSF in 1993 regarding 
provision of domain name registration services. The agreement was 
transferred from the NSF to the US Department of Commerce.   
COOPERATIVE RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (CRADA) 
Agreement between US Department of Commerce and ICANN found at 
http://www.icann.org/committees/dns-root/crada.htm. 
CHARLES COSTELLO 
Member of 2000 ICANN Election Committee. Vice-Chair of ICANN At-
Large Study Committee 2001. 
COUNTRY-CODE NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION (CCNSO) 
The ICANN ccNSO is one of three Supporting Organizations that assists, 
reviews and develops recommendations on Internet policy and structure 
regarding specific areas of ICANN’s activity and facilitates diverse 
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international participation in technical management of the Internet.  It 
names three Directors to the ICANN Board.  The ccNSO was established 
as part of the 15 December 2002 ICANN reforms and is can be found at 
http://www.cctld.dnso.icann.org/  
COUNTRY CODE TOP LEVEL DOMAIN 
A top level domain containing a two-character abbreviation based on the 
International Organization for Standardization Codes for the 
Representation of Names of Countries and their Subdivisions (ISO 3166-
1). As of October 2002 there were approximately 246 geographic codes 
some of which are countries, others are territories.  Some examples are 
.au for Australia, .nz for New Zealand, .de for Germany and .jp for Japan. 
ccTLDs are often contrasted with gTLDs.  ccTLDs sometimes have 
restrictive ‘presence’ or ‘close association’ registration requirements 
whereas gTLDs tend to be open to registrants across the globe. 
CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Alternative dispute resolution body authorised to provide arbitration 
under the ICANN Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).  
http://www.cpradr.org/ICANN_Menu.htm 
LORRIE FAITH CRANOR 
Researcher with AT&T, author of works on network security and privacy 
(eg P3P) and member of 2000 ICANN Election Committee 
http://lorrie.cranor.org 
GREG CREW  
ICANN Director to 2000 and Chair of 2000 ICANN Election Committee, Mr 
Crew is a former Chief Executive Officer of Mercury Communications and 
Chief Operating Officer of Hong Kong Telecommunications. 
PIERRE DANDJINOU 
Member of ICANN At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC), member of 
regional registry AFRINIC, Chair of the Internet Society’s Benin Chapter 
and member of the Advisory Committee of the Global Internet Policy 
Initiative (GIPI).  
PHILIP DAVIDSON 
ICANN Director 1999 to 2002 (selected by the Protocol Supporting 
Organization), Mr Davidson was former Head of BT Group Standards and 
a member of the European Telecommunication Standards Institute. He 
resigned from the ICANN Board on retirement from telecommunications 
group, BT.  http://www.icann.org/biog/davidson.htm 
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DELEGATION 
Authorisation, originally by Jonathan Postel, of responsibility for 
management of gTLDs and ccTLDs.  Delegation (and re-delegation) is a 
matter of significant contention.  Most ccTLD delegates do not have a 
formal agreement with ICANN or with the respective national 
government; some are located outside a national jurisdiction; some 
operate on a wholly or partly commercial basis; there have been ongoing 
disputes about who should be the delegate for particular ccTLDs.  
Australia’s .au ccTLD was formally re-delegated to .auDA on 30 October 
2001. http://www.auda.org.au/about/news/2001103002.html.   
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM 
German telecommunications group, with major fixed-line, mobile, ISP and 
ICH interests, that provided financial support (US$200,000 loan in 1999) 
for ICANN during the start-up phase.   
MOUHAMET DIOP 
ICANN Director and member of ICANN Internationalised Domain Names 
(IDN) Committee 2001. 
CHRIS DISSPAIN 
Chief Executive of .au Domain Administration Ltd, the manager of the 
Australian ccTLD.  http://www.auda.org.au/about/officers.htm. 
DOMAIN NAME 
An addressing construct used for identifying and locating devices on the 
Internet.  Domain names provide a system of easy-to-remember Internet 
addresses, which can be translated by the DNS into the numeric 
addresses, IP numbers, used by the network.  A domain name is 
hierarchical and often conveys information about the type of entity using 
the domain name. A domain name is simply a label that represents a 
domain, which is a subset of the total domain name space.  Domain 
names at the same level of the hierarchy must be unique. Thus, for 
example, there can be only one .com at the top level of the hierarchy and 
only one networksolutions.com at the next level of the hierarchy. 
DOMAIN NAME REGISTRATION INDUSTRY (DNRI) 
Commercial and other entities engaged in the provision of domain name 
registry, registration and ancillary services such as domain name 
registration dispute arbitrators and domain name valuers.  
DOMAIN NAME SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION (DNSO) 
Prior to 15 December 2002 the DNSO was a Supporting Organization of 
ICANN (that is, one of the entities that assist, review and develop 
recommendations on Internet policy and structure regarding specific 
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areas of ICANN’s activity and that facilitate diverse international 
participation in technical management of the Internet). It advised the 
ICANN Board regarding DNS policy issues. The DNSO comprised a Names 
Council consisting of representatives of Constituencies elected by those 
Constituencies and a General Assembly consisting of all interested 
individuals and entities. Its responsibilities are now shared by the ccNSO 
and GNSO. http://www.icann.org/dnso/dnso.htm   
DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM (DNS) 
A distributed database of information that is used to translate IP numbers 
into domain names which find devices connected to the Internet.  People 
working on computers around the globe maintain their specific portion of 
this database and the data held in each portion of the database is made 
available to all computers and users on the Internet. The DNS comprises 
computers, data files, software and people working together. 
DRAFTING COMMITTEES 
Drafting committees are volunteer groups of the Domain Name 
Supporting Organization General Assembly members established by the 
DNSO Names Council to carry out its consensus-building responsibility.  
Each recognised DNSO Constituency is able to participate in any drafting 
committee or other taskforces. 
PAVAN DUGGAL  
Member of 1998 ICANN Advisory Committee on Membership.   
ESTHER DYSON 
Director and Chair of ICANN to 2000.  Member of ICANN At-Large 
Advisory Committee (ALAC) 2003.  New economy entrepreneur, former 
securities analyst and reporter for Forbes magazine, founder of the 
Russian Software Market Association, Director of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and Global Business Network, author of Release 2.0.  
http://www.edventure.com 
CLEMENT DZIDONU 
A Professor in the Computer Science Department at Ghana’s Valley View 
University and consultant to the United Nations Development Programme, 
Mr Dzidonu has been a member of the ICANN At-Large Advisory 
Committee (ALAC) from 2003. He was a member of the NAIS group and 
authored the NAIS Africa Regional Study.  
ELECTRONIC NUMBERING (ENUM) 
Proposed electronic mailbox scheme to integrate voice, facsimile and e-
mail messages.  ITU discussion of ENUM technology is found at 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/enum/index.html 
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ROBERT ELZ  
Melbourne University information technology specialist who received 
delegation for the .au ccTLD from Jonathan Postel.  Responsibility for .au 
was assumed by the .au Domain Administration Ltd (.auDA) in October 
2001. 
PATRIK FÄLTSTRÖM 
Member of 2000 ICANN Election Committee 
BRET FAUSETT 
US networking specialist and ICANN critic.  
http://www.lextext.com/icann/ 
FRANK FITZSIMMONS  
An ICANN Director 1998 to 2002.  
http://www.icann.org/biog/fitzsimmons.htm 
KEN FOCKLER 
An ICANN Director from 1999 to 2001 (selected by the ASO) and member 
of 2000 ICANN Election Committee, Mr Fockler was a former Director of 
ARIN and CANARIE (a counterpart of AARNet), first Chair and President of 
the Canadian Association of Internet Providers, a member of the 1999 
WIPO domain names study and President of CA*Networking Inc.  
http://www.icann.org/biog/fockler.htm. 
FRANCE TELECOM 
French telecommunications group that provided financial support for 
ICANN during the start-up phase.   
MICHAEL FROOMKIN 
Professor of Law at University of Miami Law School.  Attracted attention 
as a writer on Internet governance, particularly as a critic of ICANN. He is 
a co-founder and animator of the ICANNWatch site.  http://www.law.tm 
MICHAEL GEIST 
Professor of Law at University of Ottawa Law School, CIRA Director, 
analyst of ccTLD practice and author of influential jurimetric studies 
regarding the UDRP. http://www.michaelgeist.com 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY (GA) 
The General Assembly was an open forum for participation in the work of 
the ICANN DNSO, now replaced by the ccNSO and the GNSO. It was 
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expected that participants in the GA would be individuals with a 
knowledge of and an interest in issues pertaining to the areas for which 
the DNSO had primary responsibility, and willingness to “contribute time, 
effort and expertise to the work of the DNSO, including work item 
proposal and development, discussion of work items, draft document 
preparation, and participation in research and drafting committees and 
working groups”. 
GENERIC NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION (GNSO) 
The ICANN GNSO is one of three Supporting Organizations entities that 
assist, review and develop recommendations on Internet policy and 
structure regarding specific areas of ICANN’s activity and that facilitate 
diverse international participation in technical management of the 
Internet.  It names three Directors to the ICANN Board.  The GNSO is the 
successor to those responsibilities of the DNSO that relate to the gTLDs.  
http://gnso.icann.org   
GENERIC TOP LEVEL DOMAIN (GTLD) 
A generic top level domain is a top level domain that is open to 
registrants around the world in contrast to country code top level 
domains that are sometimes restricted to registrants located in a 
particular country or region. .com, .net and .org are considered to be 
generic top level domains.   Recent unsponsored additions to the gTLD 
space include .biz, .info, .pro and .name.  Sponsored additions are 
.museum, .aero and .coop. 
GLOBAL INTERNET LIBERTY CAMPAIGN (GILC) 
Described by Tim Berners-Lee in Weaving the Web as “a group that has 
been laudably vocal in support of individual rights on the Net (although 
occasionally tending to throw out the baby with the bathwater)”.  
GLOBAL INTERNET PROJECT 
US-based advocacy group that represents major corporate interests.   
GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE (GAC) 
The GAC comprises appointed representatives of national governments, 
international government organizations and distinct economies.  Its 
function is to advise the ICANN Board on matters of concern to 
governments.  It operates as a forum for the discussion of government 
concerns and interests, including consumer interests. As an advisory body 
the GAC has no legal authority to act for ICANN and its advice is not 
binding on the organization. GAC meetings typically attract 
representatives of less than 30 governments and international 
organizations. Dr Paul Twomey, appointed as chief executive of ICANN in 
2003, was formerly Chair of the GAC.  http://gac.icann.org/ 
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GREEN PAPER 
A Proposal to Improve Technical Management of Internet Names & 
Addresses was prepared by the US Department of Commerce (DoC) as a 
means of making recommendations to and receiving comments from the 
Internet community about the management of the DNS. The Green Paper 
was released in January 1998, with a comment period during which DoC 
received a small number of comments from interested parties around the 
world.  In response to those comments the DoC published the policy 
statement referred to as the White Paper (see 
www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dnsdrft.htm).  See Section F – 
Supplementary Material. 
GTE INTERNETWORKING 
Arm of US telecommunications group (now part of Verizon) that provided 
financial support for ICANN during the start-up phase.   
RYOZO HAYASHI 
Member of ICANN Advisory Committee on Independent Review.   
SCOTT HEMPHILL  
Member of the ICANN Independent Review Committee 2001. 
GEOFF HUSTON 
Australian academic and later Telstra executive who formerly 
administered .au 2LDs and the AUNIC registry database on behalf of 
Robert Elz.   http://www.potaroo.net   
HOST 
Also called a name server. A computer that has both the software and the 
data (zone files) needed to resolve domain names to IP numbers.   
XUE HONG  
A member of the ICANN At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) from 2003, 
Dr Hong is an academic, senior research fellow of the Chinese Academy 
of Social Science, chair of the Asia-Pacific Top Level Domains 
Association’s Dispute Resolution Policy Committee and Chair of the Policy 
Commission of the International Forum for Internet Keyword.   
IBM 
US-based computer hardware, software and services group that provided 
financial support for ICANN during the start-up phase.   
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ICANN/NSI REGISTRY AGREEMENT 
An agreement executed on 10 November 1999 between ICANN and 
Network Solutions Inc (NSI) regarding the terms and conditions under 
which NSI was authorised to be the exclusive registry for all second-level 
domain names in the .com, .net and .org gTLDs.  
http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-agreements.htm   
INDIVIDUAL DOMAIN NAME OWNERS CONSTITUENCY (IDNO) 
Group with links to the Alternative Root industry and critical of ICANN’s 
stance on intellectual property and, more broadly, governance of the 
Internet. The group has unsuccessfully sought recognition by the ICANN 
Board and Supporting Organizations as a new constituency. Karl 
Auerbach served as its spokesman at the 1999 ICANN meeting.  
http://www.democracy.org.nz   
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE RECHERCHE EN INFOMATIQUE ET 
AUTOMATIQUE (INRIA) 
French national information technology research laboratory that co-hosts 
the W3C. 
INTERNATIONAL AD HOC COMMITTEE (IAHC) 
A US-based coalition of participants from the broad Internet community, 
working to satisfy the requirement for enhancements to the Internet’s 
global Domain Name System.  Key members were the Internet Society, 
IANA, the Internet Architecture Board, US Federal Networking Council, 
International Telecommunication Union, International Trademark 
Association and World Intellectual Property Organization.  Its participants 
were broadly at odds with those of the IFWP.  The IAHC was dissolved in 
1997, being replaced by the gTLD-MoU Policy Oversight Committee and 
the ICANN DNSO. http://www.iahc.org and http://www.gtld-mou.org   
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TOP LEVEL DOMAINS (IATLD) 
The IATLD was “founded to give voice to the concern that ICANN would 
make changes to the global governance structure of the domain name 
system without consulting the men and women from around the world 
who have built this system—the TLD administrators”.  Its 27 members 
are ccTLD managers, primarily from former Soviet Bloc republics such as 
Turkmenistan, from dependencies such as Heard & McDonald Islands and 
Pacific states. Several of those managers are in dispute with their local 
national/territorial government.  http://www.iatld.org   
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ICC) 
A Paris-based global business advocacy group, the ICC is promoted as 
“the voice of world business championing the global economy as a force 
for economic growth, job creation and prosperity” and as “the main 
business partner of the United Nations”.  It has been influential in the 
development of international business-to-business and business to 
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consumer alternative dispute resolution regimes and EDI or other 
business communication standards.  The ICC is aligned with the World 
Intellectual Property Organization and content industry bodies as an 
advocate of protection for intellectual property.  http://www.iccwbo.org 
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY 
(IFPI) 
A London-based global trade group representing the music recording 
industry, with around 1,500 members. IFPI is broadly aligned with the 
World Intellectual Property Organization as an advocate of the rights of 
intellectual property owners.  Its stance regarding ICANN and—more 
broadly Internet governance—is strongly influenced by the Recording 
Industry Association of America.  http://www.ifpi.org   
INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE WHITE PAPER (IFWP) 
An ad-hoc coalition organised in June 1998 to create an international 
forum that would respond to White Paper recommendations regarding 
establishment of what became ICANN.  It embodied a minimalist view of 
ICANN’s powers and responsibilities.  Promoted as an “ad hoc coalition of 
professional, trade and educational associations”, the IFWP sought to 
sponsor a “framework of coordinated international meetings, to be held 
around the world, at which stakeholders will discuss the transition to 
private sector management of the technical administration of Internet 
names and numbers”.  It appears to have attracted around 1,000 
participants but went into abeyance with the establishment of ICANN. 
http://list.ifwp.org   
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE (IIPA) 
A coalition of US copyright industry organizations (in particular the 
software, music and film/video industries) established in 1984 to 
encourage international protection of intellectual property, in particular 
through agreements such as TRIPS, bilateral trade negotiations (including 
Section 201 watch-listing by the US Federal Trade Representative) and 
representations to bodies such as ICANN. The IIPA is a participant in 
ICANN Intellectual Property Constituency discussions.  
http://www.iipa.com   
INTERNATIONALISED DOMAIN NAMES (IDN) 
Second level domain names in non-ASCII character sets, for example, in 
Chinese, Japanese, Arabic and Portuguese. The technical challenges for 
development of standards regarding such multilingual names are 
substantial; work on IDN reflects uptake of the Internet by users in Asia, 
the Middle East and elsewhere. Although attracting little attention from 
Western civil society groups, ICANN activity regarding IDNs has been 
controversial because some schemes have been perceived as advantaging 
particular commercial interests. 
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO) 
Geneva-based agency of the United Nations, concerned to harmonise and 
foster the development of national, regional and international standards. 
It is influenced by government and industry standards bodies in the 
advanced economies, for example, the US American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI), the International Electronic Commission (IEC) and 
European Telecommunications Standardization Institute (ETSI). The ISO 
3166 Maintenance Agency is responsible for the two-character 
alphabetical code (3166-1 list) used for most ccTLDs.  http://www.iso.int 
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION (ITU) 
The ITU is a Geneva-based agency of the United Nations concerned with 
the coordination by governments and the private sector of global 
telecommunication networks and services.  Its relationship with ICANN is 
similar to that of the World Intellectual Property Organization and the 
World Trade Organization, memorably characterised by Peter Drahos as a 
tango where no one is sure who’ll end up on top.  The ITU was a key 
member of the IAHC and signatory to the gTLD-Memorandum of 
Understanding, participates in ICANN’s Governmental Advisory 
Committee and hosted the 2003 international workshop on ccTLDs.  Its 
stance on ICANN reflects differing perceptions of DNS as management of 
a global numbering resource that has escaped from traditional 
telecommunication service providers and regulators. http://www.itu.int   
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION (INTA) 
A global organization of trademark owners and advisors dating from 
1878, headquartered in New York, deploying substantial expertise. INTA 
has been instrumental in the development of national trademark 
legislation and enforcement standards.  It has been prominent in regional 
and global trade negotiations (for example, GATT and TRIPS) and in the 
ICANN Trademark, Intellectual Property & Anti-Counterfeiting Interests 
Constituency.  http://www.inta.org 
INTERNET ARCHITECTURE BOARD (IAB) 
Initially established as the Internet Activities Board, the IAB is a non-
government and non-commercial body “of researchers and professionals 
with a technical interest in the health and evolution of the Internet 
system”.  It oversees the Internet standards-making process (in 
particular through direction to the Internet Engineering Task Force). The 
IAB is formally the “coordinating committee for Internet design, 
engineering and management”.   http://www.iab.org   
INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY (IANA) 
Originally established by Jonathan Postel and which oversees registration 
for various Internet Protocol parameters, such as port numbers, protocol 
and enterprise numbers, options, codes and types.  The IANA function is 
currently located at the Information Sciences Institute at the University of 
Southern California in Marina Del Rey and functions under the direction of 
ICANN.  ICANN has responsibility for the IANA function under a contract 
 xxiv 
with the US Department of Commerce in effect from 9 February 2000.  
Under ICANN, the IANA continues to distribute addresses to the Regional 
Internet Registries, to coordinate with the IETF and others regarding the 
assignment of protocol parameters and to oversee the operation of the 
DNS. http://www.iana.org   
INTERNET CONTENT HOST (ICH) 
An entity that specialises in hosting online content; in particular ICH’s 
host web servers on a commercial basis that contain hypertext, video, 
music and other files accessed over the Internet.  Many Internet Service 
Providers serve as ICHs. 
INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS 
(ICANN) 
An international not-for-profit private sector organization created to 
coordinate four key functions for the Internet: the management of the 
Domain Name System, the allocation of IP address space, the assignment 
of protocol parameters and the management of the root server system. 
Milton Mueller’s 2002 Dancing the Quango characterises ICANN as “an 
emergent international regulatory regime, analogous in its powers and 
modes of regulation to the [US] Federal Communications Commission, 
except that its authority is global rather than national in scope”.  
http://www.icann.org 
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE (IETF) 
An international voluntary body consisting of network designers, 
engineers, researchers, vendors and other interested individuals who 
work together to address and resolve technical and operational problems 
on the Internet and develop Internet standards and protocols.  
Membership is open to interested individuals.  The IETF was formed by 
the IAB and meets three times per year.  The bulk of collaboration and 
work takes place on the various mailing lists maintained by its 
participants. http://www.ietf.org 
INTERNET 
The global network of networks, based on two standard protocols, 
Internet Protocol and Transmission Control Protocol, concerned with the 
exchange of data between computers and other devices (for example 
some personal digital assistants and mobile phones) through wire and 
wireless infrastructure. The World Wide Web is a subset of the Internet 
and, as of April 2002, probably accounts for under half the data 
transmitted over the Internet.   
INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP) NUMBER  
A unique numeric identifier used to specify hosts and networks. Internet 
Protocol (IPv4) numbers are part of the global standardized scheme for 
identifying devices that are connected to the Internet. Technically 
speaking, IP numbers are 32 bit addresses that consist of four octets. 
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They are expressed as four numbers between 0 and 255, separated by 
periods, for example 198.41.0.52.  IP allocation for the Americas, the 
Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa is currently handled by ARIN.  IP 
allocation for Europe is currently handled by RIPE. IP allocation for the 
Asia-Pacific region is currently handled by APNIC.  IPv6 numbers are less 
human friendly and reinforce the need for memorable domain names. 
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER (ISP) 
An entity that provides Internet connectivity, using fixed/wireless 
infrastructure that it owns or that is leased from another entity (typically 
a telephone company or cable television service operator). For most 
consumers the ISP is their gateway to cyberspace. Many ISPs host 
Internet content, in particular web sites, and offer other services such as 
a retail presence for domain registrars.  Major ISPs such as WorldCom, 
AOL, Deutsche Telekom and UUNET generate significant revenue (from 
several million customers, sometimes located over several continents) 
and were instrumental in ICANN’s early budget grants through unsecured 
loans and other assistance.   
INTERNET SOCIETY (ISOC) 
An international organization, which includes national and local chapters, 
such as Australia’s ISOC-AU, concerned with global cooperation and 
coordination of the Internet.  Membership of ISOC is open to interested 
individuals.  It has around 17,000 members around the world as of March 
2003 with significant growth since 2000.  The organization has been 
characterised as a trustee of the Internet, encapsulated in its slogan that 
“the Internet is for everyone”, and an embodiment of online civil society. 
Most members are believed to have a technical background.  
http://www.isoc.org 
INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTRE (INTERNIC) 
InterNIC was the name given to a project that originated in 1993 under a 
cooperative agreement with the NSF enabling Network Solutions Inc to 
provide domain name registration services in .com, .net, .org and .edu.  
The InterNic name is a registered service mark of the US Department of 
Commerce (initially registered by AT&T) and is no longer used by 
Network Solutions for its services.  InterNic is currently the name of a 
web site of the US Department of Commerce to provide public 
information regarding Internet domain name registration services.  
http://www.internic.net 
IP  
see Internet Protocol Number and IP Address. The initials are often used 
as shorthand for intellectual property rights (IPR) 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPR) 
Legislation and practice regarding respect for creators of and commercial 
exploitation of the property of the mind.  Intellectual property embraces 
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industrial property, for example, trademarks and patents and copyright.  
The global intellectual property regime consists of a set of international 
agreements that seek to harmonise national legislation concerned with 
intellectual property practice.  For example, registration requirements and 
provisions that seek to balance the rights of copyright owners and users 
within individual national jurisdictions.  Disagreements about IPR have 
been a central feature of debate about ICANN’s responsibility, operation 
and legitimacy.  ICANN has been a theatre for the interaction of hopes 
and anxieties regarding such matters as free speech, the nature of brands 
in a digital economy and the viability of models for the online distribution 
or protection of music and other content. 
OLIVIER ITEANU 
Member of the ICANN Independent Review Committee 2001. 
JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE 
US corporate law firm used by ICANN.  See also Joe Sims & Louis Touton 
KANCHANA KANCHANASUT  
Member of 1998 ICANN Advisory Committee on Membership.   
DANIEL KAPLAN 
Member of 1998 ICANN Advisory Committee on Membership.   
MASANOBU KATOH 
ICANN Director (At-Large) from 2000, Mr Katoh is an executive with the 
Fujitsu information technology group and Chair of the Electronic 
Commerce Committee of the Forum for the Global Information 
Infrastructure (GIIC) and Internet Law & Policy Forum (ILPF). He was 
formerly the Asia-Pacific representative of the business constituency on 
the Names Council of the DNSO.  http://www.mkatoh.net 
ETHAN KATSH 
US legal scholar and member of ICANN Advisory Committee on 
Independent Review.   
HANS KLEIN 
US academic at the University of Syracuse and one of the animators of 
the NGO & Academic ICANN Study (NAIS). 
JOHN KLENSIN  
AT&T engineer, Member of the 2000 ICANN Nominating Committee and of 
ICANN IDN Committee 2001.  Author of influential IETF Requests for 
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Comment found at 
http://www.networksorcery.com/enp/authors/KlensinJohnC.htm 
HANS KRAAIJENBRINK 
ICANN Director from 1998, member of 2000 ICANN Election Committee, 
senior executive with the Netherlands posts and telecommunications 
group KPN.  Also former executive in the Netherlands public service and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Telecommunications 
Network Operators association (ETNO).   
SANG-HYON KYONG  
An ICANN Director from 2000 (selected by the ASO), a former Minister of 
Information & Communication, former senior executive with Korea 
Telecom and President of Korea’s Electronics & Telecommunications 
Research Institute, Dr Kyong is a Professor of telecommunications 
management & policy and Governor of the International Council for 
Computer Communication.  
SIEGFRIED LANGENBACH 
Member of 1998 ICANN Advisory Committee on Membership.  Active in 
Registrars’ Constituency. 
LATIN AMERICAN & CARIBBEAN INTERNET ADDRESSES REGISTRY 
(LACNIC) 
A non-profit membership organization and one of four Regional Internet 
Registries (RIRs) responsible for administration and registration of IP 
addresses in Central and South America.  http://lacnic.net   
LAWRENCE LESSIG  
US legal scholar whose writings about governance of cyberspace and 
intellectual property, in particular Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 
(1999), has influenced debate about ICANN and domain name 
administration.  http://www.lessig.org/ 
CHING-YI LIU 
Member of the ICANN Independent Review Committee 2001. 
STUART LYNN 
ICANN President and Chief Executive Officer 2001-03.  Dr Lynn held 
senior research and administrative positions with IBM, Rice University, 
Cornell University and the University of California, Berkeley.  He served 
as an initial Director of the US national Internet2 consortium, as CIO of 
the University of California System and first President and Chair of 
California’s CENIC academic networking consortium. 
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IRA MAGAZINER 
Author and former senior policy advisor in the Clinton Administration, 
where he was closely associated with proposals to restructure the US 
health system and with the transition to non-government management of 
the DNS.  
ANDREW MCLAUGHLIN  
Interim ICANN Secretary (1999), Chief Financial Officer (1999-2001), 
Vice-President 2001-2002.  Also a Fellow at the Berkman Center for 
Internet and Society.  http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/mclaughlin.html 
MARKLE FOUNDATION 
Headed by former Clinton Attorney-General nominee Zöe Baird and funds 
activity regarding the ICANN At-Large Membership and Council amongst 
other projects.  For Markle Foundation, http://www.markle.org and for Ms 
Baird,  http://www.markle.org/about/_about_staffbio_baird.stm 
MCI WORLDCOM 
US-based global telecommunications group that provided financial 
support (US$500,000 loan in 1999) for ICANN during the start-up phase.   
MELBOURNE IT (MIT) 
Australian domain name registrar that has expanded its market to 
achieve a global presence.  Spun-off from University of Melbourne as sole 
registrar for the .com 2LD within Australia’s .au space.  Also sells .com, 
.net, .org and .biz gTLDs.  It is consistently ranked in the top ten gTLD 
registrars.  Introduction of competition in registrar services following the 
establishment of .auDA means that Melbourne IT is no longer the sole 
.com.au registrar, although its market share is believed to be over 40%.  
http://www.melbourneit.com.au 
MEMBERSHIP ADVISORY COMMITTEE (MAC) 
ICANN committee concerned with development of At-Large Constituency. 
http://www.icann.org/committees/membership/  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) 
1998 Agreement between US Department of Commerce (DoC) and ICANN 
recognising the latter and dealing with the transition of responsibility for 
technical coordination of some Internet functions from the US 
Government to the private sector.  The MOU involves provision by ICANN 
of reports to the DoC concerning its activities.  
http://www.icann.org/general/agreements.htm 
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METADATA 
Literally information about information, metadata on the Web consists of 
information embedded within or associated with an online resource, such 
as a Web page or music file, to identify that resource. It is used by some 
search engines to find online resources and rank those resources when 
displaying search results.  There are no universally accepted standards 
for metadata structures and quality; comprehensive metadata is found on 
only a small portion of the Web, primarily sites maintained by major 
government and cultural institutions.   
STEVEN METALITZ  
Intellectual property advocate and Chair of ICANN Trademark, Intellectual 
Property & Anti-Counterfeiting Interests Constituency. 
MICROSOFT 
US software group, with a dominant presence in the personal computer 
and browser markets, that provided financial support for ICANN during 
the start-up phase.   
MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION (MPA) 
The MPA, under high-profile executive Jack Valenti, serves as a trade 
body for the international motion picture and video production and 
distribution industry.  The MPA has operated in tandem with the 
Recording Industry Association of America in identifying intellectual 
property as a commodity of national importance, requiring new national 
and global legislation and strengthened practice regarding the Internet.  
Its concerns embrace both illicit online dissemination of content and 
perceptions that its member’s interests are being damaged through 
domain names, for example, names that tarnish brands or signal that 
content is available for illicit use.  Those concerns have been reflected in 
US Section 201 Watchlisting. http://www.mpaa.org   
MILTON MUELLER 
Syracuse University-based Dr Mueller is the author of the influential 
Ruling The Root and a range of studies about ICANN, the UDRP and 
Internet governance.  http://istweb.syr.edu/~mueller/   
ANDY MÜLLER-MAGUHN  
ICANN Director (At-Large, Europe) from 2000, Mr Müller-Maguhn is a 
journalist and member of Germany’s Chaos Computer Club.  
http://www.ccc.de/%Eandy/ 
JUN MURAI  
An ICANN Director from 1998 and Chair of ICANN Root Server System 
Advisory Committee, Dr Murai is a Japanese academic (computer science 
 xxx 
at Keio University), President of JPNIC, Vice President of the Japanese 
Internet Association and Vice Chair of the Internet Society’s Japan 
Chapter. 
CHARLES MUSISI 
Member of 2003 ICANN Nominating Committee. 
NAMESECURE 
US registrar that provided financial support for ICANN during the start-up 
phase.   
NAME SERVER 
Also called a host. A computer that has both the software and the data 
(zone files) needed to resolve domain names to IP numbers. 
NAME SERVICE 
Providing individuals and organisations with domain name-to-Internet 
Protocol number resolution by maintaining and making available the 
hardware, software and data needed to perform that function.  Many ISPs 
operate name servers and provide their customers with name service 
when they register a domain name.  Most individuals are not in a position 
to operate a name server on their own and therefore make arrangements 
for name service with an ISP or similar organisation. 
NAMES COUNCIL (NC) 
The Names Council is a part of the DNSO, one of three supporting 
Organizations for ICANN.  It consists of three representatives from each 
DNSO constituency recognised by the ICANN Board, with the temporary 
exception of the gTLD Registry Constituency that currently only has one 
representative.  The NC is responsible for management of the consensus 
building process of the DNSO. 
NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM (NAF) 
US alternative dispute resolution body authorised to provide arbitration 
services under ICANN’s UDRP.   
NATIONAL OFFICE FOR THE INFORMATION ECONOMY (NOIE) 
Australian Federal Government agency within the portfolio of 
Communications, Information Technology & the Arts, Minister Senator 
Richard Alston.  NOIE is charged with facilitation of the Internet economy 
through information sharing, grants programs and development of an 
appropriate regulatory framework that encompasses matters such as 
online accessibility, censorship, privacy and security, whether 
independently or in conjunction with agencies inside/outside the portfolio.  
Formerly headed by Dr Paul Twomey, NOIE facilitated the establishment 
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of .auDA and formerly provided the secretariat for the GAC.  
http://www.noie.gov.au   
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION (NTIA) 
An agency of the US Federal Department of Commerce (DoC), the 
Executive Branch’s principal voice on domestic and international 
telecommunications and information technology issues. NTIA is the DoC 
agency that manages the Cooperative Agreement with Network Solutions 
Inc and the MoU with ICANN   http://www.ntia.doc.gov 
NETSCAPE 
US browser company, now part of the AOL Time Warner conglomerate, 
that provided financial support for ICANN during the start-up phase.  
Netscape’s dominance of the global browser market has shrunk to around 
6%.  http://www.netscape.com   
NETWORK SOLUTIONS INC (NSI) 
An arm of the network security and domain name services group, 
VeriSign, that includes gTLD and ccTLD Registry and Registrar operations.  
NSI was formerly the monopoly registry operator for the .com, .org and 
.net gTLDs.  It was acquired by VeriSign in 2000 for around US$21 billion 
and included in a subsequent write down of assets by US$16 billion after 
disappointment over ownership of ‘cyberspace’s largest toll booth’.  
Criticisms of NSI-VeriSign’s exploitation of its privileged position were 
echoed in industry comments about MelbourneIT, its counterpart in the 
.au ccTLD.  http://www.verisign.com   
NEW.NET 
New.Net has been the leading commercial Alternative Root scheme. 
Established by high-profile US incubator IdeaLab, it sought to generate 
revenue by spawning a wide range of proprietary gTLDs (eg .law, .med, 
.mp3 and .xxx) that are independent of what ICANN President Stuart 
Lynn characterised as the ‘Unique Authoritative Root’ and may thus 
involve problems with domain name collisions and non-receipt of 
electronic mail.  Ongoing uptake of those gTLDs by individuals and 
organizations is uncertain, irrespective of New.Net’s release of a paper on 
The Role of Market-Based Principles in Domain Name Governance.  
http://www.new.net   
HUU DONG NGUYEN 
Member of 2000 ICANN Election Committee. 
NOMINET 
Oxford-based administrator of the .uk ccTLD, formerly headed by Dr 
Willie Black.  Nominet is the British counterpart of Australia’s .auDA and 
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Canada’s CIRA and is a non-government organisation that aspires to 
represent the UK Internet community in managing the national domain 
space.  In contrast to .auDA, it does not have a formal agreement with 
ICANN, has been concerned to assert its independence of both ICANN and 
the UK government, and has been publicly critical of ICANN as a body 
that is overly influenced by gTLD (implicitly US) interests at the expense 
of ccTLD (particularly European ccTLD) managers.  
http://www.nominet.org.uk 
NON-COMMERCIAL DOMAIN NAME HOLDERS CONSTITUENCY 
(NCDNHC) 
The NCDNHC was a constituency group of the ICANN Domain Name 
Supporting Organization, reflecting expectations that the DNSO should 
encompass the views and interests of not-for-profit organisations and 
individual registrants.  Those expectations were evident in statements by 
the Internet Society, in successive At-Large initiatives and in arguments 
by independent bodies, however representative, such as IDNO. As part of 
the ICANN structural changes announced in December 2002 the NCDNHC 
is being rebadged as the Non-Commercial Users Constituency (NCUC) for 
the GNSO.  http://www.ncdnhc.org   
NOVELL 
US networking company that provided financial support for ICANN during 
the start-up phase.  As first major vendor of networking software for 
personal computers, Novell drove move towards PCs on standalone 
networks as a critical step towards widespread Internet use. 
NTT COMMUNICATIONS 
Japanese telecommunications group that provided financial support for 
ICANN during the start-up phase.   
OPEN ROOT SERVER CONFEDERATION (ORSC) 
An informal organization of Alternative Root operators and advocates. 
YUN PARK 
Member of the ICANN Independent Review Committee 2001. 
ALEJANDRO PISANTY  
Director and Vice-Chair (from 2000) of ICANN.  Dr Pisanty is Director of 
Computing Services at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and 
a Professor in the Graduate School of Chemistry.  He is Chair of the 
Mexican Internet 2 Consortium and President of the Internet Society’s 
Mexico Chapter. He was selected for the ICANN Board by the former 
DNSO.   
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JORGE PLANO  
Member of ICANN Advisory Committee on Independent Review.   
ELISABETH PORTENEUVE  
Member of ICANN Internationalised Domain Names (IDN) Committee 
2001.  Very active in the ccTLD Constituency for .fr and other French 
speaking country code administrators.   
JONATHAN POSTEL  
Jon Postel, remembered in Vint Cerf’s October 1998 RFC (2468) as “our 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, friend, engineer, confidant, leader, 
icon and … first of the giants to depart from our midst … the foundation 
on which our every web search and e-mail was built” and, by a less 
reverent observer, as “the ultimate übergeek”.  Postel was a US computer 
engineer at the USC Information Sciences Institute who served as the 
administrator of IANA.  Dr Postel was a founding member of the Internet 
Architecture Board and of the Internet Society (of which he was also a 
Trustee), custodian of the .us ccTLD and editor of the RFC series.  Dr 
Postel delegated responsibility for ccTLDs to respective trustees such as 
Australia’s Robert Elz and was closely involved in the discussions that led 
to the establishment of ICANN.   
PROTOCOL SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION (PSO) 
The former ICANN Supporting Organization concerned with ”the 
assignment of unique parameters for Internet Protocols, the technical 
standards that let computers exchange information and manage 
communications over the Internet”. The PSO’s members were standards 
development organizations. The PSO ceased to operate, as part of the 15 
December 2002 ICANN structural reforms, and its members now provide 
advice to ICANN with facilitation by the Technical Liaison Group.  
http://www.pso.icann.org   
PSINET 
A major US Internet service provider (acquired by Cogent following the 
dot-com crash) that provided financial support for ICANN during the 
start-up phase.  http://www.psinet.com   
NII QUAYNOR  
ICANN Director (At-Large, Africa Region) of ICANN from 2000.  Dr 
Quaynor gained engineering and computer science qualifications in the 
US, working for Digital Equipment before returning to Ghana where he 
was active in the telecommunications industry and established the 
Computer Science Department at the University of Cape-Coast. Among 
other affiliations he is Chair of the Organization of African Unity Internet 
Task Force, a member of the ITU Telecom Board, President of Internet 
Society’s Ghana Chapter and Chair of AfriNic. He was a member of 1998 
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ICANN Advisory Committee on Membership.  
http://www.ncs.com.gh/Quaynor.htm   
QUILCAP 
New York-based high technology fund that provided financial support for 
ICANN during the start-up phase.   
REALNAMES INC 
A US keywords service, matching keywords to IP addresses and 
bypassing the domain names that ceased operation in 2002.  Its demise 
has been attributed by some observers to lack of sustained venture 
capital interest and indifference by Microsoft, owner of the dominant web 
browser, as incorporation of RealNames into Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 
was instrumental for the scheme’s success. http://www.realnames.com 
RECONSIDERATION COMMITTEE 
An ICANN Committee concerned with review of policy and administrative 
decisions by the ICANN Board, for example the publication of policy 
documents and the decision to award a new gTLD.  Review poses 
particular governance challenges, given ICANN’s status as an 
international non-government Organization that is not established by a 
global agreement to which most governments are signatories on a multi-
lateral basis.   
RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (RIAA) 
Headed by Hilary Rosen, the RIAA is a trade group that represents the US 
music recording industry and embraces the dominant twenty groups 
across the globe.  The RIAA, along with the film and video industry MPAA, 
has sought to position itself as the vanguard of the ‘copyright-industrial 
complex’ in protection of copyright from illicit online use, employing both 
intellectual property code and software code against intermediaries and 
end-users.  Advocacy by the RIAA was instrumental in passage of the US 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act.  
The RIAA has been a presence at most ICANN meetings and active within 
the Trademark, Intellectual Property & Anti-Counterfeiting Interests 
Constituency.  http://www.riaa.org 
REGIONAL INTERNET REGISTRIES (RIRS) 
The four regional registries, APNIC, ARIN, RIPE and LACNIC, are non-
profit organisations responsible for distributing IP addresses on a regional 
level to Internet service providers and local registries.  They accordingly 
serve as intermediaries between those entities and IANA. 
REGISTRANT 
The individual or organisation that registers a specific domain name with 
a registrar.  That individual or organisation holds the right to use the 
specific domain name for a specified period of time, provided certain 
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conditions are met and any registration fees are paid. The person or 
organisation is the legal entity bound by the terms of the domain name 
registration agreement with the registrar, whether directly or through a 
registrar’s reseller.  For example, .auDA’s registrar agreement and the 
mandatory Code of Practice can be found at 
http://www.auda.org.au/policy/. 
REGISTRAR 
A domain name registrar provides name registration services to domain 
name registrants, serving as the liaison between the domain name 
registry and the registrant. The registrar database contains customer 
information in addition to the DNS information contained in the Registry 
database.  Registrars process name registrations for Internet end-users 
and then send the necessary DNS information to a Registry for entry into 
a centralised Registry database and ultimate propagation over the 
Internet.  Most gTLDs and ccTLDs involve multiple registrars. Many 
registrars use agents, such as ISPs, website builders and lawyers, in 
retailing their services to registrants. ICANN’s accredited registrars are 
listed at http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html. 
REGISTRAR WHOIS 
A searchable database maintained by registrars that contains information 
about networks, networking organisations, domain names and the 
contacts associated with them for the gTLDs and ccTLDs.  Also the 
protocol or set of rules that describes the application used to access the 
database. Each registrar implements the Whois protocol and maintains a 
separate distinct Whois database for its respective domain name 
registrations.   
REGISTRY 
An Internet domain name registry is an entity that receives DNS 
information from domain name registrars, inserts that information into a 
centralised database and propagates that information in Internet zone 
files on the Internet so that domain names can be found by users around 
the world via applications such as the World Wide Web and e-mail. 
Different registries are run on a commercial or not-for-profit basis by 
registry operators.   
REGISTRY REGISTRAR PROTOCOL (RRP) 
A protocol for the registration and management of second level domain 
names and associated name servers in both gTLDs and ccTLDs. 
REGISTRY WHOIS 
The authoritative Whois service for second level domain names (2LDs) in 
a particular gTLD, ccTLD or 2LD within a ccTLD.   
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REQUEST FOR COMMENT (RFC) 
The RFC series, devised by US network engineer Steve Crocker and 
initially edited by IANA chief Jonathan Postel, is a mechanism for the 
exchange of information and development of standards regarding 
Internet architecture.  Some RFCs have a narrowly technical focus; 
others, such as Vinton Cerf’s 1998 obituary for Postel, have a broader 
interest. Publication of a document in the series does not signify that a 
proposal has been accepted by the IETF.  It means, instead, progress 
towards the ‘rough consensus and running code’ emphasised by the 
founders of the Internet.   
RESALE 
In some gTLDs, notably .com and some ccTLDs, it is possible to trade the 
right to use a domain name.  The resale market has contributed to the 
growth of a vigorous domain name services industry (including domain 
name auction services and large-scale ‘pre-registration’ services.  Resale 
has also, however, been criticised as encouraging cyber-squatting and 
inappropriate speculative registration. The Australian regime specifically 
prohibits resale of .au domain names.   
RÉSEAUX IP EUROPÉENS (RIPE) 
A non-profit membership organisation responsible for administration and 
registration of IP addresses in Europe, the Middle East, Equatorial Africa 
and Central Asia.  http://www.ripe.net   
RESOLVE 
The process whereby domain names are matched with their 
corresponding IP numbers.  Resolution is accomplished by a combination 
of hardware and software, referred to as name servers, that use the data 
in the DNS to determine which IP numbers correspond to a particular 
domain name.   
SEBASTIÁN J RICCIARDI  
Appointed as a member of ICANN At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) in 
2003, Mr Ricciardi is an Argentinian businessman with a background in 
information technology.  
MICHAEL M ROBERTS  
Mr Roberts was Deputy Director of Information Technology Services at 
Stanford University, a founder and first Executive Director of the Internet 
Society, and Vice President of the US EDUCOM tertiary education IT and 
networking consortium. From October 1998 to March 2001 he was 
ICANN’s President and Chief Executive Officer. 
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OSCAR ROBLES GARAY  
Chair of the Registration Facility for .mx, Mr Robles Garay was a member 
of the IATLD, of the World Wide Alliance of Top Level Domains (WWTLD) 
and a member of the 1998 ICANN Advisory Committee on Membership.   
THOMAS ROESSLER  
Appointed as a member of the ICANN At-Large Advisory Committee 
(ALAC) in 2003, Roessler had earlier been involved in the 2000 At-Large 
elections and has been active in the icannatlarge.com initiative. He was 
Chair of the DNSO General Assembly from early 2002 and a GA delegate 
to the DNSO WHOIS Task Force. Mr Roessler’s weblog has attracted 
attention for its coverage of ICANN developments.  http://www.does-not-
exist-net   
ROOT 
The top of the DNS hierarchy often referred to as the ‘dot’. 
ROOT SERVER 
A machine that has the software and data needed to locate name servers 
that contain authoritative data for the top level domains such as .com and 
ccTLDs such as .au, .nz and .uk. The root servers are, in fact, name 
servers and contain authoritative data for the very top of the DNS 
hierarchy. Currently technical specifications limit the number of root 
servers to 13. The servers are located around the world. 
HELMUT SCHINK 
An ICANN Director from 2000 (selected by PSO), Dr Schink is Director for 
Advanced Standards at electronics giant Siemens, ITU Rapporteur for the 
Global Information Infrastructure Project, chair of the ETSI project on IP 
telephony specifications and a member of the ISOC Advisory Council.  
STRATTON SCLAVOS  
Chief Executive of VeriSign.  http://www.verisign.com 
SEARCH ENGINE 
An online service that enables users to search the World Wide Web for 
websites, individual documents or other resources. Although there are 
over 2,000 engines, most search traffic is believed to involve the top six 
engines, including Google, Altavista and Infoseek.  Engines typically 
display a hyperlinked list of search results that match a query input by a 
user, implicitly providing an index of the web.  That list is derived from a 
database generated by a web spider that had previously visited many 
sites on the web or another engine or directory.  Most engines use 
proprietary algorithms in collecting information from the web and ranking 
information for display to users.  Early engines tended to privilege sites or 
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individual web files that used domain names and file titles that matched 
the user’s search query.  That privileging was reflected in the domain 
name industry, with premium prices being paid for generic or other 
domain names (including misspelt names) that were likely to appear at 
the top of a search list and the emergence of businesses specialising in 
advising registrants (or registering for resale) for good names.  
SECOND LEVEL DOMAIN NAME (2LD) 
In the DNS, the next level of the hierarchy underneath the top level 
domains. Second level domain names are often descriptive and have 
come to be used to represent businesses and other entities on the 
Internet.  For example, in www.auda.org.au, the .org portion is the 
second level domain. 
SECURE SOCKET LAYER 
A security protocol that facilitates communications privacy over the 
Internet by allowing client/server applications to communicate in a way 
designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering or message forgery. 
WENDY SELTZER 
Member of ICANN At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) from 2003, staff 
attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Fellow at the 
Berkman Center for Internet & Society.  Ms Seltzer is associated with the 
Chilling Effects and Creative Commons projects.  
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/seltzer.html   
FRANCISCO A JESUS DA SILVA 
ICANN Director from 2003.  http://www.icann.org/biog/silva.htm  
JOE SIMS 
Served as ICANN’s outside legal counsel until 2003.  Partner at Jones, 
Day, Reavis & Pogue.  
http://www1.jonesday.com/attorneys/bio.asp?AttorneyID=13072 
START OF AUTHORITY (SOA) RESOURCE RECORD 
A type of record used in the distributed DNS database to indicate that a 
particular name server contains authoritative data for a particular 
domain. 
SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS 
ICANN’s Supporting Organizations serve as advisory bodies to the ICANN 
Board, with primary responsibility for developing and recommending 
substantive policies regarding those matters that fall within their specific 
responsibilities.  http://www.icann.org/general/support-orgs.htm 
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PETER DENGATE-THRUSH  
Very active in ccTLD Constituency, Director of ISOC NZ, NZ Barrister.  
http://www.internetnz.net.nz/biographies/bio99pdthrush.html 
TLD ZONE 
A file that contains data describing a portion of the domain name space 
for a specific top level domain (TLD).  Zone files contain the information 
needed to resolve domain names to Internet Protocol (IP) numbers. Zone 
files contain domain names, their associated name server names and the 
IP addresses for those name servers.   
TOP LEVEL DOMAIN (TLD) 
In the DNS, the highest level of the hierarchy after the root.  In a domain 
name, generally the portion of the domain name that appears furthest to 
the right, for example, .com, .net, .org, .biz, .info, .name, .pro, .coop, 
.museum, .aero.  
LOUIS TOUTON 
ICANN Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary (from 1999). 
Formerly a partner with Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue and legal counsel to 
Jonathan Postel and IANA.  http://www.icann.org/biog/touton.htm 
TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL (TCP) 
A computer protocol that allows one device to send another device a 
continuous stream of information by breaking that data into packets and 
reassembling the data at the other end, resending any packets that get 
lost in the Internet. TCP uses Internet Protocol (IP) to send the packets; 
the two are referred to as TCP/IP.   
EUGENIO TRIANA  
Dr Triana was an ICANN Director from 1998 to 2000. After an academic 
and business career he held senior positions within Spain’s civil service 
and the European Commission, where he was Deputy Director General for 
Directorate XIII.  He was President of the Licensing Executive Society’s 
Spanish Chapter 1983-90. 
PAUL TWOMEY  
Former Chief Executive of Australia’s National Office for the Information 
Economy (NOIE) and chair of the ICANN Governmental Advisory 
Committee (GAC) 1999-2002.  Dr Twomey was previously an Executive 
General Manager with Austrade, the Australian government’s trade 
promotion agency, a consultant with McKinseys and principal (in 
association with Ira Magaziner) of venture catalyst firm, ArgoPacific.  In 
contrast to most ICANN Directors, his degrees were in history and 
political science rather than network engineering or mathematics. His 
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appointment as chief executive of ICANN was announced in March 2003.  
http://www.argopacific.com/paul.htm 
UNIFORM DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (UDRP) 
A commercial alternative dispute resolution mechanism, developed by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization for ICANN to deal with 
disagreements about rights to the use of domain names in the .com, .net 
and .org gTLDs.  The UDRP has since been adopted (and adapted) for a 
range of ccTLDs and new gTLDs, for example the Australian .auDRP rules. 
The mechanism aims to provide timely and low-cost arbitration, based on 
the contract between registrars and registrants.  UDRP providers are 
independent of national trademark or other intellectual property law and 
specific cyber-squatting enactments such as ACPA, reflecting traditional 
commercial ADR regimes.  Jurimetric studies by Mueller and other 
scholars suggest that the UDRP has accentuated the shift from IP 
addresses to IPR, privileging trademark and other intellectual property 
owners at the expense of the ‘first come, first served’ domain registration 
practice in the first years of the Internet. 
UNIFORM RESOURCE LOCATOR (URL) 
An address used to locate web sites and pages or other resources on the 
Internet, for example, www.qut.edu.au is the address of the Queensland 
University of Technology.  URLS are often considered to be synonymous 
with URIs, although strictly URLs denote that the address may change.   
UNIVERSAL RESOURCE IDENTIFIER (URI)  
A string of characters, often starting with http:// used to identify anything 
on the Web. URIs are meant to be unique and permanent.   
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INFORMATION SCIENCES 
INSTITUTE (USC-ISI) 
Research and support body at the University of Southern California, host 
for Jonathan Postel and IANA.  
UUNET 
Former European telecommunications group that provided financial 
support for ICANN during the start-up phase.   
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING  
ICANN Senior Adviser 1998-99.  http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/svh.html 
JORGE VEGA  
Member of ICANN Advisory Committee on Independent Review.   
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WAIT-LISTING SERVICE 
Domain name pre-booking service from Verisign and SnapNames.  
Debate on the WLS and registry services sharply divided the Registrars’ 
Constituency.  Some of the debate can be found at 
http://www.icann.org/bucharest/dnso-deletes-report-10jun02.htm   
WHITE PAPER 
June 1998 Department of Commerce document, Statement of Policy for 
the Management of Internet Names & Addresses, in response to 
comments regarding the Green Paper published in January 1998. The 
White Paper specified that preserving the stability of the Internet should 
be the first priority of any DNS management system.  Among other things 
it called for the creation of a global not-for-profit non-government 
organisation that would eventually assume responsibility for coordinating 
four key functions for the Internet: the management of the Domain Name 
System, the allocation of IP address space, the assignment of protocol 
parameters and the management of the root server system.   
http://www.icann.org/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm 
WHOIS 
A searchable database maintained by registries and registrars that 
contains information about domain name registrations in the gTLDs and 
ccTLDs. Also the protocol that describes the application used to access 
the database.  
WHOIS SERVER 
The URL where the Whois service for a particular registry or registrar may 
be found. 
LINDA WILSON  
ICANN Director from 1998, Chair of the ICANN Finance Committee from 
2000, Chair of ICANN Board Nominating Committee 2003.  Dr Wilson is 
former President of Radcliffe College, member of the Advisory Council of 
the US National Science Foundation, a Fellow of the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science, a member of the American Chemical 
Society, and a charter member of the US National Academy of Science’s 
Government-University-Industry Roundtable.  
http://www.icann.org/biog/wilson.htm. 
PINDAR WONG  
Dr Wong was an ICANN Director from 1999 to 2000, serving as Vice-
Chairman of the Board (1999-2000). He was Vice-Chair of ICANN At-
Large Study Committee.  He is Chair of the Asia & Pacific Internet 
Association (having co-founded Hong Kong’s first licensed ISP in 1993), 
and was an Alternate Chair of the Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 
(APNIC).  http://www.icann.org/biog/wong.htm 
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WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO) 
A Geneva-based agency of the United Nations concerned with copyright 
and intellectual property, in particular the administration and 
development of global agreements such as the Berne Convention, Paris 
Convention and Rome Convention that harmonise national intellectual 
property law and practice.  WIPO’s ethos reflects perceptions of 
intellectual property as both a commercial entity and something 
intimately associated with an author’s personality.  WIPO has been 
criticised for acting as an advocate for major corporate intellectual 
property owners at the expense of ordinary consumers.  It was closely 
involved in the establishment of ICANN, particularly the development of 
the ICANN Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, widely considered to favour 
trademark owners.  WIPO’s arbitration unit has secured the bulk of 
dispute hearings under the UDRP, analysed in jurimetric studies by 
Mueller and Geist. 
WORLD WIDE WEB 
A subset of the Internet, characterised by the use of addresses such 
http://www.icann.org.  Tim Berners-Lee’s work on developing the www 
has made the Internet far more intuitive and usable for ordinary Internet 
consumers.   
WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (W3C) 
International not-for-profit organisation concerned with the development 
of standards for delivery and use of information on the Web. 
HOULIN ZHAO  
Member of the ICANN Independent Review Committee 2001.  Director of 
ITU Telecommunications Directorate.  http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ 
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN 
US legal scholar, member of 1998 ICANN Advisory Committee on 
Membership.  He is a member of the Faculty of Harvard’s Berkman 
Center. http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/zittrain.html  
ZONE FILE ACCESS AGREEMENT 
An agreement with VeriSign Global Registry Services that must be 
executed by parties requesting access to the VeriSign Global Registry TLD 
zone files.  http://www.verisign-grs.com/TLD/ 
ZONE FILES 
Files that contain data describing a portion of the domain name space for 
specific TLDs.  Zone files contain the information needed to resolve 
domain names to Internet Protocol (IP) numbers.  Zone files contain 
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domain names, their associated name server names and the IP addresses 
for those name servers. 
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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
This research has been undertaken in an active and 
applied manner with direct professional and corporate 
governance roles in the field.  The research has been guided and 
informed by real-time developments in policy, procedures, Board 
positions and corporate advisory work. 
I was an elected member of the Board of Directors for the 
.au Domain Administration Ltd in 2001 and 2002.   .auDA is 
responsible for the management of the .au country code 
registry, the conduct of registrars in Australia and the 
development of the domain name industry in Australia.4 
                                   
4 .auDA’s website is found at http://www.auda.org.au. 
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I also served as the Deputy Chair of the Board.  Prior to 
joining the Board, I was an active member of the Competition 
Model Advisory Panel that provided detailed advice to the Board 
about the nature of competition in the Australian domain name 
market. 
Whilst on the Board, I chaired the Registrar Code of 
Practice Committee that developed the mandatory Code of 
Practice for regulating registrar and re-seller conduct.   I was an 
active member of the Membership Sub-Committee, responsible 
for determining a new membership structure, fees and charges 
for membership and member benefits. 
At an international level, I have been active in the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers Registrars’ 
Constituency working on diverse issues such as the development 
of policies for the transfer and deletion of domain names and the 
development of policy on new registry services.  In addition, I 
conducted a comprehensive review of the Registrars’ 
Constituency By-Laws to enable the Constituency to work more 
effectively. 
I have also been involved in the ccTLD constituency as a 
member of the .auDA Board.  I am on the Christmas Island .cx 
Policy Advisory Board and assisted the DOT CX Corporation with 
their negotiations with the Commonwealth of Australia and 
ICANN on key re-delegation issues. 
I have advised the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat on 
DNS governance issues and opportunities for Pacific nations to 
participate more actively in ICANN processes and activities. 
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SECTION A – THESIS MECHANICS 
The section sets out the mechanics of the dissertation and 
provides a guide to the structure of the research. It outlines the 
research methodology employed and the content of each 
chapter.  The chapters are designed as discrete but connected 
portions of the work, examining the hypotheses from different 
perspectives.  Several of the chapters have been submitted to 
academic journals and are under review.  Much of the work has 
been the subject of conference proceedings and has benefited 
from commentary from both corporate and academic colleagues.  
This section also provides some historical and contextual 
materials to place the research in a limited timeframe and within 
the literature. 
The bulk of the research has been undertaken 
independently and off campus.  It has been completed in a 
completely practical way with intimate involvement in both the 
management and commercialisation of Internet resources in 
Australia and overseas. 
Whilst the research has been undertaken in the Faculty of 
Information Technology’s School of Software Engineering and 
Data Communication, it is not a technical treatise about Domain 
Name System5 engineering.  It does not consider the impact of, 
for example, the proposed transition from Internet Protocol 
version 4 (IPv4) to Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6).  It does 
                                   
5 “The Domain Name System is an Internet service that translates domain names into IP 
addresses. Because domain names are alphabetic, they're easier to remember. The 
Internet however, is really based on IP addresses. Every time you use a domain name, 
therefore, a DNS service must translate the name into the corresponding IP address. For 
example, the domain name www.example.com might translate to 198.105.232.4.   The 
DNS system is, in fact, its own network. If one DNS server doesn't know how to 
translate a particular domain name, it asks another one, and so on, until the correct IP 
address is returned.” http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/DNS.html 
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not consider the implications of including multilingual domain 
names nor does it consider in technical detail the deliberations 
of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). 
It does, however, bring the impact of technical discussions 
and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Number’s 
(ICANN) mandate to manage the DNS, into the realm of both 
political science and public policy development.  The research 
takes account of a highly political, commercially sensitive 
environment in which the technical standards for operating the 
Internet exist.  Without those standards and the governance 
associated with determining those standards, the Internet will 
not work effectively.   
The research demonstrates a convergence of technical 
standards, corporate intent, government policy and the 
privatisation of regulation in a global electronic marketplace.  
It is an examination of the impact of the development of a 
set of global technical standards that has moved from the 
private technocrat world6 to the public corporate sphere.   
Discussions about what is private and public; what is 
private sector and public sector; what is national government 
and international governance and what is public infrastructure 
and private commerce run through the work.   
The battle continues for control of more robust and 
formalised regulation within ICANN.  The recommendations of 
                                   
6 I have called this the ‘Postel Apostle’ phenomena.  Dr Jonathan Postel and his volunteers 
who took responsibility for various portions of the root were, and some still are, 
technical specialists who maintained the integrity of the DNS.  The Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) still closely approximates the way in which, in a collaborative way, 
Requests for Comment (RFCs) were developed and published.  The shift away from 
technocrat volunteers, for example, in Australia, provides some of the most interesting 
material with which to analyse the impact of the globalisation of regulation, the 
corporatisation of regulatory structures and the effect of the dramatic commercialisation 
of the Internet, characterised here by the development of a commodity industry for the 
sale of domain names. 
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the Evolution and Reform Committee7 are not fully implemented 
but will affect the future governance of ICANN.  There are clear 
expectations from a wide range of participants, from both the 
corporate and government sector alike, that the rules of play in 
the new regulatory game of DNS governance will be 
strengthened.  This is evidenced by moves towards reform that 
took place after the bulk of the research here was completed.  
More predictable regulatory outcomes are required to 
engender continued confidence in a regulatory experiment that 
supports the shift to private sector regulation of the ubiquitous 
commercialised technical assets that enable the Internet to 
function. 
Chapter Outline 
This section provides an overview of each of the following 
chapters. 
Chapter One sets the context of the work and frames the 
way in which the work is undertaken.  It provides a brief history 
of the Internet, as that history relates to the technical 
management of the Internet network and the strong culture of 
regulatory volunteerism that developed around the Request for 
Comment (RFC) system.  Volunteerism is important as it 
continues into the newly constructed policy development 
mechanisms of ICANN.  Who pays for ICANN is also important.  
Unlike other regulatory bodies, ICANN is not paid for by 
governments except where they make contributions to the 
running of the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC).  
ICANN is funded, for the most part, by ICANN-accredited 
                                   
7 ICANN President and CEO Dr Stuart Lynn’s document and subsequent evolution and 
reform can be found at http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/fifth-
supplemental-implementation-report-22apr03.htm. 
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registrars and registries, both generic top level domain and 
country code registries.  Whilst the Internet and the research 
that developed it was confined to research institutions and the 
military, the cost was absorbed by taxpayers in the United 
States and elsewhere.  Now that the majority of costs are met 
by private sector corporations, the motivation for the donation 
of time and expertise has shifted, the actors have changed and 
expected outcomes have altered.   
Chapter One also identifies key individuals and 
corporations involved in the formation of ICANN.  This is 
important information because, over the life of the research, 
whilst ICANN’s processes and procedures have been under 
development, personalities have been more important and 
influential than objective rules and regulations. 
Finally, the chapter gives an overview of the market 
demographics of the industry in questions.  The statistics 
provide a snapshot of key data about the extent of electronic 
commerce, market capitalisations of domain name registration 
companies and others in the industry such as hardware and 
software providers.  
Chapter Two contains a comprehensive literature search 
across three key themes.  These are the globalisation of 
regulation, regulatory frameworks and the DNS and the 
multifaceted public policy debate about the management of the 
Internet’s technical resources.  The findings have contributed to 
the literature in three key ways.    They expand the discussion 
of the globalisation of regulation and provide some original 
conceptual thinking on the demographics of global influence 
patterns.  This is being developed further in methodologies to 
track and define a comprehensive picture of the cosmocracy in 
fine detail.   
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I present data on critical participation patterns that has 
not been previously collated and analysed in any detailed way.  I 
have expanded the literature on the role of governments and 
their relevance in global regulatory structures and on the place 
of national governments as entities with little influence on the 
global regulation of the DNS. 
Chapter Two also contains an explanation of the research 
methodology employed here.  The challenge of much of this 
work has been that the Internet is a constantly evolving 
phenomenon.  To contain the research scope only data between 
November 1998 and November 2001 has been used. However, 
the literature which is considered here is more comprehensive 
and includes both historic and very recent 2003 materials.   
The conceptual framework and hypothesis which has 
guided the work is also found in Chapter Two.  The broader 
thrust of the research seeks to understand some conceptual 
thinking which frames the development of hybrid regulatory 
models for the DNS.  These are: 
 ownership versus stewardship 
 control versus trusteeship 
 commercial versus non-commercial use of global 
Internet resources 
 international governance versus national 
government 
Chapter Three is a discussion about a new philosophy of 
the value of names and naming.  It describes the shift from the 
use of number strings to names that have manifestly different 
values.  Control of the system which enables the resolution of 
domain names to Internet numbers and the policies enabling 
their effective use are critical to understanding the importance 
of the shift from IP numbers to the widespread use of domain 
names. 
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The chapter opens up some of the complex arguments 
surrounding domain name policy and its component parts of 
naming, ordering, ranking and labelling.  Understanding why 
names are so important and why effective but forgettable 
numbers have been replaced by names provides insight into the 
underlying importance of the DNS, stressing the value of the 
name itself rather than the characteristics of the system.   
Understanding the value of names to individuals, to 
groups, to businesses, to the organisation of society resides in 
history and philosophy.  In this context, numbers to names is 
treated as a shifting emphasis from Internet Protocol and 
Intellectual Property rights or IP to IP®. 
Chapter Four provides a general discussion of ICANN8.  It 
explores the core of ICANN’s mandate which is the management 
of technical functions which enable the Internet to operate 
reliably.  ICANN is discussed in an historical context and the 
chapter does not take into account the impact of recent evolution 
and reform activities during 2002 and 2003.    
Chapter Five defines and discusses governance by the 
private sector as opposed to governance by governments.  It 
illustrates, through data about the GAC, the changing interplay 
                                   
8 “The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a technical 
coordination body for the Internet.  Created in October 1998 by a broad coalition of the 
Internet's business, technical, academic, and user communities, ICANN is assuming 
responsibility for a set of technical functions previously performed under U.S. 
government contract by IANA and other groups. 
Specifically, ICANN coordinates the assignment of the following identifiers that must be 
globally unique for the Internet to function: 
 
• Internet domain names 
• IP address numbers  
• protocol parameter and port numbers 
 
In addition, ICANN coordinates the stable operation of the Internet's root server system.   
As a non-profit, private-sector corporation, ICANN is dedicated to preserving the 
operational stability of the Internet; to promoting competition; to achieving broad 
representation of global Internet communities; and to developing policy through private-
sector, bottom-up, consensus-based means. ICANN welcomes the participation of any 
interested Internet user, business, or organization.” Quoted directly from ICANN’s 
website found at http://www.icann.org 
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between national governments, a hybrid private sector 
regulatory authority and the broader DNRI.  Electronic 
commerce is the broader framework in which DNRI operates.  
The chapter reaches some conclusions about the role of national 
governments in the regulation of the global DNS and their 
relevance to ICANN.   In ICANN’s current form, national 
governments have been deliberately and strategically 
marginalised.   
Chapter Six discusses the nature of corporate strategy and 
the influence of corporations on the development of Internet 
governance models.  The chapter draws together, for the first 
time, a comprehensive statistical understanding of the types and 
kinds of corporations, both large and small, US-based and non-
US, that have been involved in the early stages of ICANN’s 
development.  The statistics in the chapter provide an early data 
set on which to draw some conclusions about the kind of 
influence corporations have exerted on both policies and 
procedures for making decisions and the decisions themselves, 
particularly with respect to the expansion of the domain name 
space and the introduction of new gTLDs. 
Chapter Seven is a detailed examination of Internet 
governance in Australia.  It provides the first detailed discussion 
of DNS governance in Australia and contributes a comprehensive 
historical review and analysis of the transition to an industry 
self-regulatory model.  It is a case study of how complex and 
multifaceted DNS governance has become in a national context 
whilst, at the same time, drawing direct parallels from the global 
experiences with ICANN.  The .au domain name space provides 
a very useful illustration of the evolution of geographic top level 
DNS governance, at a critical point in the development of ICANN 
at an international level.  The process through which the .au 
domain name space evolved is instructive when trying to 
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understand the impact of the hybridisation of regulation on a 
global scale especially with respect to the establishment of a set 
of global principles for DNS management which are used in 
national jurisdictions.   
The evolution of the domain name registration market, in 
parallel with a regulatory experiment of open DNS governance, 
remains a work in progress.  However, it is now possible to 
identify a set of factors that have enabled an orderly transition 
from a monopoly-provided service, limited by highly restrictive 
policy, to a more open industry where opportunity for 
competition can be identified at several points in the market. 
Chapter Eight encapsulates a summary of the key findings 
of the research, a review of the key statistics and provides some 
commentary on future research directions.   
The thesis also contains, at the beginning of the 
document, a comprehensive Glossary of key terms, stakeholders 
and abbreviations to facilitate an explanation of the research.  
The Appendices hold all the statistical data and charts; the 
Bibliography presents all the materials used in the thesis, both 
on-line and off-line and the Supplementary Material provides the 
full text of some critical resources which are only available, 
sometimes unreliably, on-line. 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION  
We are now convinced that a more fundamental consideration of governance 
is urgently needed, aimed at producing a road map and a migration plan for 
the shift from industry to digital governance9 
. . .the domain name war is a complex topic because of the way it combines 
technical knowledge of Internet protocols with economic, legal, and 
geopolitical factors10 
 
This thesis is about the development of a new global 
regulatory economy for the management of one of the key 
technical resources of the Internet, most commonly called the 
Domain Name System or DNS.  
It examines the formation of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) as the global private 
sector industry self-regulatory body responsible for the 
management of the Internet.  It identifies and discusses the role 
and power of key corporations and individuals.  It analyses 
trends that have emerged in the formulation of alternate policy 
and regulatory models for the governance of the critical 
infrastructure on which Internet applications, such as electronic 
commerce, e-mail and information services, operate. 
This is a fresh field of enquiry that encompasses an 
understanding of politics and policy formulation, global 
governance models and the impact of technology on decisions 
about effective international management of the globally 
accessible critical network infrastructure of which the Internet is 
part. 
                                   
9 Ticoll (1999:  1) 
10 Mueller (2000a:  95) 
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The work extends the literature on globalisation and the 
role of national governments.  It develops a new perspective on 
corporate strategy and influence on non-government regulatory 
agencies.  It questions the efficacy of international governance 
models absent multi-lateral treaty arrangements and adequate 
enforcement mechanisms, such as licensing frameworks, 
performance standards compliance and consumer protection. 
The application of the broader globalisation literature to 
the regulation of global business operations which depend on 
the robustness and reliability of the DNS, is a very specific slice 
of both the literature and its relevance to a market sector.  Even 
though the DNRI is relatively small in terms of market 
capitalisation or investment volumes, the vast majority of 
corporations, small businesses, universities and research 
institutions, schools and a vast array of individual users rely on 
the Internet in a way not dissimilar to the telephone.   There are 
many parallels between Internet governance and the way in 
which the international telephone numbering system has 
evolved.  The most critical of these is that standards for 
technical governance have been developed in partnership 
between the “supply side” (or equipment manufacturers) and 
the “demand side” (or those who wish to make telephone calls).   
The most important findings of the work are, firstly, that 
national governments have played a peripheral role in the 
operational management of Internet architecture11.  They have 
failed to engage actively because, structurally and operationally, 
the formation of ICANN explicitly consigns national governments 
                                   
11 Discussion about whether national governments ever had the right to manage the DNS 
remain moot.  A more important question to ask is, given that the GAC exists and is 
functioning and that many national governments have authority over their geographic 
country code identifier, how effective government influence is and how it is manifest in 
any new regulatory structure such as ICANN. 
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to a limited advisory role.  There was also a very specific push 
by successive US Governments for the private sector to take the 
lead in the regulatory management of the Internet itself, leaving 
content regulation, taxation and other domestic issues which 
remain the purview of domestic administrations. 
Secondly, ICANN has struggled with achieving its mission 
and mandate because of significant questions surrounding its 
authority and ability to do what it has been tasked to do.  It has 
struggled particularly with a controversial agenda, poorly 
resourced staff and an ever-changing job of work to do12.  There 
has been little separation between the mechanisms for 
developing ICANN’s policies and procedures and the use of those 
two elements in making decisions.  
ICANN has been criticised in many quarters for its failure 
to address significant legitimacy and representation issues.  
Those criticisms have been addressed, in part, through the work 
of the Evolution and Reform Committee, the consideration of 
which is outside the scope of this thesis.  It remains to be seen 
whether recommendations for change will strengthen the 
capabilities of the organization to manage its responsibilities 
more positively. 
Thirdly, the research has found that corporate actors have 
been particularly persuasive in their influence on ICANN’s 
agenda, on its funding arrangements and on the demands for, in 
return for costs being borne by the private sector, more flexible 
and effective regulatory responses.  The idiosyncrasies of ICANN 
as compared to, for example, the International 
                                   
12 From the meeting records, it is actually difficult to determine which agenda is the real 
one.  Is it the Board agenda; the agenda of constituencies; personal agendas for 
representation on the Board; or the broader agenda of the global Internet community?  
For the purposes here, I have focused on the Board of Directors agenda but also taken 
account of other pressures from different quarters. 
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Telecommunications Union (ITU), are that ICANN is not a multi-
lateral treaty organisation with binding powers to enforce 
directions.  It is principally funded by the private sector, unlike 
the ITU which is a United Nations agency.  It is populated by a 
greater proportion of private sector representatives than 
government appointees. 
Finally, the research has found that the globalisation of 
regulation in the DNRI and the management of the DNS are 
highly volatile economically.  It subject to rapid shifts in opinion, 
rapid developments in technology and applications and acute 
sensitivity to the economic conditions of the broader 
communications and information technology sector. 
The expansion of the responsibility for the regulation of 
the DNS has created a new regulatory economy, outside the 
realm of national governments with new goods to trade and new 
advantages sought in that trade.  This new economy is 
populated by an evolving class of individuals and corporations in 
the private sector who are disparately located but inextricably 
linked by technology and their ability to authorise the functional 
management of the DNS13.  A new class of cosmocrats, who 
populate a global cosmocracy of policy and rulemaking, have 
replaced traditional bureaucrats in the new regulatory economy 
that manages Internet architecture and the commercial 
opportunities conferred by that architecture. 
The rules of engagement for policy setting, technical 
management and commercial decision-making about the DNS 
have changed markedly in the last five years. The research set 
                                   
13 The authorisation for the cosmocrats to fulfil a regulatory mandate comes from diverse 
sources.  For example, for Board Directors it comes from a requirement to represent a 
particular region; for corporate representatives, it comes from being charged with 
maximising corporate advantage; for civil society advocates, mandate is derived from a 
broader social policy agenda in which ICANN is just one forum. 
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out here explains those critical changes, extends the application 
of existing theoretical literature on the globalisation of 
regulation; the role of governments and the manifestation of 
corporate strategy.  It identifies key actors, both individuals and 
corporates, and illustrates patterns of engagement and 
participation.  It provides some commentary on likely trends for 
the future. 
The research links management structures with the 
implementation of mechanisms to protect critical infrastructure 
that enables a vast number of applications and uses around the 
world.   
The work extends the literature on globalisation and the 
role of national governments.  It also provides a detailed 
examination of the Australian experience of the transition of the 
governance of the DNS from government to the private sector. 
The major challenge of the research has been to draw 
together very diverse threads of discussion across three areas.  
These are political science, technical standards and global 
governance.  The research has evolved rapidly with the 
explosive growth of the DNRI through to April 2000.  It has 
taken into account the marked economic downturn from April 
2000 onwards and its impact on the realignment of the DNRI.   
The research has been undertaken during the critical start- 
up phase of ICANN.  This has meant that very little scholarly 
research has been available to directly inform the work14.  The 
field of inquiry remains highly fluid, subject to the vagaries of 
economic conditions in the global information industry and to 
ongoing attempts at regulatory reform. 
                                   
14 Since 2002, the work of Lessig, Mueller, Paré and Lim has expanded more general 
discussions around Internet governance, in all its various forms, which includes 
copyright and intellectual property, privacy and data protection.  I have focused 
particularly on governance of the DNS. 
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Internet governance has a special and tightly constrained 
meaning here.  It does not mean government of the Internet. 
The research is about a critical and fundamental slice of the 
Internet DNS that resolves Internet Protocol (IP) numbers to 
domain name addresses.  The rapid commercialisation of the 
Internet network and the push to private sector management of 
public sector resources has challenged the way in which 
governments think about their role as governors; the way in 
which corporations fund the governance of critical infrastructure 
on which their businesses rely and the role for a global self- 
regulatory body driven by a consensus model of policy 
development. 
The work is not about what the Internet does such as 
deliver e-mail, provide access to on-line information resources 
or commercial transactions.  The work does not discuss content 
regulation, on-line gambling, civil society issues such as privacy 
protection or free speech.  It does not tackle issues that are the 
responsibility of national governments such as taxation, the 
definition of culturally appropriate materials or surveillance.   
In summary, the work focuses solely on the politics and 
policies of the management of a database of numbers and 
names.  The discussion is highly complex because it has global 
commercial policy with widely divergent cultural, legal and 
regulatory impacts.   
From a technical perspective the DNS works transparently 
with the average end-user unaware of what happens at the 
network layer that connects computers to each other in a similar 
way to the telephone system.  In general, end-users are not 
concerned with how a technology works, but focus on the 
functionality of a system.   
The architecture of the network is where the mission and 
mandate of ICANN starts.  The network is the point from which 
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the research examines the development of new regulatory 
structures that are applicable around the world, insofar as the 
network itself is accessible to everyone.  
The technology of the Internet is borderless and is 
concerned little with the policies of particular national 
governments.  Some governments have shown an interest in the 
formation and implementation of the broad scope of Internet 
policies including the management of the DNS15.  The global 
regulatory model and its hybrid manifestation includes 
participants from ICANN’s five geographic regions16 through 
both physical and remote participation.   
The globalisation of regulation is not a new phenomenon.  
The shipping and aviation industries have global rules and 
regulations; the international standards organisation’s work is 
applied around the world; the diamond and gold industries have 
standards which are recognisable wherever those commodities 
are sold. 
The funding methodologies for industry self-regulation 
found in the telecommunications, aviation and broadcasting 
industries are well established.  Those methodologies have 
provided a model for that which has been adopted in ICANN, 
particularly with respect to the levying of fees for registrar 
accreditation and for registry operation.  In the 
telecommunications industry, fees are levied as part of license 
application processes or assessed as a proportion of revenue.  
Licenses are used as a means of ensuring compliance with 
standards and protocols to deliver network interoperability.  
                                   
15 These governments are highlighted Appendix Three which sets out GAC participation 
rates. 
16 A discussion of the regions (and the problematic nature of arbitrary groupings of 
countries) is found at http://www.icann.org/yokohama/geo-topic.htm. 
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They are also used to provide a framework for operator 
behaviour across a wide range of areas including consumer 
service, inter-operator relations and service standards.  In an 
industry self-regulatory environment, the engagement of 
industry representatives, consumer groups and government 
agencies is now considered, in many developed economies, the 
norm. For example, in the Australian case, industry self-
regulation encompasses the development of enforceable codes 
of conduct, technical standards, interconnection terms and 
conditions and number portability all of which are overseen by 
the Australian Communications Authority (ACA)17.  The ACA also 
has responsibility for regulating the Internet inasmuch as that 
regulation refers to law enforcement and national security18. 
The system of license fees as a condition of market entry 
are, in the context of the research here, applied to ICANN 
accredited registrars and registries.  The critical difference is 
that the enforcement mechanism relies not on the domestic 
jurisdiction of the parties but on Californian statute19.   
The other critical difference is that the regulation of the 
DNS is relatively new.  For example, the RFC series is about 
thirty years old but, for comparison, the ITU has been in 
operation since 1865, starting its life as the International 
Telegraph Union.  The domain name registration industry is even 
                                   
17 The ACA takes a light touch approach to regulation – full details are found on their 
website at http://www.aca.gov.au.  The general competition regulator, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), manages the Trade Practices Act which 
is applicable across the economy, most notably in the telecommunications industry.  
18 See the ACA’s industry fact sheet on the issue.  
http://www.aca.gov.au/consumer_info/fact_sheets/industry_fact_sheets/fsi13.pdf 
19 I would argue that too much has been made of the location of ICANN’s location in 
California and the reliance upon US law and statute.  Any organisation needs a start 
point and perhaps ICANN will evolve to different legal tradition.  At present, that seems 
unlikely.  
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newer, only really taking hold from the late 1990s onward when 
the Internet became more readily accessible to the general 
public.    
The rapidly evolving private sector driven governance 
model for the management of Internet resources has become a 
new manifestation of policy and procedures that flow from an 
historical approach to the development of protocols via the RFC 
system, about which there is detailed discussion later in the 
work20.  The model is designed to enable the Internet to function 
seamlessly.  Technically, it also depends on telecommunications 
infrastructure, bandwidth availability and pricing structures that 
make Internet access affordable.  It has given momentum to the 
development of the domain name services industry that has, in 
large part, met the cost of that regulation21.  During the course 
of this research, the domain name registration industry has 
matured rapidly.  Most notably, new gTLDs have been added 
which include open domains such as .biz, .info, .pro and .name 
and closed domains such as .aero, .museum, and .coop.22 
                                   
20 There is very specific reference, on the ICANN website, to the desire to achieve broad 
representation of global Internet communities; and to developing policy through private-
sector, bottom-up, consensus-based means.  This is a very different set of motivations 
than those found in domestic policy and regulatory models within national jurisdictions.  
The key differences are “broad representation, private sector, bottom-up, consensus-
based” all of which have enormous significance in the discussion of the globalisation of 
regulation and the input of governments into ICANN’s operations. 
21 Discussion of the importance of corporations and other private sector actors is found in 
Chapter 6. 
22 Open domains are those which have very few restrictions on who can register names in 
the domain.  Closed domains have specific requirements, for example, being an officially 
recognised museum in .museum.  The press release announcing the expansion of the 
gTLD name space is found at http://www.icann.org/announcements/icann-
pr16nov00.htm  As at January 2003, .pro was not active. 
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Internet, regulated 
The work here dispels the myth that the Internet is free of 
regulation.  The research has found that regulation may not be 
driven by governments but technical standards and protocols 
are, nonetheless, regulatory in effect.  There may not be 
contracts and multi-lateral treaties, but there is regulation of 
behaviour by other means. 
The regulation of Internet numbers (and later names) was 
held in private, and principally volunteer, hands for many years.  
From the late 1960s to the early 1990s, the technically driven 
Internet standards community was limited to a small number of 
research and military organisations but while formerly a “tool 
reserved for scientific and academic exchange, the Internet has 
emerged as an appliance of every day life, accessible from 
almost every point on the planet”23.  The Internet community 
has undergone profound change as the Internet has moved into 
the public domain where highly commercial applications for 
Internet technology have had a direct impact on the way in 
which Internet architecture is managed.  The potential for 
commercialisation of the DNS, and hence the applications to run 
on it, brought unheard of attention to a network system. 
In this thesis, the term “domain name registration 
industry”24 or DNRI refers to the Internet domain name 
structures, governing bodies and other stakeholders who 
formulate the rules for the supply and registration of names.  At 
the retail, consumer level, the DNRI is a highly developed sub-
set of the broader e-market place.  The DNRI is global in its 
                                   
23 Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, 1 July 1997.  Found in Supplementary 
Material A and online at http://dcc.syr.edu/ford/course/e-commerce-framework.pdf.  
24 A detailed discussion of the constituents of the DNRI is found in Chapter Six. 
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reach because service providers and customers can be far 
removed, geographically, from each other.  It is global in its 
involvement of national governments who manage country 
codes (ccTLDs) for their domestic constituencies; and global in 
its regulatory reach through the role of ICANN.  To use Drucker’s 
words, “in the mental geography of e-commerce, distance has 
been eliminated.  There is only one economy and only one 
market.” (Drucker 1999a:  50)  
This research has focused on the global market for domain 
names as anyone, anywhere can buy a domain name assuming 
they have access to the Internet, can find a domain name 
registrar website and have access to a valid credit card25. 
The research extends a comprehensive body of work on 
global business regulation found in writings on the law of the 
sea, international telecommunications and aviation.  Whilst there 
is nothing new about global corporations such as British 
American Tobacco, the East India Company, IBM, De Beers, 
influencing their regulatory environments by relationships to 
governments in the countries in which they operate (by licensing 
conditions, by taxation, by limitations on private investment, by 
environmental controls), this work highlights strategies in a new 
industry.   
What is new is the way in which regulation has shifted 
from multi-lateral treaty based regulation such as that which 
happens within the ITU and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
to private sector regulation.  Private sector regulation is that 
which substitutes the functions of traditional government 
bureaucracies as evidenced by the structure of ICANN, a private 
                                   
25 There are many other issues bound up here – I deal only with the presumption that if 
one were to get access to the Internet, it is possible if one understands enough English 
to register a domain name.  There are, of course, registrars who provide services in 
many different languages. 
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sector not-for-profit organisation based in the USA and run 
under statutes of the State of California.   There are two new 
features.  The first is that global resource management has 
moved from the public sector and that contracts are now used, 
rather than treaties, to effect that management.  This trend is 
also reflected in national arrangements for DNS governance 
within countries such as Australia and the .au Domain 
Administration (.auDA) and in Canada with the Canadian 
Internet Registration Authority (CIRA). 
The rise of industry self-regulation as a regulatory trend is 
critical to this work and places the work in a broader policy 
context.  The drive towards, for example, national infrastructure 
polices has come principally from the United States, followed, in 
no particular order and in differing guises, by, for example, 
Singapore, Australia, Canada and Malaysia.  Kahin identifies “the 
paradoxical role of the federal government as both a 
disinterested referee and an interested investor” (Kahin 1996:  
150).   
The policy commitment for the formation of ICANN is 
discussed in Chapter Five, but briefly, the US Government’s 
National Information Infrastructure (NII) policy was a precursor 
to a broader agenda for a Global Information Infrastructure 
(GII) which gained wide currency throughout the 1990s.  US-
based communications services firms were advantaged by the 
fact that the US was far ahead of other countries in liberalising 
its telecommunications markets.  This meant that the cost base 
was lower and has continued to drop to the point where supply 
of bandwidth far exceeds demand.  
Kahin argues that “the US NII initiative…expressed and 
illustrated the limited and increasingly self-effacing role of the 
public sector in the world’s largest economy” (Kahin 1996: 155).  
For the work here, it is an important statement.  It gives a start 
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point for the, now predictable, sequence of a government 
removing itself from both the development of the Internet 
network (as a research and academic network) to one which, in 
its current form, is highly commercial. 
“…the Internet was recognized as a model because the 
processes for developing Internet standards had been so 
successful in advancing widespread use of the TCP/IP protocol 
suite…” and this success in self-regulation perhaps provided 
some confidence in a self-regulatory model.  (Kahin 1995:  173)  
It is important to note though that that success of early self-
regulatory approaches by members of the IETF and others who 
created the RFCs depended on a very small group of committed 
technical operators. They were expert in communications 
protocols and, between 1970 and 1990, they operated in a 
technical environment, focused on making things work rather 
than juggling competing commercial imperatives. 
Kahin’s finding that the “. . . success of the Internet 
processes convinced the federal research agencies that 
standards development…had to be anticipatory, iterative, and 
linked to the development of real products and services” has 
been borne out in the ICANN processes and procedures.  From 
work done in 1995, prior to the full formation of ICANN “…it has 
become clear [to Kahin] that Internet standards will be driven 
increasingly by market forces…” (Kahin 1995:  173).  However, 
as late at 1999, the Department of Commerce sought 
assurances from the private sector that it had the resources and 
commitment to manage the DNS and, by extension, the office of 
ICANN. 
It is interesting, in the context of the first part of the 
hypothesis which is set out in full in Chapter Two, that Kahin 
argues that “…the NII initiative has been aimed at stimulating 
private-sector activity and at reducing government activity in 
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favor of private enterprise”.  (Kahin 1995:  181)  This contention 
is examined in Chapter Six on corporate involvement in setting 
the regulatory agenda.   
Kahin, in his explanation of the impact of the NII project, 
goes part way in illustrating why the civil society lobbyists, 
whose views I have left aside in the dissertation, succeeded in 
capturing much of the public microphone time at ICANN 
meetings in the Open Forum space on the agenda.  Kahin 
argues that “…The NII initiative as a whole has succeeded in 
focusing public attention on the transformative potential of 
information technology and networks and the need to develop a 
deeper understanding of their social, economic and policy 
implications”  (Kahin 1995:  183).  I leave aside completely 
discussions of social policy impacts as, in general, responsibility 
for, rather than empathy with, those policies lies with national 
governments. 
However, as Kahin argues, “…the underlying policy issues 
remain and indeed have grown in complexity and nuance, but 
they are overshadowed by the plethora of business opportunities 
playing out in the Internet”.  (Kahin 1995:  184)  The research 
here indicates that Kahin is correct even if there has been a 
marked economic downturn through April 2000.  I have used 
two key markers to understand the nature of market 
opportunity presented by the commercialisation of the Internet.  
The first is found in the diversity of corporate and individual 
actors who have attended meetings.  The data to support that is 
found in Chapter Six.  The second is an issues-based discussion 
on the processes, procedures and decisions about the allocation 
of new gTLD names, the issuing of which expands the 
opportunity for the DNRI to sell more names. 
Baer argues that the GII discussion, led by the United 
States, was important for the framing of and policy development 
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for ICANN.  The GII acted as a key external catalyst.  The 
release of the Clinton Administration’s 1997 Framework for 
Global Electronic Commerce formed part of the chain of policy 
discussions that led to the creation of ICANN and, as a result, a 
significant shift in regulatory policy.  The Framework is 
discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
Baer’s 1997 argument that “…the technologies, markets 
and investment patterns propelling the GII are changing much 
faster than are the rules and institutions that traditionally have 
governed these activities.  How these rules and institutional 
arrangements will evolve will strongly influence the pace of 
investment, trade innovation, infrastructure development within 
and among nations” has been borne out by the research here.  
(Baer 1997:  532)   
Baer’s framing of his argument along the following lines – 
“…(1) continued reliance on national regulatory regimes; (2) 
acceptance of negotiated arrangements principally among 
private sector stakeholders; and (3) strengthened GII roles for 
regional and international institutions” (p 532) supports all three 
components of the hypothesis.   
Baer’s identification of key stakeholders which include “…a 
wide range of private sector suppliers of communications and 
information products and services, government-owned 
communications carriers, content providers and others…, and a 
wide variety of national and international governmental 
agencies…” indicates how complex the picture is.  However, the 
data gathered here across the chapters, highlights that it is 
possible to rank, order, categorise and understand the key 
actors (both individual and corporate) and some of their 
motivations.  It is too early to determine, by any objective 
measures, their success over the long term.  
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Baer is correct in finding that “. . .consensus becomes 
even more difficult to achieve when actors and issues are 
transnational”.  I would argue that, when conflicting or 
competing commercial opportunities are included, there is too 
much pressure placed on developing bottom-up consensus- 
driven decisions that adequately reflect tolerable, practical and 
workable outcomes.  
Finally, Kahin argues that “…the nature of the technology 
makes them (services) globally accessible and implementable.  
The Web is conspicuously ‘world wide’, and its transformation of 
and by advertising, marketing customer relations is not limited 
by national borders”  (Kahin 1995:  151).  This view is examined 
in Chapter Three’s exploration of the importance of domain 
names, rather than their corresponding numbers. 
Summary: Context and Content 
In summary, the policy context for the research here is 
one in which many governments have removed themselves from 
direct regulation of industry to a rather more distant ‘set policy’ 
and ‘industry regulate’ philosophy.  For conduct within a 
country’s natural jurisdiction, this is relatively simple to 
implement and oversee.  The challenge arises now, and here the 
impact of technology is at its greatest, where regulated business 
activity takes place out of jurisdiction.  However, this work is not 
about the conduct at a computer terminal; it is about having all 
devices26 connected to a network communicating with each 
other reliably, efficiently and robustly wherever those devices 
may be located.  
                                   
26 I use the term “device” because it more accurately characterises the possibility that 
equipment such as mobile telephones, kiosks in airports, laptops on wireless networks 
could all be connected to the Internet with an IP number. 
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The core of the work is, firstly, an analysis of the 
globalisation of regulation, secondly, an analysis of the changing 
relationships of government and the private sector, and thirdly, 
the impact of the governance of the DNS in creating a new 
regulatory economy with new actors, new influences and new 
systems.  
Key Findings 
The research has found that national governments have 
played a peripheral role in the operational management of 
standards and protocols that enable Internet architecture to 
work effectively.   
Secondly, ICANN has struggled with achieving its mission 
and mandate because of significant questions surrounding its 
authority and ability to do what it has been tasked to do.  It has 
struggled particularly with a controversial agenda, poorly 
resourced staff and an ever-changing job of work to do.  It has 
been roundly and loudly criticised in many quarters for its failure 
to address significant legitimacy issues.  It remains to be seen 
whether recommendations for change will strengthen the 
capabilities of the organisation to manage its responsibilities 
more effectively. 
Thirdly, the research has found that corporate actors have 
been particularly persuasive in their influence on ICANN’s 
agenda; on its funding arrangements and on the demands for, in 
return for industry self-regulation costs being borne by the 
private sector, more flexible and effective regulatory responses. 
Finally, the research has found that the globalisation of 
regulation in this particular part of business operations is still 
developing its service offerings, at the same time as a 
consolidation of operators takes place. 
 26 
I turn now to detailed explanation of the literature, 
concepts and methodologies which have guided the work.  
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CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE SEARCH & 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Laudant illa sed ista legunt27 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the 
materials that have been used to inform the work.  The 
literature ranges across three key subject areas.  These are 
globalisation and business regulation; the Internet and the DNS; 
the role of governments and corporate strategy.  Conceptually, 
the work is bounded by four key concepts sets.  The hypothesis 
is in three parts and is discussed below.  Finally, the scope of 
the work is defined and key definitions are provided.  
Literature 
The literature review has been a complex task because of 
the unevenness and partiality of much of the writing.  On the 
one hand there is significant work on, for example, globalisation 
and regulatory reform, on electronic commerce in general and 
on dispute resolution in the intellectual property wars over 
ownership of domain names.  On the other, there is little 
material on the hybridisation of regulatory structures and the 
shift from public sector to private sector regulation, little about 
policy development in the DNS at a network infrastructure level 
and even less about the resolution of disputes over DNS 
governance rather than specific domain names as 
                                   
27 Martial, Epigrammata, book 12, no 46 (47).  Found in Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 
449:  13. 
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manifestations of intellectual property.  In addition, the recent 
history of ICANN is just that.  It is recent and dominated by 
popular press articles rather than a body of dispassionate 
academic contributions.  The Internet, using the most general 
definition, has engendered a plethora of populist writings, on-
line web logs28 and outlandish predictions about how the 
Internet has or will change the world.   There have been, over 
the life of the research, a changing set of variables including, for 
example, a significant economic downturn and a shift in 
personalities, evidenced in part by the comprehensive dramatis 
personae in the glossary. 
With those variables in mind, the literature review is set 
out as follows:  
• global governance and, more broadly, globalisation of 
institutions;  
• the valuation of names and naming rights;  
• within the context of the demographics of the DNS and 
broader industry, an examination of the dot com boom and 
subsequent market correction;  
• an analysis of legal materials to put in context regulatory 
(as opposed to legal and legislative) structures.  
An analysis of intellectual property disputes is included to 
frame and acknowledge what this work excludes, that is, 
disputes over the intellectual property of domain names, and to 
clearly identify the management of the underlying network 
resources as the core of the technical part of the work.  
                                   
28 Blogging is an on-line form of commentary or personal journal that is particularly 
popular among the ‘digerati’. Some blogs offer detailed and cogent analysis of 
governance issues. Others, particularly community blogs with multiple authors, have the 
characteristics of unmediated on-line news groups, with a flavour of shout loudly, shout 
early and shout often. Blogging as a phenomenon and concerns about the closed nature 
of many blog communities are discussed at 
http://www.caslon.com.au/weblogprofile.htm.  See examples of ICANN-related blogs at 
http://www.icannwatch.org and http://www.lextext.com/icann/ 
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An examination of both scholarly and popular works on 
ICANN, its mandate, its successes and detractors completes the 
framing of the work.  
Global Governance & the Globalisation of Institutions 
 
The discussion of global governance sits within the 
broader literature of globalisation which includes work by Sassen 
(1996), Braithwaite & Drahos (2000), Arup (2000) and Held & 
McGrew (2002).  Globalisation as a concept also sits within the 
social policy literature and, in the context of developing legal 
structures, within legal discourse.   
Of most use to this work is the positioning of Arup’s work 
in a politico-legal context that recognises the maturation of 
cross-border regulatory structures, through open technology and 
public policy.  In addition, Arup argues that the application of 
global regulatory responses challenges the capacity of national 
governments to successfully regulate domestically.   
Braithwaite and Drahos’ contribution, in size and 
significance, to the debate on global business regulation puts 
into perspective the nature of global businesses in the network 
economy.  This includes what kinds of businesses they are; what 
they trade; how they trade and how they manage the 
environments in which they operate.  The results here extend 
Braithwaite and Drahos’ work by applying it to the DNS and the 
new DNRI which is global in scale, scope and customer base.  
This globalisation is especially the case with ICANN-accredited 
registrars29 that are located all over the world and, if they only 
sell generic top level domain names (gTLDs) such as .com, .net 
and .org, are likely to have customers anywhere who are 
                                   
29 A full list of accredited registrars is found at www.icann.org/ 
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connected by a phone line, computer terminal and have access 
to a credit card.  The novel part of arrangement is that 
businesses have customers all over the world.  The businesses 
may be physically remote from their major market with 
operations in one area with access to cheap bandwidth and 
telephone costs, locate the corporate offices in a tax-friendly 
location like the Cayman Islands and have a small head office 
for the executive team in New York City.  This configuration is 
similar to other global industries such as banking and finance 
and is consistent with the findings of both Porter and Sassen.  
Arup and Braithwaite & Drahos argue that there is a contest 
between national sovereignty and the harmonisation of 
regulatory principles.  This is starkly illustrated here when 
examining the regulation of geographic or ccTLDs which remain 
in the purview of national governments (but, to confuse matters, 
the operation of which may be hived off to private sector 
regulatory authorities or commercial entities) and gTLDs which 
are most certainly within the purview of the global regulatory 
body, ICANN.  
I have used, to frame the discussion, Braithwaite and 
Drahos’ (2000:  8) distinct kinds of globalisation, that of firms, 
that of markets and that of regulation as they all are relevant 
here.  Whilst their work does not specifically refer to the 
Internet nor its governance, it is a relatively straightforward task 
to extrapolate their work on firms (seen here as corporate 
strategy in contributing very markedly to the progress of 
ICANN’s work) and markets (seen here as the development of 
new markets in electronic commerce and particularly in the 
development of highly competitive registrar and registry 
business models).   
Braithwaite and Drahos’ work takes place in the context of 
a series of industry groups – most notably telecommunications 
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as the treatment of international telecommunications regulation 
has many similar facets to that of Internet governance30.  In 
addition, their work focuses on two key elements which support 
the work here.  The first is that of “recognizing and harmonizing 
the decline of national sovereignty” which is discussed here in 
the context of country code administrators and the operation of 
the Governmental Advisory Committee.  The second is 
recognition of the globalisation of regulation through the 
creation of global networking businesses such as Network 
Solutions and Register.com.  The globalisation of firms is 
tackled, in practical terms in Chapter Six on corporate 
heavyweights and their influence on a global regulatory agenda. 
Braithwaite & Drahos also tackle, unlike other scholars in 
the field, the presentation of “globalization as a contest of 
principles – a contest, for example, between the principle of 
harmonization and the principle of national sovereignty” 
(Braithwaite & Drahos 2000:  7).  This idea is mapped here to 
the clear tensions between, on the one hand, the desire of 
national governments to maintain control of their portion of the 
Internet and, on the other, the clear shift to governance models 
that have no location except in cyberspace. 
Finally, Braithwaite and Drahos’ work on standards setting 
and the normalisation of technical standards into more general 
operating rules is important.  In this case, the Request for 
Comment series is examined and maps closely to their 
findings.31 
                                   
30 In addition, the role of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has been 
instrumental, both positively and negatively, on the formation of ICANN and its policies 
and procedures. 
31 See, for example, discussion on air safety standards by IATA, the World Association of 
Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the New York Stock Exchange’s influence on securities 
trading (2000:  492). 
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The date collected for this work, particularly on 
participation rates and attendance costs align with Braithwaite 
and Drahos’ work on identifying power bases and the shifting 
nature of regulation.  Indeed, the identification of transition 
phases and volatility in power bases is reflected in the ICANN 
experience where the development of a variety of constituencies 
has provided the avenue for participation by a wide range of 
both corporate and individual actors. 
The globalisation of regulation is a thread running through 
the whole of the work but handled specifically in Chapter Four 
on the development of ICANN.  Sassen’s work on governance 
and accountability takes a different direction to that of 
Braithwaite and Drahos.  It is instructive when considered in 
relation to the calls for ICANN to be accountable and to practice 
good governance.  Accountable to whom and govern what and 
how?  Sassen argues that the “growth of a global economy in 
conjunction with the new telecommunications and computer 
networks that span the world has profoundly reconfigured 
institutions fundamental to processes of governance and 
accountability in the modern state.  State sovereignty, nation-
based citizenship, the institutional apparatus in charge of 
regulating the economy. . .all of these institutions are being 
destabilized and even transformed as a result of globalization 
and the new technologies”  (Sassen 1996:  xii).  We see that 
this is indeed the case with respect to the governance of the 
DNS and its associated service industries, such as the DNRI. 
It is interesting to align Sassen’s arguments about 
citizenship with the broader view here that cosmocrats32 have, 
                                   
32 Cosmocrats is a term used to describe those stateless beings (because they don’t care 
where they live) who are connected by technology, have access to e-mail and could as 
easily sleep and work in Bermuda as Brisbane.  They all, nonetheless, contribute to the 
development of rules of the Internet roost.  This phenomenon is seen in high relief by, 
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to a large extent, established the rules of global DNS.  The rules 
that are used in the management of the DNS are cumulative and 
reflect a variety of rule-making traditions, those of engineers 
and code writers; those of bureaucrats developing policy and 
those of lawyers who seek to protect the interest of their clients.  
I have characterised this trend as IP versus IP®, or Internet 
Protocol versus Intellectual Property Rights. 
The Value of Names and Network Assets 
To understand the effect of the decline of numbers and the 
rise of names, it is helpful to review the literature on the value 
of network assets.  Those values and the utility and desirability 
of domain names demonstrate the rise of IP® and the decline of 
IP numbers.  Although this is fully explored in Chapter Three, 
the literature on the value of names comes from two areas.  The 
first is a sociological and information science examination of why 
names are important to us.  This includes the ability to describe, 
rank, order and associate information. In many cases, the value 
of a domain name is intangible.  For example, it may sound 
good, look funny or new or interesting or point to an off-line, 
physical location of a good or service. This work focuses on the 
value of domain names as that which is derived from the 
capability of the DNS database to match a network of numbers 
to a corresponding and unique domain name.  The names that 
match numbers are a simple, technical answer to making it 
easier to remember where electronic resources are located when 
the network reaches a certain critical mass.   
                                                                                               
for example, the contributions to ICANN discussions which are routinely posted on 
ICANN’s website and, for more granularity, on the Registrars’ Constituency website at 
www.dnso.org/registrars.  Chapter Six provides data and analysis of cosmocracy and 
cosmocrats.  In summary, I talk about a community of expertise and interest which is 
not bound by nationality or location.   
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The complication is that there must be a unique number to 
match with a unique name.  This creates difficulties when a 
name has other intellectual property and branding 
characteristics bound up in it. 
The second part of the literature deals more specifically 
with the value of names in the context of the DNS and the DNRI.  
I focus here only on the latter which is the use of domain names 
as a simplifier for IP number strings.  
The academic literature on the commercial value of 
domain names is limited.  The value of a domain name to 
famous trade name or mark holders (IP®) is well described in 
the intellectual property literature.  In addition, there have been 
numerous cases where substantial sums of money have changed 
hands to buy desirable names or to recover them from 
speculators. Perceptions about the value of names as a 
marketing asset are reflected in the emergence of a domain 
name dispute resolution sector populated by professional 
arbitrators, lawyers and marketers.  This is found in the growth 
of World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) arbitrations 
about the rights to use a domain name.  ICANN has outsourced 
uniform dispute resolution processes (UDRP) to WIPO through a 
variety of independent arbitrators. 
The prices paid for names, either in a gTLD or ccTLD 
context is, however, only part of the equation and, for the 
purposes here, the least important. 
Measures to determine the value of a domain name also 
demonstrate the importance of the underlying DNS architecture.  
There is considerable variation in domain name valuation 
methodologies.  There are, however, four key components.  
There are name length, the attributes of the characters in the 
name, for example, inclusion of ‘power’ characters such as ‘z’ or 
prefixes such as ‘e-‘ or ‘I-‘, whether the name is in the .com 
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domain or whether it is easy to remember.  The latter is the 
most subjective characteristic.  Taken together, these 
characteristics are subjective; depend on some measure of luck 
in speculating on the most attractive and the existence of the 
right economic conditions to achieve a good price.  The writing 
in this area is at best unsophisticated and ill conceived.  In 
addition, the valuation methodologies are opaque and not 
readily tested33.    I would expect that, in future, new marketing 
and branding philosophies will take into account the valuation of 
domain names in a more robust, statistical way which is not so 
susceptible to the vagaries of dot com boom and bust. 
Demographics and Statistics 
There are three key sources of statistics that frame the 
research.  The first is the zone34 files which are the authoritative 
list of all domain names and numbers.  The second is general 
data from the OECD, the Australian Bureau of Statistics and 
other industry sources such as investment house analysis.  The 
final source is the meeting records from ICANN. 
Some early zone file information, in its original form, is 
instructive.  The 1992 table is useful as a start point for later 
growth analysis.35 
 
Distribution of Hosts by Top-level Domain 
 
                                   
33 Most of the literature is on-line and may have disappeared since the dot com crash.  For 
example, Lee Hodgson’s site at http://www.sitepoint.com/article/266. 
34 A zone file is “A file on a nameserver that designates a domain name with all of its 
associated subdomains, IP addresses, and mail server.  Parts of the zone file include the 
A record, CNAME, and MX records.  A zone file is also called a ‘DNS table’. Found at 
http://www.free-webhosts.com/definition/zone-file.php  
35 Found at http://www.isc.org/ds/rfc1296.txt.  Emphasis added. 
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An Internet Domain Survey of July 2001 shows the 
numbers of hosts advertised in the DNS.36  These figures map to 
the period of the research undertaken and indicate that the 
number of hosts has increased dramatically since the early 
1990s.   
 
 
 
 
                                   
36 Found at Internet Software Consortium http://www.isc.org. 
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At the same time, the numbers of domain names 
increased dramatically37.  The State of the Domain (SOTD)38 
holds relatively reliable figures for the numbers of domain 
names and which registrars manage them on behalf of end-
users.  However, the data only takes account of events after 
March 2001.   
The DNRI is in two parts.  This discussion focuses only on 
ICANN accredited registries and registrars who provide domain 
name registrations and are listed on the ICANN website39.  There 
are other ancillary industries which have emerged.  These 
include domain name valuation services, industry data suppliers 
and auction services.  The DNRI has evolved from the 
commercialisation of Internet network resources and the 
creation of business opportunities on the network.  Registry 
services are provided by companies such as Verisign-Network 
Solutions40 which manages .com, .net and .org.  Registry 
services, as defined under the contract, are the  “operation of 
the registry for the Registry TLDs and shall include receipt of 
data concerning registrations and nameservers from registrars, 
provision of status information to registrars, operation of the 
                                   
37 The most useful source of data on the numbers of domain names and registrar market 
share shown across registries is found at http://www.sotd.info. 
38 Found at http://www.sotd.info. 
39 Found at http://www.icann.org 
40 The Network Solutions & ICANN agreement is found at http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-
registry-agreement-04nov99.htm 
 38 
registry TLD zone servers, and dissemination of TLD zone files.”  
Registries do not have a relationship with end-user domain 
name owners. 
Registrars41, on the other hand, provide domain name 
registration services to domain name holders.  The importance 
of the DNRI (which includes registries and registrars) to the 
development of ICANN, cannot be understated especially with 
respect to the gTLD space42.  The critical impact of commercial 
entities on setting the policy agenda, its implementation and 
review is clear throughout the research.   
Subsequent SOTD reports show that there was little 
movement between the registrars with majority market share 
but that there was a decline in the number of names under 
management.  For example, the Fourth Quarter 2001 Market 
Review43 showed a significant reduction in the number of names 
in the .com, .net and .org registries as well as a significant re-
alignment of registrar market share positioning.  The former was 
due to deletion of expired famous names that were not likely to 
be renewed; the latter to a significant reduction in domain name 
registration pricing. 
Over the course of the research, the registrars were 
significantly affected by the downturn in dot com industries, 
reflected in the reduction of speculative name registrations; a 
decline in the number of on-line businesses; a contraction in 
venture capital funds and a significant re-alignment of the value 
                                   
41 A full list of ICANN accredited registrars can be found at 
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html.  Other registrars, such as those in 
Australia or Canada are accredited by .auDA (http://www.auda.org.au/registrars/) and 
CIRA respectively.   
42 This section of the ICANN website explains the hierarchy of the Domain Name System 
and its implicit global demographics.  http://www.icann.org/tlds/ 
43 Found at https://www.sotd.info/sotd/content/documents/sotdYrEnd01.pdf 
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of on-line businesses.  Cassidy’s comprehensive statistics 
illustrate these trends44.  
The DNRI is a sub-set of more general electronic 
commerce.  Historical OECD data is used here to provide a 
snapshot of electronic commerce across OECD member 
countries. “. . .the best definition of e-commerce is. . .the 
broadest definition:  any transaction over the Internet involving 
the transfer of goods, services, or information, or any 
intermediary function, which helps enable those transactions.”45  
OECD data46 for October 2001 indicates that during the 
1980s and 1990s, information and communications technologies 
investment (ICT) “contributed between 0.2 and 0.5 percentage 
points per year to economic growth, depending on the country.”  
The OECD’s comparative study of nine OECD member countries 
demonstrated that all countries (including Australia, France, 
Italy and Japan) benefited economically from ICT investment.  
The OECD study also found that “ICT diffusion plays a key role 
and depends on the right framework conditions, not necessarily 
on the existence of an ICT producing sector” which means that, 
in the case of electronic commerce service provision, that a 
flexible, market-driven regulatory structure produces gains even 
if there is no production of hardware or computer chips or other 
manufactured goods.  During the course of the OECD study, the 
United States experienced significant economic growth and, with 
reference to the sector under examination here, drove 
significant investment in on-line industries.  Cassidy’s statistical 
                                   
44 Cassidy’s statistics are found in the Appendix (pp370-385)  of his 2002 work.  
45 The full text of AT & T President Michael Armstrong’s paper can be found at 
http://www.internetpolicy.org/briefing/3_00.htm 
46 Found at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2001doc.nsf/LinkTo/DSTI-DOC(2001)7 
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work is most useful because it illustrates historical share market 
pricing that is hard to find on either the NASDAQ or New York 
Stock Exchanges where most dot com companies are listed.  
Cassidy’s analysis shows the hyper-increase in share market 
pricing, in market capitalisation and in the dramatic fall in share 
prices which maps to the life of the research conducted here 
(Cassidy 2002:  370). 
The OECD also track data on electronic commerce 
transactions.  The OECD uses a narrow definition of electronic 
commerce which is useful here and constrains the research to 
the technology47.  
The remaining statistics and data which support the 
analysis are unique to this work and are found in full in the 
Appendices. 
Technical Overview 
There are many explanations for how the Internet, as a 
network, actually operates.  There are three separate sources of 
information that provide a full picture.  These are Dr Vint Cerf’s 
website48; the RFC series hosted by the Internet Society49 and 
the information found on a variety of technical websites50.   
                                   
47 “An Internet transaction is the sale or purchase of goods or services, whether between 
businesses, households, individuals, governments, and other private or public 
organisations, conducted over the Internet.  The goods and services are ordered over 
those networks but the payment and delivery of the good or service may be conducted 
on or off-line”.  Found in Measuring the Information Economy 2002, Annex 4. 
48 Found at http://global.mci.com/resources/cerfs_up/. 
49 Found at http://www.isoc.org/standards/ and which also includes notations on which 
groups are involved in setting technical standards. 
50 For more technical treatment of this section, some basic explanations can be found at 
http://www.mids.org/works.html and at http://www.gipiproject.org/how/. 
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Internet Governance:  A Brief History51 
This section puts in context the Internet as a system and 
the Internet as a manifestation of what it does.  There are many 
good general histories of the Internet, most notably by Hafner & 
Lyon, Berners-Lee and Fischetti, Kahin and Nesson, Winston and 
Reid.52    These books have informed the research as they 
provide the broader context of the Internet including its 
technical roots, its policy impacts and its social and cultural 
values.  For the purposes of the research here though, the most 
interesting aspects of those works is that which touches on 
technical standards and protocols as a form of rulemaking.   
The Internet is two, sometimes conflated, ideas.  The first 
is the network layer of a collection of computers, telephone lines 
and equipment.  The second is what the Internet does.  The 
Internet, as the DNS, enables disparately located devices to 
communicate with each other.  It also facilitates the easy use of 
a wide range of applications such as e-mail, music and video 
downloads and information transfers. 
I focus here on what the Internet is, the network, not 
what it does, the applications.  ICANN, as the global technical 
regulator, is responsible for a variety of functions that were, 
prior to its formation, the responsibility of the US Government 
through the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).   IANA 
is “dedicated to preserving the central coordinating functions of 
the global Internet for the public good”.53   As this work is about 
                                   
51 The Internet Society provides comprehensive history and background at 
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/. 
52 Also of interest is Rhonda Davila’s chronological, on-line history found at  
http://www.sat.lib.tx.us/Displays/itintro.htm and Vint Cerf’s MCI website found at 
http://global.mci.com/resources/cerfs_up/internet_history/. 
53 IANA’s website is found at http://www.iana.org/ 
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the orderly development of globally applied standards and 
norms, which I call global governance of the Internet, rather 
than law which is driven by jurisdiction and legislation and a 
clear sense of physical place, a discussion of technical 
governance is helpful. 
Technical governance of the Internet is characterised by a 
collection of collaboratively developed network standards 
relevant to every part of the Internet, whether that is the 
generic top level domain name space including .com, .net, .org 
or the geographic country code top level domain name space54. 
The RFC series is critical for two reasons.  The RFC series 
is a key part of Internet history.  It identifies key actions, 
technical developments and the emergence of standards and 
protocols for operating the DNS.   
The RFC series demonstrates unequivocally that the 
Internet, as a network, has been ‘governed’ for more than 30 
years.  The first RFC was issued on 7 April 1969 and RFCs are 
still under development through the participation of the experts 
in the Internet Engineering Task Force, assisted by members of 
the Internet Society and, in the current configuration, input from 
the ICANN community.  Critical here is an understanding of the 
culture of volunteerism, the culture of global involvement in the 
setting of technical standards and protocols and a philosophy of 
limited involvement from governments.  Volunteerism and a 
commitment to making a system work has, over years, been 
overtaken by a commitment to business objectives and 
commercial imperatives. 
Arguments about whether the Internet should or shouldn’t 
be governed are not relevant to this work.  Perry Barlow and 
                                   
54 The full list of country codes is found at http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-whois.htm. 
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other cyber libertarians have perhaps failed to recognise that, 
with respect to the technical management of the DNS, there has 
always been regulation of the Internet as a technology rather 
than an application.  The libertarians argue, amongst other 
things, that there should be little government intervention; little 
constraint on individual freedom and liberty; robust privacy 
protection; limitations on spam and, for those concerned with 
pornography, control of undesirable content.  These are all 
issues that fall within national jurisdiction and are the 
responsibility of domestic governments.  They are outside the 
scope of the dissertation as they reflect what the Internet does, 
not what it is. 
The critical finding in this part of the research is that the 
results describe the shift of privately held, publicly funded 
Internet architecture, used historically by academic and research 
institutions, to publicly managed, privately commercialised 
assets governed by a complex body of representatives from a 
broad global base.  
The most critical shift is from the governance by RFCs to 
more readily accessible and institutionalised policies and 
procedures which now have commercial and operational impact.  
The RFCs55 are a series of standards, discussed and developed 
by a small group of engineers and software experts.  In the 
early days of the development of Internet protocols such as the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and IP, the rulemaking was 
the preserve of those within a small sector of particular 
academic faculties and military institutions around the world, 
predominately in the USA.  
                                   
55 Found at http://www.rfc-editor.org/. 
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The control of rulemaking and its perceived application 
and leverage is what is at issue here. The RFCs were, and are 
still, quite tightly controlled and governed by a set of publication 
standards, a set of discussion principles and a set of principles 
which enables the enactment of an RFC once it is agreed. 
Historically, the key contributors to RFCs were the developers of 
a system of networking that enabled access to information 
located in diverse places such as university research 
laboratories, for example, at the University of Southern 
California where Dr Jonathan Postel did much of his work.   
There was little need or incentive for that system of 
rulemaking to be any more public than it was, that is, it was 
essentially privately developed within public institutions and was 
not subject to broad global scrutiny as is the case with ICANN’s 
decision-making processes. 
The RFC process and the work of the IETF is closely tied to 
that of ICANN and the Address Supporting Organization (ASO)56 
and the Protocol Supporting Organization (PSO)57.   ICANN uses 
these expert technical organizations to ensure that “its authority 
in the assignment of naming and numbering resources” is 
consistent and robust58.  
The relatively simple work (in terms of its administration) 
of the RFC process has been markedly complicated by the 
pressure of developing a regulatory model that reflects broader 
interests, such as those of individual users, corporations, 
academic entities and the civil society lobby.  This complexity is 
most obviously seen in the Supplementary Material 
                                   
56 Found at http://www.aso.icann.org/. 
57 Found at http://www.pso.icann.org/. 
58 The author is grateful for examiner’s comments on this area of the work. 
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documentation which is discussed in detail below and which is 
reproduced in full in the final section of the work. 
Legal Studies 
Much of the legal debate around the protection of 
intellectual property is interesting for two reasons.  The first is 
that it focuses discussion on the retail end of the domain name 
industry, that is, who owns the right to use a domain name.  
Secondly, it highlights how little is written on the management 
of Internet network resources and the disputes that arise in the 
course of that activity.  Control of the root is the most important 
aspect of DNS governance and the reason why wrestling for 
control of ICANN continues.  Mueller and Lessig have been at 
the forefront of this area of work.  It seems that the struggle for 
control of the definitive root (or, more precisely, the only 
accurate directory with all the names and numbers in it) has 
been won by ICANN.  Those that propose alternate roots have 
been given some attention but this has been replaced by tacit 
agreement that ICANN and its directory is the definitive source 
of network resources.  As such, ICANN has the major 
responsibility to manage technical policymaking. 
Sound management and regulation of global network 
resources makes good sense, technically, politically and socially.  
That much of the literature has focused on the protection of 
intellectual property points more to the success of trademark 
lawyers and their large clients in dominating and influencing the 
debate rather than any logical attribution of merit to their 
arguments over those of the engineers.   The other side benefit 
of an examination of legal resources is better understanding of 
the drift away from legislative solutions (which require 
legislation, applicable within a jurisdiction, and a constituency to 
support it) to regulation that is predicated on mechanisms such 
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as codes of conduct, standards and industry self-regulation 
where governments of many countries have, in large part, 
withdrawn from the traditional regulatory role. 
However, ICANN’s continued negotiation by contract is an 
interesting legal aberration.  It is one that has caused ongoing 
legitimacy problems and has attracted “only in the USA, 
California jurisdiction, exclusivity” criticisms from those outside 
that limited geographic area.  In ICANN’s early phase, much of 
its work was done by a few key personnel59 which has created 
(or fostered) a bottleneck of personality over process, 
particularly with respect to the introduction of new gTLDs.  For 
example, two figures stand out.  Former Chief Policy Officer 
Andrew McLaughlin and General Counsel Louis Touton.  In 
ICANN’s defence, one can, see the need for tight contracts in a 
generally litigious society like the US60.    However, that is not 
global governance, based on consensus and bottom-up policy 
development.  It is governance by personality rather than by 
clearly defined process.  It is not necessarily objective and may 
be prejudiced against entrants from areas outside the US. 
Critical documents 
The following documents are critical to the research and 
analysis found here. They are included in full in the 
Supplementary Materials and have informed the direction of the 
work.  The documents also serve to constrain the research. The 
                                   
59 The key personnel are listed in the Glossary with an explanation of their titles and 
qualifications. 
60 Further exploration is necessary of an alternative view which may reflect ideas that a 
more legalist approach is part of a transition to formal rulemaking which requires the 
formation of a bureaucratic structure with objective rules for decision making.  Despite a 
stated policy that negotiations should be open and transparent, commercial contracts 
which bind ICANN and its contracting entities do not allow the release of commercially 
sensitive information. 
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July 1997 Framework For Global Electronic Commerce provides 
the policy context for the policy principles from which ICANN is 
constructed.  The subsequent July 1997 Request For Comment 
on DNS Administration demonstrates the focus of intentions to 
formulate an organisation with a technical function rather than a 
global Internet government.  The February 1998 Proposal to 
Improve the Technical Management of Internet Names and 
Addresses delineates the US Government position as to which 
functions and responsibilities were to be transferred to the new 
ICANN entity whilst, at the same time, seeking a broader public 
consultation. 
The June 1998 Statement of Policy on the Management of 
Internet Names and Addresses takes into account public 
comment and proposes transitional arrangements that reflect 
broader governance and finally, the November 1998 ICANN and 
Department of Commerce Memorandum of Understanding gives 
effect to the policy context, the public discussion and the 
momentum to move towards industry self-regulation with 
defined methods of articulating and implementing policy.  The 
May 1999 Governmental Advisory Committee Operating 
Principles reflects the way in which governments can interact 
with ICANN and affect interaction between the organisation and 
a diverse range of government representatives.  They are 
included in full as they are central to the discussion of regulatory 
relevance in Chapter Five. 
Commentary  
One of the challenges of this research has been the lack of 
scholarly and academic writing about the Internet which meshes 
the political, policy and technical aspects of the Internet 
network.  This presents an opportunity to contribute to the 
scholarship.  The concentration on the technical aspects of 
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Internet and the mandate of ICANN constrains the research.  
The DNRI has evolved from the commercialisation of network 
resources and the creation of business opportunities as a 
consequence of the network configuration.  Governments have 
endeavoured to integrate domestic policy with the availability of 
Internet access which involves significant domestic policy setting 
and the integration of those policies in a global system. 
This work’s fundamental contribution is its exploration of 
global technical regulation by the private sector, the influence of 
corporations and the interests of governments. 
I turn now to the hypothesis for the research which has 
been tested and proven.   
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis is characterised by three components.  The 
first is:  
That national governments are losing both the right and the 
ability to regulate for the resolution of disputes in the domain 
name system 
I test the notion that “the nation-state remains our 
fundamental unit of government” but that “transforming the 
business of government is now an accepted necessity” (Ticoll 
1999: 1).  In Chapter Five, I examine whether national 
governments are withdrawing from some regulatory tasks, in 
particular, the management of DNS network resources. This is 
most definitely the case with DNS governance in Australia.  
Australia’s approach to DNS governance is set out in Chapter 
Seven.  In the context of global DNS governance, the right and 
ability of national governments to regulate for the creation of 
policies and procedures and the resolution of disputes in the 
domain name industry is almost nil.  Within the structure of 
ICANN, the GAC is the only way in which governments, at a 
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global level, can effectively influence any ICANN outcome.   The 
GAC is, however, an advisory body.  It has no sanctioning 
power, its meetings are not attended by all governments and 
the proceedings of its closed meetings are broadcast to the 
Internet community by a post-meeting communiqué.  It is 
dominated by Australia (which provided a chairman and 
secretariat services for several years), the US, Canada and the 
Europeans61, all of whom are first world economies. 
On a domestic level, I examine as a case study the 
approach Australia has taken.  It is instructive because, after a 
few false starts, the system is working well, is inclusive, is 
relatively un-controversial.  It follows the principles of open and 
transparent processes to which ICANN aspires and has delivered 
real results such as the introduction of competition at both the 
registrar and registry level, technical stability and 
comprehensive stakeholder acceptance.  
In this context, the Australian Government deliberately 
sought to remove itself from DNS governance and disputes 
surrounding the management of network resources, principally 
those associated with control of the .au root server and WHOIS 
directory.   
The second part of the hypothesis is;   
That the regulation of disputes in an electronic marketplace is 
moving towards arrangements financed and enacted by the 
private sector and that, in return for the financing of that 
regulation, the private sector require a commitment from 
government to more flexible regulatory responses 
The electronic marketplace that I refer to here is the 
DNRI.  I have tested the idea that corporations have both been 
                                   
61 Australia has provided both a Chairman and Secretariat services since the inception of 
ICANN.  Key personalities include Dr Paul Twomey, now former DOC representative J 
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forced and have forced the shift to industry-led, market-
dominated regulation at the expense of governments.  This is 
discussed in Chapter Six on corporate strategy and regulatory 
modelling. 
And finally, 
That the regulatory treatment of the DNS illustrates a 
fundamental and irrevocable shift away from centralised 
government regulation to private sector driven regulation 
The hypothesis is considered in tandem with a set of 
concepts which, taken together, have shown the hypothesis to 
be tested and proven.  Despite moves by ICANN’s Evolution and 
Reform Committee there is, as yet, little effective change to 
include governments in a more meaningful way. 
Conceptual Framework  
There are three concept sets.   The first concept is a 
consideration of globalisation, national sovereignty and impact 
of supranational organisations such as ICANN.  The sovereignty 
of national governments is not under question.  However, the 
changing nature of what is within the power of a national 
government and what control mechanisms are developing 
outside that realm are integral parts of the work.  Jayasuriya’s 
work on the shifting, rather than static, nature of globalisation is 
highly instructive as is Sassen’s work on globalisation and 
accountability.  The impact of the formation and activities of 
supranational organisations (organisations beyond the bounds of 
one nation) are particularly important as background for the 
discussion of ICANN in Chapter Four.  Some examples of supra-
national organisations are the ITU, the WTO, WIPO and the 
APEC Telecommunications Working Group (APEC TEL WG).  
                                                                                               
Beckwith Burr (and later Ms Karen Rose), Canadian representative Len St Aubin, and 
European Commission representative, Christopher Wilkinson.   
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ICANN is idiosyncratic because of its constitution, its by-laws, its 
procedures and mandate.  As yet, parallels to other international 
agencies have not emerged because it is still in a formative 
phase and operates under different rules than multi-lateral 
treaty organisations. 
The second concept is a consideration of what I have 
termed govern*.  This is the separation of governments from 
governance.  Governments have traditionally constrained and 
regulated behaviour, both market and personal, within their 
jurisdiction.  Governance is determining ways of behaving that 
are applied to institutions (for example, by the World Bank in a 
process of institution strengthening or the airline industry to 
protect safety standards).  Governance can be both institution-
derived such as through the ITU or industry-agreed technical 
conformance and safety standards.  
The third concept considers different kinds of rules or  
legislation versus regulation.  Legislation is devised by 
governments.  Regulation can be derived from government but 
in the case of ICANN, regulation is derived from a variety of 
sources.  These include software code and standards; from 
ICANN contracts which are the ticket to DNRI market entry and 
the philosophical and policy commitments by a variety of 
governments that the technical management of the Internet 
network should reside in the private sector.   
Within these three concepts sit four equations which are 
balanced throughout the work.  They are the notions of 
ownership and stewardship; control and trusteeship; 
international governance and national government and finally, 
non-commercial and commercial use of Internet resources. 
I have set aside claims that the Internet shouldn’t or can’t 
be regulated.  The formation of ICANN illustrates that there was 
a clear intent across a range of stakeholders to regularise the 
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governance of the DNS.  The network layer has always been 
governed by standards, by processes and by procedures 
confined, in the main, to technologists and engineers who made 
a system work.  Now that the Internet is highly commercial, an 
understanding of the impact of governance models on 
developments in the architecture and on applications is critical. 
ICANN, as a technical management body, is rightly 
unconcerned with matters of content regulation or free speech 
and democracy.  However, as more recent discussion has 
shown, ICANN is not just a technical management organisation.     
The concept sets then provide a frame of reference to 
consider how regulation is developed and what constitutes 
influence drift.  The concept sets also provide some way of 
mapping influence drift.   They extend Sassen and Jayasuriya’s 
work on the fluid nature of regulation. 
Key Terms and Definitions 
Much of the terminology for the research is technical and 
is reflected in the Glossary.  It reflects the influence of highly 
experienced engineers, lawyers and other professionals.  The 
language also reflects an Internet culture which has spawned all 
kinds of arcane terms, such as blog, streaming, squatting and 
flaming.  Other terms have been developed in the popular press 
or as part of policymaking exercises such as the digital divide, 
information superhighway, homesteading and cyberspace.  
These are not relevant here except insofar as they indicate a 
time of innovation and one which has attracted much media 
attention and policy reflection. 
The latter terms, most particularly, have conceptualised 
the Internet as an undefined electronic space, without rules and 
indeed, without the need for rulemaking.  I contend that this is 
neither the case in theory nor in practice.   
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The Internet as a network and as a series of protocols is 
bound by rules because without rules or standards, the network 
doesn’t function.  Now that the Internet is mission-critical to 
many businesses and is indispensable to a wide variety of users 
as a communications tool, it is clear that there must be effective 
rules that ensure that the system is stable and reliable.  There 
may not be jurisdiction, legislation or courts but there are 
certainly rules.  There are rules that govern how a network 
works and rules that govern on-line behaviour.  With respect to 
the latter, that may be manifest in simple network etiquette or 
other, more serious, rulemaking that governs contracts, protects 
consumers and satisfies national governments and their 
respective policies about on-line gambling, pornography or 
taxation.  
In preparing the research here it was necessary to put 
together a comprehensive list of terms and definitions that 
would contribute to simplifying the research results and to 
making the research accessible to non-specialist readers.  A 
comprehensive glossary has also been prepared and, for easy 
reference, is found at the beginning of the document.   
Words and phrases that are found throughout the work 
are set out below.  
Global meaning not restricted to one country but not 
necessarily relating to all countries with equal application at the 
same time.  
Global regulation is that which applies to an industry on 
an ubiquitous basis in any country in the world.  The DNS is, for 
the purposes of this work, the central structure which is 
regulated in the same way wherever you are in the world using 
gTLD names such as .com, .net and .org names.  The name 
registration rules and policies of geographic TLDs, or more 
commonly, country code top level domains (ccTLDs) are 
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different.  The code that runs the network is, however, globally 
applicable. 
Globalisation Lewis & Slade (1997:  276) argue that 
there are four key elements to globalisation:  deregulation, 
privatisation, communications technology convergence and 
global cultural flows.  Held provides a useful definition and also 
includes related terms in his analysis.62 
Globalization can be conceived as a process (or set of processes) which 
embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and 
transactions, expressed in transcontinental or interregional flows and 
networks of activity, interaction and power (see Held and McGrew, et al, 
1999). It is characterized by four types of change. First, it involves a 
stretching of social, political and economic activities across frontiers, 
regions and continents. Second, it is marked by the intensification, or the 
growing magnitude, of interconnectedness and flows of trade, investment, 
finance, migration, culture, etc. Third, it can be linked to a speeding up of 
global interactions and processes, as the development of world-wide systems 
of transport and communication increases the velocity of the diffusion of 
ideas, goods, information, capital and people. And, fourth, the growing 
extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions can be associated 
with their deepening impact such that the effects of distant events can be 
highly significant elsewhere and specific local developments can come to 
have considerable global consequences. In this sense, the boundaries 
between domestic matters and global affairs become increasingly fluid. 
Globalization, in short, can be thought of as the widening, intensifying, 
speeding up, and growing impact of world-wide interconnectedness. 
Marketplace is a term that has traditionally implied a 
physical location.  For the purposes here, a marketplace is 
principally an on-line, electronic space which is not defined by 
geographic or physical boundaries.  In terms of the trade in 
domain names, most transactions happen online using credit 
card facilities and a simple web interface.  
Electronic commerce  “. . .the best definition of e-
commerce is. . .the broadest definition:  any transaction over 
the Internet involving the transfer of goods, services, or 
information, or any intermediary function, which helps enable 
                                   
62 http://www.polity.co.uk/global/globocp.htm.  Emphasis added. 
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those transactions.”63  The DNRI is a sub-set of electronic 
commerce. 
Meetings are both virtual and physical.  In terms of 
ICANN’s meeting schedule, the meetings take place in a rough 
rotation around the world to ensure, as far as possible, a wide 
variety of ICANN constituents can attend.  The meetings are also 
accessible in real time on the Internet. 
Disputes about market place behaviour, such as anti-
competitive conduct, misleading and deceptive conduct or 
cybersquatting can be resolved physically or virtually.  In this 
case, disputes means those which relate to internet protocol 
policies and standards, not disputes about the ownership of 
domain names. 
Influence drift is a phase used to describe the way in 
which influence over regulation is changing.  The phrase is 
applied to the drift from governments to private sector 
regulatory agencies, from personalities to processes as 
processes mature, from the corporate sector to regulatory 
agencies, domestically and internationally.  
Internet is a sophisticated distribution network for 
content, a facilitator of commercial transactions, a unique world 
of ideology and philosophy.  The Internet is also a technology, a 
network, and a highly developed cultural icon.  For the purposes 
of this work, I focus on the network layer of the Internet, not 
the applications which run on it.  
                                   
63 The fuller definition can be found at 
http://www.internetpolicy.org/briefing/3_00.htm, which is the full text of 
Armstrong’s views. 
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Key Actors and Corporations 
The glossary provides a detailed overview of key people and 
corporations.  The data in Appendix Two provides a 
comprehensive overview of the wide variety of corporations that 
have been involved in ICANN meetings and discussions.  The 
identification of key personalities and corporations is important 
because, whilst ICANN strengthens its policies and procedures, 
the power and influence of individual actors and corporations is 
important.  The transition to more objective regulatory criteria, 
such as a standard country code top level domain name space 
contract will mean that process is strengthened and the power 
of personality will decline.  As recent writing about digital divides 
demonstrates, there are still only a small number of people 
actively involved in Internet governance, despite the attempted 
development of a global Internet community.  
Methodology 
The work has been undertaken through a process of 
comprehensive textual analysis in tandem with professional 
work in the industry on a variety of levels.  Most of the actors, 
corporations, institutions and processes are well known 
professionally.  Statistically, information has been collected 
using publicly available data, supplemented by analysis from a 
variety of sources including the investment industry, the 
specialist domain name industry analysts at SnapNames.com 
who source their data from the DNS WHOIS tables. 
Research Scope 
The data for the research is constrained by information 
between November 1998 and November 2001.  The literature 
for the research is current to December 2002. 
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I turn now to Section B of the dissertation which sets out 
the core research findings.

 59 
SECTION B – CORE RESEARCH 
This section contains the chapters which contribute to 
the originality of the research and the key findings.  The 
chapters are focused on using the literature, the conceptual 
framework and the concept sets in tandem with data which 
has been collected.  They are used together to test and prove 
the hypothesis that national governments are losing both the 
right and the ability to regulate for the resolution of disputes 
in the DNS; that the regulation of disputes in an electronic 
marketplace is moving towards arrangements financed and 
enacted by the private sector and that, in return for the 
financing of that regulation, the private sector require a 
commitment from government to more flexible regulatory 
responses; and that the regulatory treatment of the DNS 
illustrates a fundamental and irrevocable shift away from 
centralised government regulation to private sector driven 
regulation. 
I turn now to Chapter Three which discusses a 
transition from numbering to naming which demonstrates the 
decline in policy importance of numbering and the rise of 
naming.  The chapter leads to a new philosophy of naming 
and highlights some changes in the way we think about the 
value of domain names in the context of the DNS.  
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CHAPTER THREE – NUMBERS TO NAMES OR IP VS 
IP®64 
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a distributed Internet directory 
service.  DNS is used mostly to translate between domain names and IP 
addresses, and to control Internet e-mail delivery.  Most Internet services 
rely on DNS to work, and if DNS fails, web sites cannot be located and e-
mail delivery stalls.65 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is about influence drift between numbers 
and names, from one IP to another.  It also demonstrates a 
drift from the ITU, a technical regulatory organisation, to 
WIPO which is more concerned with intellectual property 
ownership.   
Internet Protocol numbers (the first IP) are critical to 
the functioning of the DNS.  IP numbers are the unique 
number string used to identify devices connected to the 
network and ensure that users can find Internet addresses 
reliably and quickly66.   
Managing this function is central to ICANN’s mandate.  
Intellectual property is the second IP or, to prevent confusion, 
IP®.  IP® has overtaken IP as the main policy and economic 
driver of ICANN’s work.  IP happens as a matter of technical 
imperative and IP® drives some of broader policy functions 
                                   
64 This chapter is to be submitted to First Monday, an online peer reviewed academic 
journal.  http://www.firstmonday.org. 
65 From http://www.dns.net/dnsrd/, the DNS Resources Directory. 
66 In a March 2003 paper delivered to the ITU, the Council of European Top Level 
Domain Registries (CENTR).  
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around which ICANN’s work is centred, such as name 
registration policies, the use of registrant information and the 
nature of WHOIS tables. 
This influence drift and the focus on domain names 
rather than numbers demonstrate a clear shift from the 
technical management of a numbering system to the policy 
and politics of the allocation of names.  The right to allocate 
names falls into two parts.  The first is the right as an 
accredited registrar to sell names to end-user registrants.  
The second is the right of an accredited registry to put those 
names into the root server.  This is important because 
ICANN’s mission is about coordinating the allocation of 
globally unique identifiers such as domain names and 
numbers.  It coordinates the activities of registries and 
registrars.   
Domain names now have invested in them a set of 
values vastly different to the value of the DNS itself and the 
numbers that enable the DNS to work.  Taken together, the 
rise of importance of domain names and the system itself 
leads to a new philosophy of naming which extends the 
literature on both the value of the DNS and the value of 
names themselves. This is what I have called IP versus IP®.   
IP® seems to have become the more dominant force 
and, to explain this conclusion, I have set out three key 
sections to this chapter.  The first is a discussion of the DNS 
as a directory service.  The second discusses the value of 
domain names and methodologies for determining that value.  
The third discusses the impact on ICANN’s focus on the 
allocation of numbers and names.   
There are three other critical factors.  Firstly, it is 
specifically part of ICANN’s mandate to introduce competition 
in the provision of domain name registration services.  
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Secondly, one of ICANN’s key pieces of work has been the 
introduction of new gTLDs to increase the domain name space 
and, as a consequence, to make available more names to sell.  
Thirdly, the power of IP® holders has been central to ICANN’s 
policy making initiatives about the way in which domain 
names, as a reflection of intellectual property assets, can be 
used.  That power concerns setting policy for the registration 
of new names; for the control of cybersquatting; for rise in 
defensive registrations and for the development of UDRP.  
The general unevenness of national approaches to robust 
intellectual property protection also demonstrates another 
shift of regulation from governments to the private sector 
(and the strengthening of truly global markets) as IP® 
owners have sought to invest ICANN with the power to 
resolve disputes about the right to use domain names. 
We, perhaps, have a new way of thinking about names 
in general and about domain names in particular.  Control of 
the rulemaking for naming and the management of the 
effective use of technical assets to resolve unique numbers to 
unique names is critical to understanding the importance of 
the shift from IP to IP®. 
The Framework:  Early Directions 
The policy context for the discussion of a contest 
between IP and IP® is evident in one of the critical 
foundation documents of the thesis.   
The July 1997 Framework for Global Electronic 
Commerce says that “An Internet domain name functions as a 
source identifier on the Internet.  Ordinarily, source 
identifiers, like addresses, are not protected intellectual 
property (i.e., a trademark per se).  The use of domain 
names as source identifiers has burgeoned, however, and 
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courts have begun to attribute intellectual property rights 
[and therefore property and monetary value] to them, while 
recognizing that misuse of a domain name could significantly 
infringe, dilute, and weaken valuable trademark rights”67.   
Throughout the following sections, I track the extent to 
which the perceived value of domain names as intellectual 
property assets is increased by the successful application of 
special domain name registration privileges in the new gTLDs.  
The sunrise provisions in new gTLDs to enable famous name 
and trademark holders to register in a early rush on names is 
important in the valuing of names.  It means that defensive 
registrations can be made which shut out ordinary users who 
may, for example, have a legitimate claim to a famous name 
because it reflects their own business name or identity.  For 
example, Nissan, the car manufacturer, successfully wrested 
control of www.nissan.com from Mr Nissan.   
I examine what this policy has done to the value of the 
DNS as a directory service and to the value of the right to use 
a domain name.  It is necessary to go back several steps 
before the policy discussion can take place to put in context 
the technical characteristics of a network directory service. 
The Domain Name System:  Simple Directory? 
In determining a more robust philosophy that underpins 
the valuation of domain names, I consider the intrinsic value 
of the DNS and its characteristics as a database of unique 
numerical identifiers.  The DNS is now viewed as much more 
than a simple look-up table with numbers that identify 
disparately located computers or other devices.  However, the 
                                   
67 The Framework does not have page numbers.  The reference is found in the Section 
4 under the “Trademark and Domain Names” sub-section. 
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DNS is not the only directory service in use.  X.50068 was the 
internationally agreed standard for naming and addressing 
under the OSI model, sponsored largely by the 
telecommunications industry through the ITU.  Indeed, 
complete systems were established using the X.500 directory 
services. 
Until 1990, there was a possibility that the global 
Internet wouldn’t become more readily accessible to the 
general public because telecommunications companies were 
pushing X.500.  The X.500 could and did perform the same 
service as the DNS.  X.400 and X.500 were international 
standards and telecommunications companies wanted to 
leverage their voice telephone systems into systems that 
serviced data.   
Both global and national networks were established.  In 
Australia, Telecom’s (now Telstra) packet switching service 
was called AUSTPAC.  There were two completely separate 
services, the Internet architecture and the OSI architecture 
for networked systems.  There were also a number of 
proprietary schemes, for example, IBM’s Systems Network 
Architecture (SNA), Digital Equipment Corporation’s DECNet 
and Compuserve.  America OnLine (AOL), a comprehensive 
private network aimed at the general community rather than 
the corporate sector, dealt with resource identification 
challenges by developing catalogue style directories and a 
system of key words.  The Microsoft Network (MSN) was also 
developed with its own architecture and provided gateways to 
the Internet through what became known as portals to the 
wider Internet network.   
                                   
68 http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/sg17-q9.html 
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From these early attempts at private networks and 
directory services offerings, the Internet emerged as the 
preferred technology.  As a consequence, ICANN really 
started to matter in 1995, when the Internet became more 
commercially critical to a wider range of businesses, outside 
the early grouping of research and academic institutions.  
Even though the DNS was already in universal use, the 
rise of Mosaic69, Berners-Lee’s World Wide Web, and other 
search engines made the Internet more user-friendly.  With 
that usability, the desirability of owning a domain name 
increased dramatically.  
The DNS, as a directory service of unique electronic 
identifiers has received rapid and comprehensive market 
acceptance.  Market acceptance has been critical to the 
success of the DNS as a system.  In a commercial sense, this 
is most clearly evident by analysing the impact of 
corporations on the development of ICANN (discussed in 
detail in Chapter Six). 
Structurally, and this is why ICANN has attracted such 
interest, there is intrinsic value in the control of policies for 
the tables that perform the mapping function that resolves IP 
number strings to domain names. 
Two key processes then took on greater momentum.  
These are the development of the DNRI and the identification 
of value in domain names as another manifestation of 
intellectual property rights and assets.   
In a short space of time, the usability and 
attractiveness of a simple address book of names and 
                                   
69 The press coverage of the tenth anniversary of Mosaic features some critical 
commentary by Vint Cerf, now Chairman of ICANN.  Found at 
http://news.com.com/2009-1032-995680.html 
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numbers has grown in importance as its fundamental 
characteristics yield enormous commercial value to 
businesses and individual users alike. 
Rood’s (2000:  1)70 work on the characteristics of 
identifiers on electronic networks shows that “. . .Identifiers 
on electronic networks such as telephone numbers, domain 
names, IP-addresses and e-mail addresses are not only 
necessary components of information and communication 
technology (ICT) applications, but they have also become a 
new kind of information good that can be traded separately”.  
He argues that identifiers such as IP numbers “cannot be 
treated with standard information goods theory; they have 
very different economic and technical characteristics.  The 
main characteristics are excludability, network externalities 
and the lack of scale advantages in the daily operations of an 
identifier system.”   
I will deal firstly with uniqueness, or to use Rood’s 
description, ‘excludability’.  He rightly argues that there has 
been extensive and heated debate about the right to use a 
domain name.  A domain name is not actually for sale71.  
                                   
70 There are two key papers.  The July/August 2000 paper on characteristics of 
identifiers on electronic networks.  This paper has no page numbers and the page 
references are approximate.  Rood’s other undated paper is called “Are naming and 
numbering systems natural resources?”.  
71 Strictly speaking an individual or organisation does not own a domain name (or the 
underlying internet protocol address); domain names are held by registrants 
(domain name holders) who are granted a licence by the registry (which holds the 
list of names and corresponding numbers) to use the domain name.  Registrars have 
a direct relationship with the end-user which buys the license to use a name and 
transfers that licence when it is no longer required.  The name itself is not sold; the 
right to use it is.   
 That licence is similar to the licence for a specific telephone number.  In practice, it is 
common to refer to ownership and sale of domain names. Commercial interests have 
taken a robust view of ‘ownership’ versus ‘licence’, regarding them as an intangible 
that is analogous to intellectual property. The monetisation of domain names as 
intangible assets is complex and it includes the development of methods of valuation 
for sale, as an asset in commercial lending and as a good which is owned rather than 
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Instead, the right to use it for a specified period is on offer.  
Property rights are not naturally vested in leasing 
arrangements.  Fights about those names that “embody” 
either trademarks or famous names have created the most 
contentious discussion within ICANN and the Intellectual 
Property Constituency and international agencies, such WIPO, 
to whom ICANN has outsourced the resolution of disputes 
about domain name usage rights.  Rood shows that “. . 
.analysis of Domain Name registration statistics show 
substantial effects of policy reform on the growth in 
registered Domain Names.” (Rood 2000: 1) 
Rood also argues that, with respect to payments for 
domain names, “the question of who assigns and withdraws 
electronic identifiers has become a significant economic and 
policy issue. . .” (Rood 2000: 2)  I move, however, too 
quickly to what the network does rather than what it is.  I 
return to the value of domain names later in the chapter.   
Historically, the ITU72 has been instrumental in 
managing the global telephone numbering system.  The 
model for control has been for government agencies and 
                                                                                           
used.  Attempts to establish a market in name-futures and other derivatives, and 
recognition in formal valuations of dot com enterprises (reflecting developments in 
accounting practice such as aggressive valuation of newspaper and magazine 
mastheads) are an important aspect of debate about intellectual property, not the 
technical management of the DNS.  
 Changes to concept of names as property have been reflected in jurisprudence and 
legislation. For example, the US Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act specifically 
identifies names as property, to the extent that its in rem provisions provide for 
action against the name rather than the registrant.  Particular US Federal circuit 
courts have taken a sharply different view, with Justice Ware denying that a domain 
is property, as it is the equivalent of a telephone number.  
 More detailed sources about the possibilities of mortgages for domain names can be 
found at (news.bbc.com.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_533000/533455.stm and 
www.iplender.com/qa.html.    
72 The ITU has been involved in standardising a variety of global numbering identifiers.  For 
example, see http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/inr/index.html. 
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private sector representatives to work through policy, 
standards setting and enforcement on a multi-lateral basis.  
The numbering system on which the telephone network relies 
is based on entirely different principles of self-organisation, or 
rather more accurately, industry self-regulation.  Rood argues 
that “…much less attention [than that given to discussion of 
intellectual property issues] has been paid to the justification 
of government intervention or abstinence from Internet 
related identifier policy questions and the establishment of 
competition in the provisioning of identifiers on the Internet”.  
(Rood 2000: 3)  This competition is the key to the derivation 
of value from the network itself and in the development of 
new industries that use network identifiers as a tradeable 
commodity.   Competition creates market energy and 
innovation.  It also encourages a reduction in prices and an 
increase in customer expectations that drives the release of 
new products and services. 
Amongst other things, Rood argues that electronic 
network identifiers are different from telephone number 
identifiers especially where ”humans must use and remember 
the identifier, the length is constrained by mnemonic 
ergonomics”.  (Rood 2000: 3)  
The literature on the use of IP numbers is 
comprehensive and technical.73  The RFC series demonstrates 
the formation of a new set of electronic identifiers over which 
the ITU had (and still has) little authority.  What is obvious 
                                   
73 A full list of RFC documents is found on the Internet Society website at 
http://ietfreport.isoc.org/rfc-index.html.   Only a few RFCs become standards.  
Others, for example, provide information or are historic or experimental. 
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from the literature is that the DNS rapidly became too large74 
and complex for sophisticated strings of numbers to be any 
help to a regular user to find what they wanted.  The 
discussion about the difficulty of remembering a small set of 
numbers (around 400) is found in RFC 799 and suggests an 
alternative addressing system75.  This encouraged the 
development of online browsers and search engines which, 
most commonly, search for resources by the domain name, 
not the IP number. 
We have then three characteristics.  A network of 
computers and equipment, linked by an interoperable IP, 
managed principally by volunteers in academic and research 
organizations.  The use of unique numbers to identify devices 
connected to the network rapidly became too unwieldy.  This 
became acute when the Internet became generally more 
accessible to the public, when domain names became more 
desirable and when, around the same time, the National 
Science Foundation started to cut budget for Internet related 
research.  At the same time, there was tremendous political 
and commercial pressure to capitalise on the ability of the 
DNS to do more than provide communications services to the 
relatively small but global technical community. 
The development of domain names as more easily 
recognisable masks for IP numbers has been a critical part of 
the commercialisation of both the DNRI and the ongoing 
                                   
74 The Internet Software Consortium (http://www.isc.org/ds/) provides a wide array 
of data on, for example, the number of Internet hosts. The Internet Society 
(http://www.isoc.org/) also provides useful links to statistical information on the 
Internet.  It has also been argued, in understanding the emergence of the world 
wide web and the rise of the use in domain names rather than numbers, that domain 
names were a response to the user unfriendliness of purely numerical addressing.  
See, for example, Cailliau & Gillies (2000), Tehan (1999) and Berners-Lee (1999).   
75 http://ietfreport.isoc.org/rfc/rfc799.txt 
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development of the utility of applications on the Internet such 
as electronic commerce, electronic publishing and e-mail. 
In summary, the first component of value in a domain 
name is the value of the Internet network, the physical 
network and the protocols that enables it to function.  The 
primary function of the DNS is its intrinsic ability to uniquely 
identify Internet resources.  There is a differentiation between 
a functional value and a commercial value.  A functional value 
is defined as having something work as a tool.  The 
commercial value is what the market will pay for a good or 
service.   
Deriving Value from the Network and Domain 
Names 
The most direct and obvious example of the direct value 
created by the Internet network is the use of domain names.  
Domain names have become the easy to remember 
substitutes for the string of numbers which identifies devices 
(which are not just desktop computers but could, if one 
believes current advertising, as easily be fridges, PDAs and 
cars) on the Internet. 
In an increasingly commercialised domain name space, 
the value of domain names as resources, particularly as 
representations of trademarks or other intellectual property 
assets, becomes obvious.  The growth of an industry 
concentrating on the sale of domain names soon pushed 
numbers to one side.  This meant that, for all but a handful of 
specialists, the network was conceptualised in terms of names 
(and associated resource identification tools such as search 
engines and directories) rather than numerical addresses76.  
                                   
76 There has been little academic study of how consumers and policymakers 
conceptualise the Internet.  For example, an analysis of the way that metaphors 
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The realisation of the commercial criticality of the 
Internet has spawned two related debates.  The first is that 
the Internet is critical to many businesses; the second is that 
those businesses rely on their domain names to be found on 
the Internet.  However, those names (such as McDonalds or 
Caterpillar or Nike) are, in the offline world, fiercely protected 
brands and trademarks.  The fight for the right to use those 
special names online and exclusively has added complexity 
and colour to the debate.  It’s also driven prices for domain 
names up; created a speculator’s market and driven the 
development of policy that gives preferential treatment to 
trademark or famous name holders.  Well-resourced 
trademark owners have a significant economic advantage in 
exercising their rights to use a name, in spite of first come, 
first served rules.  It is not surprising then to see sunrise 
provisions for the new gTLDS such as .biz and .info.   
To review, this chapter summarises a period of 
uncertainty, change and rapid growth.  It also details the 
development of a set of values beyond those of the utility of a 
network that, in its early stages, was designed to link 
research resources.  Separating the functional value of the 
network from the value of the possibilities of the network is 
difficult. 
Domain names are valuable as identifiers [of 
information], navigators [to find resources] and as 
advertising vehicles [of products and services available on-
                                                                                           
such as the ‘information superhighway’ or ‘homesteading the new frontier’ have 
shaped market perceptions and regulatory responses.  A comprehensive analysis of 
coverage in the mass media is outside the scope of this work but the ‘discovery’ of 
the Internet by business and consumers appears to date from establishment of 
simple search engines which enabled ordinary users to find what they were looking 
for.  This searching centred on names rather than numbers. The phenomenon was 
reflected in contemporary and subsequent comments by IT specialists to the effect 
that the ability (and willingness) to code and engage with the infrastructure rather 
than the applications was a prerequisite for digital citizenship. 
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line].  Names have a use in and of themselves.  This has 
created an enormous amount of discussion about who ‘owns’ 
the ‘right’ to use a domain name.  The fact that domain 
names have become a manifestation of brand names and 
famous marks has extended the intellectual property dispute 
resolution literature and has given a value to a string of 
letters that, before the commercialisation of the Internet 
network, did not exist. 
Finally, domain names registration services are a stand-
alone business sector involving, at the international level, 
some 122 accredited ICANN registrars and, in the ccTLD 
realm, many thousand more.  Those businesses are, in turn, 
surrounded by a large number of agents, for example, law 
firms and Internet service providers which extends the retail 
presence of registrars.   
In addition, tracking the derivation of value from the 
DNS itself is important, as it provides a mechanism for 
analysing the influence drift between the engineer’s camp and 
the lawyer’s camp or IP versus IP®.  Lessig, in Code and 
Other Laws of Cyberspace, has described this as the West 
Coast (engineers) and East Coast (lawyers) divide. His 
characterization contains both the issues and the approaches 
to the argument that have arisen from each side.  There have 
been similar characterizations in Europe.  
However, the simplistic adoption of Lessig’s West-East 
dichotomy in the popular media and online should be treated 
with some wariness as it leaves out the less US-centric 
discussion of North-South issues which the civil society 
advocates have taken up.  Whilst interesting, the North-South 
divide is not discussed here.  It should be noted that the West 
Coast is the home of the majority of the entertainment and 
software industries and their associated legal advisors.  The 
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critical importance of lawyers as gatekeepers, deal makers 
and norm-setters is highlighted in works such as 
Understanding Silicon Valley:  The Anatomy of an 
Entrepreneurial Region, edited by Mark Kenney, and in 
particular the Suchman chapter on ‘Dealmakers and 
Counselors:  Law Firms as Intermediaries in the Development 
of Silicon Valley’. 
However, the engineer’s IP and the lawyer’s IP® create 
fundamentally different situations.  
The ferment of the intellectual property protection 
debate prompted an investigation into why names are so 
important and why ownership of them conferred advantage 
on some much more readily than on others.  This seemed 
inconsistent with the traditionally first-come first-served 
domain name registration rules in the .com, .net and .org 
domains.  
I have examined the creation (and extraction) of value 
in DNS resources and how some of that value is now manifest 
in the domain name industry.  If all names were equal, there 
wouldn’t be a speculative or secondary market for names that 
are expired or deleted from the registry.  In addition, 
valuation services, naming services and name portfolio 
management services wouldn’t have arisen.  The importance 
here of the discussion of the Wait List Service (WLS) cannot 
be underestimated as businesses (most notably Verisign and 
SnapNames) invested enormous regulatory resources in 
winning the WLS argument within ICANN77.  
The WLS debate is important for two reasons.  Firstly 
because it is an example of policymaking that, depending on 
                                   
77 See, for example, http://www.icann.org/bucharest/wls-topic.htm 
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the end result, extracts value from the characteristics of the 
DNS.  Use of highly refined software that predicts the 
availability of domain names (by querying the WHOIS tables) 
and matches those names with potential buyers has been a 
contentious issue.  Verisign, the operator of the .com registry, 
was seeking to provide this service in partnership with 
SnapNames.  Verisign is under contract with ICANN to 
provide the .com registry service. Those registrars against the 
proposal argue that the provision of the service is an 
unacceptable alteration of the ICANN-Verisign contract.  
Regulation by contract is the other reason why WLS issue is 
interesting here and in the broader research of which this 
paper is part.  
The analysis here does not explore the development in 
the domain name industry of UDRP, a manifestation of 
disputes about the right to use a name, not the technical 
management of the network that enables the electronic 
identifier to resolve to the name78.   
With that in mind, the second part of the question then 
shifts to the value of domain names.  Within the assessment 
of value, I look at both the usability of domain names and the 
commercial opportunities which the privatisation of the DNS 
has generated, most notably for domain name registration 
companies such as Verisign, Register.com, TUCOWS and 
MelbourneIT.  The value of domain names and the valuation 
processes used to determine value of domain names is highly 
subjective.  Unravelling the subjectivity of measuring value of 
the network and the valuation of domain names is the core of 
                                   
78 ICANN has outsourced policy for resolving intellectual property disputes to the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (http://www.wipo.org/about-wipo/en/index.html) 
and have adopted WIPO’s findings. 
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this chapter.  From this, we can make some assessment 
about the criticality of the control of the policies and 
procedures for managing the technical resources of the 
Internet for which ICANN is responsible. 
I go back to the value of the network.  The value of the 
DNS lies in the use of TCP/IP which enables computers (and 
the data they hold) to be connected in disparate locations.79  
With the basic understanding that IP numbers must be 
unique, we can move to a more detailed discussion of the 
implications of this in the context of what the Internet 
network does for the DNRI. 
Firstly, the commercialisation of the provision of 
registry services and registrar services has created a whole 
new industry.  The Clinton Administration’s Framework for 
Global Electronic Commerce80very specifically refers to 
Internet technology as having a “profound effect on the global 
trade in services”.  The document also recognises that “…The 
genius and explosive success of the Internet [actually 
applications that the Internet network can run] can be 
                                   
79 The ACM Crossroads primer on the foundations of Internet Protocol provides a 
helpful overview of IP and DNS (found at 
http://www.acm.org/crossroads/columns/connector/july2000.html).  IP and 
the DNS are inextricably linked.  The DNS matches computer addresses and 
numbers.  The critical extension to the domain name system is the matching of 
Internet number addresses to domain names.  The Internet network can function 
without domain names.  Users would just have to remember strings of numbers 
rather than more descriptive and easier to remember domain names.  Critically 
“…every host and router on the Internet has an address that uniquely identifies it 
and also denotes the network on which it resides. No two machines can have the 
same IP address. To avoid addressing conflicts, the network numbers have been 
assigned by the InterNIC (formerly known simply as NIC). . . .Blocks of IP addresses 
are assigned to individuals or organizations according to one of three categories--
Class A, Class B, or Class C. The network part of the address common for all 
machines on a local network. It similar to a postal code that used by a post office to 
route letters to a general area. The rest of the address on the letter (i.e., the street 
and house number) are relevant only within that area. It only used by the local post 
office to deliver the letter to its final destination. The host part of the IP address 
performs this same function.” 
80 Found at http://dcc.syr.edu/ford/course/e-commerce-framework.pdf. 
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attributed in part to its decentralized nature and to its 
tradition of bottom-up governance.”   
For the purposes here, the most important aspect of the 
Framework is the following discussion of standards. “The 
prevalence of voluntary standards on the Internet, and the 
medium’s consensus-based process of standards development 
and acceptance are stimulating its rapid growth.  These 
standards flourish because of a non-bureaucratic system of 
development managed by technical practitioners working 
through various organizations.  These organizations require 
demonstrated deployment of systems incorporating a given 
standard prior to formal acceptance, but the process 
facilitates rapid deployment of standards and can 
accommodate evolving standards as well.”81   
The Clinton Administration’s promotion of private sector 
leadership should lead and a ‘hands-off’ approach to 
regulation was both a response to criticisms by other 
governments (most notably the Europeans) that the US was 
trying to control the Internet and a recognition of the 
substantial commercial benefits that would flow to US-based 
businesses that were moving rapidly to exploit the 
commercialisation of the Internet network.  The value of the 
network was recognised very early by government 
policymakers, some of whom had, after all, been responsible 
for the network through the National Science Foundation82.  
                                   
81 The Framework document does not have formal page numbers.  The quotes here 
are at the end of the document.  
82 The history of the Internet network, from the National Science Foundation’s 
perspective, is found at http://www.nsf.gov/search97cgi/vtopic.  Most notably 
“…NSF limited the amount of time it would support CSNET. By 1986, the network 
was to be self-supporting. This was a risky decision, because in 1981 the value of 
network services was not widely understood.”  In hindsight, this changed rapidly.  
The network itself delivered value as did the applications that could run on it. 
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Devolving this value to the private sector enabled the network 
to develop under real-world commercial conditions in addition 
to enabling other industries, such as the DNRI, to evolve.   
This commercial evolution also directed much of the 
ICANN agenda as the technical management of critical 
infrastructure increasingly had significant commercial 
meaning.  A good case study of this is the process of adding 
seven new gTLD spaces,  .biz, .info, .pro, .name, .aero, .coop 
and .museum.83  
Multiple Values for Domain Names 
This analysis is confined to the value and valuation of 
domain names in the gTLD space, most particularly, those 
that end with .com. There are four key areas of value for 
domain names themselves, presuming that we can take as 
given that the growth of the network has given rise to domain 
names. 
I examine publicly available tools for valuing names. It 
should be noted that there is a disconnection between the 
value of numbers as navigation tools and the business 
models, revenue streams and economic conditions of the 
domain name industry.  It should also be noted that much of 
the industry information about the valuation of names is 
anecdotal.  
The privatisation of the DNS through ICANN’s contract 
with Network Solutions/Verisign introduced competition into 
                                   
83 ICANN’s announcement of the seven new gTLDs is found at 
http://www.icann.org/announcements/icann-pr16nov00.htm.  The 
announcement does not give any sense of the intense competition, lobbying 
and positioning that went on to win one of the very limited places.  This 
document lists the applicants http://www.icann.org/tlds/tld-applications-
lodged-02oct00.htm. 
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the provision of registry services, the control of a large 
database of IP numbers that match domain names. 
The valuation of domain names is a pseudo-science.   
There is uncertainty, not a little wizardry (as most of the 
valuers are male) and plenty of pure speculation.  
Cybersquatters, those that buy names speculatively in bad 
faith, have given speculation in domain names a bad name.  
With the implementation of anti-cybersquatting legislation in 
a number of jurisdictions and along with the downturn in the 
dot com sector, this problem seems to have dissipated.  
The domain name valuation sector within the DNRI is a 
commercial response to market demands for valuation of 
domain names. It embraces specialist businesses (many of 
which appeared during the dot com boom but no longer 
appear to be in existence), pundits and offshoots of registrars 
or entities in other DNRI sectors.  It addresses a global 
market. Its practitioners appear to be largely disconnected 
from the valuers of intangibles in other industries. Many of its 
consumers appear to be unaware of academic or industry 
debate about standards and methodologies for the valuation 
of financial derivatives or other intangibles (for example the 
valuation of consumer brands and newspaper mastheads) 
that would serve as a frame of reference for valuing domain 
names. 
The sector has not been publicly mapped and there is 
no substantial academic literature about its dimensions and 
evolution.  It appears to be volatile, with substantial changes 
over the past five years and plentiful criticism of business 
practices in the industry84. Information about revenue, 
                                   
84 Intervention by trade practices bodies has centred on competition policy (eg the 
VeriSign and MelbourneIT monopolies) and misleading claims by registrars/agents 
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personnel and mode of operation is uncertain. However, we 
can use some baseline conceptions to develop some ideas 
about valuations. 
Methodical Valuation:  Generic, Length, Industry 
Strength, Memorability 
 
There are no substantial offline works about criteria for 
valuing a domain name and the commercial acceptance of 
associated methodologies for valuing a large number of 
domain names. Most writing has featured as chapters within 
works on the valuation of intangibles.85 
Web-based materials that value domain names, despite 
claims to the contrary, are unsophisticated and use poorly 
articulated methodologies.86  The methodologies are not open 
to testing by third party sources and, as most of the valuers 
provide retail services (among other things) the independence 
of their claims cannot be tested87.   
                                                                                           
(eg ACCC against ING in Australia, DTI and FTC against alternative root vendors in 
UK and US). 
  85 For example, Smith and Parr’s 2000 work on Valuation of Intellectual Property & 
Intangible Assets.  Challenges in valuing dot coms are discussed by practitioners 
such as Anthony and Michael Perkins in The Internet Bubble (New York: Harper 
Collins 1999).  There is a more theoretical treatment in Shiller’s Irrational 
Exuberance and Schleifer’s Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioural 
Finance (New York: Oxford University Press 2000). 
86 In addition, some of the websites that offer guidelines for valuing names or value 
domain names appear to contain advertorial information rather than statistical 
analysis of the value of domain names.  Some examples of domain name valuations 
services include  www.domainguru.com, 
www.domainfellow.com/ezine/marketresearch/domainnamevaluation.asp, 
www.tangy.com/about/namescience.cfm.  The language used to characterise domain 
names has changed, reflecting movement from a subject that primarily concerned 
network engineers to one that now preoccupies other communities, in particular, 
trademark lawyers, and has featured in the mass media.  
   87  There are no widely agreed benchmarks within or outside the sector. Participants 
in the sector are not certified by government and there is no formal industry 
accreditation, or even a sector association.  Domain valuation does not feature on 
the curriculum of the twenty leading business schools, for example, Wharton, 
Columbia, Sloan, London or INSEAD) as of December 2002.  Domain name valuation 
 80 
For as long as domain name valuers also re-sell or 
speculate in names, the value of re-sold names and our 
understanding of the secondary market for domains names 
will remain uncertain. That uncertainty is exacerbated by 
suspicion about the accuracy and representativeness of some 
reported sales. There is no generally accepted global 
database covering secondary market activity.88  Not all sales 
are conducted by registrars and resale specialists (such as 
Afternic and GreatDomains) that publish prices sought or 
received.  Some sales occur on a private basis, in response to 
advertisements on a name by name basis.  
Some journalists appear to have confused major prices 
sought for domain names with prices actually paid. There are 
recurrent suggestions that claimed million-dollar sales did not 
actually take place. And the handful of .com, .net and .org 
names resold for six figure sums are arguably not 
representative of most transactions or indeed of most 
domains.    
There are some famous cases of domain names being 
sold for enormous prices89 but, with the passing of stronger 
intellectual property protection laws in the US such as the 
                                                                                           
has attracted little attention from writers in academic business literature, in contrast 
to research on methodologies for the valuation of dot-com enterprises. 
88 The absence of authoritative figures is rarely discussed but presumably discouraged 
consumer scepticism about claims such as “Domain name speculation is probably the 
very best way to make money on the Internet and probably one of the least known!  
It is also easy, takes a very low investment and has a huge profit potential. 
Businesses and webmasters are always looking for high-quality marketable domain 
names and will pay you big bucks if you have the name they want. Many people are 
making a good living buying and selling domain names. And you can too. … no other 
investment has revealed as rewarding and profitable than Domain Names!” 
(http://www.nichunt.com/why.php3 visited 18 December 2002) 
89 An indicative list can be found at 
www.domainfellow.com/ezine/marketresearch/exhibit1.asp.  Most notable about this 
list is the date.  The prices indicate the economic conditions and speculative frenzy 
surrounding domain names. 
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1999 Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act, the intervention of 
WIPO in dispute resolution mechanisms and the downturn in 
economic conditions since April 2000, the speculative market 
seems to have dropped away.  
The high prices achieved for some names may indicate 
other factors at work:  such as, the impetus from the finance 
industry, the practice of defensive registrations and the 
advice of trademark lawyers.  However, an unwilling buyer 
and unwilling seller set a price for any commodity.  
The third, broader area of domain name value is that 
numbers and names together have created a commodity 
industry for domain name registrars and a range of 
enterprises concerned with valuation services.  It is a 
predictable outcome of the introduction of competition but the 
price of domain names is now, compared to its early days, so 
cheap (around US$6) that the profit margins for registrars 
have dropped considerably.  At the same time, for end-users 
the affordability of domain names has increased.90   
A wide variety of statistics are available about the 
market capitalisations (such as Register.com’s Annual 
Report), market position statistics and general market 
analysis such as US Bancorp Piper Jaffray’s report on 
consolidation in the domain name industry and NASDAQ stock 
prices on selected publicly listed companies, for example, 
Verisign, Register.com and TUCOWS.  The market value of 
the industry has reflected the spikes and troughs of the 
information economy.  Network Solutions was, for example, 
                                   
90 Several million names haven’t been renewed over the last few years which may 
indicate three things.  Speculative registrations are not providing the returns they 
once did; defensive registrations are perceived as unnecessary and, more generally, 
economic conditions have had a dramatic impact on online businesses which need a 
domain name to operate.  Further statistics about non-renewed names can be found 
at http://www.sotd.info/sotd/Content/Documents/sotdQ302.pdf. 
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acquired by Verisign for US$21 billion in stock in late 1999.  
At the same time, Verisign’s major competitor Register.com, 
was capitalised at around $US200 million.  The market 
capitalisation of both companies is, in 2003, considerably 
reduced91.  A discussion about the value of names and the 
methods for determining domain name value is complex.   
The common literature on valuing domain names is, in 
the context here, important only because the cost:price ratio 
of the DNRI business has put direct pressure on the DNS and 
the way in which the DNS is managed.  
The broader marketing and branding literature is useful 
here and, at a superficial level, appears to relate to domain 
names.  I examine this part of the equation by comparing the 
attractiveness and availability of .au names as compared to 
those in the gTLD space.   
The value of an .au name resides in several areas, one 
of which is to identify uniquely Australian businesses.  For 
example, RM Williams is an immediately recognisable 
Australian business and, even if RM Williams did own the 
rmwilliams.com equivalent, it is most likely that the company 
would (and does) use the rmwilliams.com.au name to ensure 
that one significant feature of their brand (that of 
Australianess) is signified through the domain name.  In 
addition, one would expect that RM Williams would have 
defensively registered the rmwilliams.com and 
rmwilliams.com.au names to prevent anyone else from using 
them.  However, I limit the discussion here to the value of 
.com and .net names as that group provides the largest 
                                   
91 For example, Register.com and Verisign’s annual reports found on their respective 
websites, market position statistics found at State of the Domain 
(http://www.sotd.info). 
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sample size, is the most commonly fought over in UDRP 
cases, and is the subject of the most comprehensive value 
analysis.   
The length of a domain name is one consideration.  The 
limited domain name valuation literature gives little 
information about the optimum length for a domain name.  It 
has been argued that the shorter a domain name the more 
value it has but this has not been assessed in any robust way. 
We could draw parallels with telephone numbers and that 
beyond roughly ten numbers, most people have trouble 
remembering the number string.   
Another assertion is that value inheres in the particular 
industry. The more identifiable an industry is, such as cars, 
flowers, insurance, the more valuable the name. The 
assertion is problematical because it appears to be based on 
perceptions of major areas of consumer spending (much 
popular writing about e-commerce is predicated on business-
to-consumer activity being the ‘only game in town’) without 
any consideration of market structures, competition and 
external promotion92.   
Memorability is another consideration which is tied 
closely to domain name length.  A name that is memorable,  
either because it is a famous name or mark or a newly made 
word (like Accenture, Avilent) or a re-purposed name (like 
Monday), seems to have more value.  Memorability also 
means that an end-user could make a reasonable guess about 
a domain name address rather than using a search engine. 
                                   
92 Examples of e-commerce enthusiasm are Canter and Siegel’s 1994 How to Make a 
Fortune on the Information Superhighway (arguably the beginning of the e-biz 
genre), Bloor’s 2000 The Electronic Bazaar, Carpenter’s 2000 eBrands:  Building an 
Internet Business at Breakneck Speed and Cohan’s 1999 Net-Profit and 2000 e-Profit 
and De Kare-Silver’s 1998 E-shock.  Hype about e-commerce is questioned in John 
Cassidy’s 2003 dot con:  The Real Story of Why the Internet Bubble Burst. 
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The importance and commercial value of names 
(whether they are priced as a wholesale or retail commodity) 
has transferred to the numbers beside them, in the database, 
a value and importance not previously associated with the 
DNS.   
Management of the technical standards for 
interoperable networks has had commercial, policy driven 
value ascribed to it.  In addition, competition rules now apply 
where previously monopoly service sufficed.  Access to these 
resources is perceived to require more than market based 
control mechanisms or simple contractual arrangements. 
The essential feature is that names are for people and 
IP numbers (or addresses) are for computers.  This 
fundamental dichotomy is borne out in both the gTLD space 
and the ccTLD space.   
Generic names, that is those that identify a particular 
sector such as ‘cars’, ‘flowers’, ‘shop’, ‘mortgage’, ‘loans’ were 
promoted by many pundits and vendors as having unique 
intrinsic value, sufficient to justify million dollar prices on the 
secondary market. The rationale appears to reflect what one 
critic characterised as the AOL’s ‘walled garden’ model, an 
echo of Internet addressing prior to development of domain 
names and browsers. 
That model assumed that the online population was 
unable or unwilling to independently identify resources (and 
would remain so) and thus required the network operator to 
search for them, providing them with a limited number of 
options. Enterprises would pay handsomely to be identified 
through the AOL keyword or obtain a generic domain name 
that would deliver them substantial traffic by default.  
In practice the walled garden model hasn’t been 
successful, partly because surfers have come to use a range 
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of navigation tools over the past five years (for example, 
hyperlinks from websites, URLS featured in broadcasts and 
print, citation-based search engines such as Google, word of 
mouth, recommendations by e-mail) and partly because early 
adopters of the web strongly influenced later generations to 
roam freely rather than stay passively within a digital 
reservation.  
Conclusions:  Network Numbers, Domain Names 
and New Value 
 
The research here has made the following conclusions.  
There is an intrinsic value in the DNS.  It enables information 
and resources to be efficiently located and managed.  The 
unique number to computer pairing is critical to the robust 
management of the Internet.  Control of the management of 
those assets and the policies enabling their effective use are 
critical to understanding the policy and political importance of 
the shift from IP numbers to the widespread use of domain 
names. 
I have demonstrated that the value of domain names is 
derived from a multitude of perspectives including the 
valuation of intellectual property assets and branding, 
navigational utility, critical commercial reliance by businesses, 
usability and functional communication. 
The commercialisation of basic Internet architecture 
and network resources has given rise to the widespread use 
of domain names as Internet resource locators.  The domain 
name registration industry has capitalized on the 
commercialization of domain names to sustain an industry in 
itself and to make Internet applications much more intuitive 
and affordable. 
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The drift from infrastructure value to name value has 
driven ICANN and other ccTLD regulators such as .auDA, 
CIRA and Nominet to devise equitable domain name 
registration policies.   Whilst ICANN (like other country code 
administrators such as .auDA and CIRA)  may be “a technical 
coordination body for the Internet [responsible] for a set of 
technical functions that coordinates the assignment 
of…identifiers that must be globally unique for the Internet to 
function: Internet domain names, IP address numbers and 
protocol parameter and port numbers. . .”93, it also 
determines, by its policies and procedures, the commercial 
success of Internet applications.  Control and management of 
the numbering function is a technical matter that has caused 
little controversy.  The numbering function and the allocation 
of number blocks is straightforward. Allocation of names is 
more complex and more contested. 
The management of naming and all the variables 
associated with domain names rather than numbers has 
created and distributed value to the DNS.  Understanding that 
new value and apportioning it fairly is the critical complication 
of ICANN’s work.  This is borne out in the process for the 
allocation of new gTLDs, in changes to policies about the 
deletion and transfer of domain names, in the policies to 
protect the rights of intellectual property holders and in the 
more general market discussion about the use and utility of 
domain names.  
Klensin argues, from a technical perspective, the results 
of globalisation are as follows.  “Convenience of typing, and 
the desire to make domain names out of easily-remembered 
                                   
93 From ICANN’s mission statement found at http://www.icann.org. 
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product names, has led to a flattening of the DNS, with many 
people now perceiving that second-level names under COM. . 
.are all that is meaningful (this perception has been 
reinforced by some domain name registrars who have been 
anxious to ‘sell’ additional names.  And, of course, the 
perception that one needs a top-level domain per product, 
rather than a (usually organizational) collection of network 
resources has led to a rapid acceleration in the number of 
names being registered, a phenomenon that has clearly 
benefited registrars charging on a per-name basis. . .but has 
not obviously benefited the Internet as a whole”  (Klensin 
2000:  3). 
Lessig argues that cyberspace is controlled by its 
architecture and the software code which runs it.  I have 
found it to be more complicated than that.  Even with all the 
argumentation about who controls what, the DNS itself is 
protected by underlying fear.  Fear that the whole system will 
fall over and no one dares touch the goose which lays golden 
eggs.  
Finally, Irlam, writing in 1997, argues that “the 
tremendous economic value of the Internet is a result of the 
global interconnection of documents, e-mail addresses, 
computers, and ultimately people. . . .The interconnection of 
people [and the creation of secondary markets] via e-mail is 
the result of the use of a global e-mail address space”.  He 
continues by observing that “great economic value is derived 
from the fact that a single authoritative DNS database exists, 
and that all host names are interpreted within this single 
context”.  (Irlam 1997:  4) .  Irlam’s views are borne out in 
developments since 1997.  Control the name; control the 
commerce. 
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I turn now to an examination of the formation of ICANN 
and the creation of a new fulcrum of regulatory power. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - ICANN AND THE SHIFTING 
FULCRUM OF REGULATORY POWER 
Given the exponential growth of the Internet, legal institutions face 
serious questions, not only about how to regulate the Internet, but also 
about whether it should be regulated at all94 
A cycle that moves between phases of unbridled self-interest and 
collective self-restraint95 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed description of ICANN, 
its constitution and operations.  ICANN is specifically 
responsible for the technical coordination of the DNS.  It is 
designed to be a globally representative body that makes 
policy and implements decisions about the ongoing stability 
and utility of the DNS96.  
Structured as a global organisation with headquarters in 
Marina del Rey, California, ICANN is constituted as a non-
profit corporation under Californian statute97.  A small staff 
and a Board of Directors from each of ICANN’s five 
geographic regions98 run ICANN.  The implications of an 
                                   
94 Yee, Fen Lim (2002:  1) 
95 A statement, unrelated to ICANN, and made in the context of Abolafia’s work on the 
creation of markets that could equally describe ICANN. 
96 The February 2001 Congressional Testimony by Mike Roberts (ICANN’s first CEO) 
gives a good overview of many of the issues surrounding ICANN in its early phase.  
http://www.icann.org/correspondence/roberts-testimony-14feb01.htm. 
97 The original By-Laws and subsequent revisions are found at 
http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/.   
98 The commitment to geographic diversity is part of ICANN’s by-laws found at 
http://www.icann.org/yokohama/geo-topic.htm.  The geographic diversity 
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organisation government by California statute are many and 
varied.  The first is a matter of perception.  Great efforts were 
made to create mechanisms that reflected the global nature 
of the ICANN experiment and the shift away from US 
dominance of control of the Internet.  Locating the offices in 
California was seen by some, more as a perception than 
perhaps fact, as a continuation of that control.  The first staff 
members99 of ICANN were all American.  Again, this is a 
matter of perception.  I doubt that there was ever a direct 
attempt to ensure that the staff were sourced more broadly.  
(This is changing as the organisation matures.)  Perceptions 
of diversity, in an atmosphere of attempts to be more globally 
attuned, were not met.  The more important issue is that of 
the impact of Californian statute.  The US legal tradition has 
driven the constitution, by-laws, contracts and negotiating 
style of the organisation.  None of this is necessarily negative, 
it just means that, in attempts to be more global, US legal 
tradition has driven the core of organisation. 
Having said all that, the office needed to be located 
somewhere, the process started somehow and Marina del Rey 
is as good a location as any.    
The chapter concentrates on the development of 
ICANN’s mission, mandate and work focus between November 
1998 and November 2001.  The statistics found in the 
Appendices illustrate data about ICANN that has not been 
previously collected or analysed.  The data supports the 
hypothesis that regulatory arrangements are now financed 
                                                                                           
characteristic is to ensure that decisionmaking is distributed out of North America 
and reflects a broader Internet community.  The geographic diversity rules are also 
designed to capture differing skills and expertise from a broad pool of experts. 
99 For example, CEO Mike Roberts, General Counsel Louis Touton, Vice President and 
CFO Andrew McLaughlin. 
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and enacted by the private sector.  Participation rates and 
types of organisations represented are detailed in the charts.   
The chapter also explains the formalisation of a culture 
of volunteerism or the ‘delegation’ process100.  Postel’s 
delegates were a group of experts, who took responsibility for 
particular portions of the Internet hierarchy, maintained zone 
files and, in many cases, assisted in the ongoing development 
of RFCs that improved the working of the DNS.  The chapter 
is also about the development of formal regulatory responses 
to the peculiarities of the DNS that enables a global 
communications network to work. 
ICANN has attracted comprehensive but often uneven 
and alarmist media coverage101; it has been criticised from 
within its own constituencies102 and by a range of 
outsiders103.  It seems, however, that the organisation has 
been accepted as the least intolerable alternative.  Efforts for 
reform of its By-Laws, whilst outside the scope of the work, 
have been well received and are now being implemented.  
The distinction between ICANN’s policy-making role as a 
triage point for competing interests and its administrative, 
secretariat-like role is often blurred and has been the cause of 
dissension. 
                                   
100 I have referred previously to the delegates as Postel’s Apostles. 
101 For example, by such diverse publications as the now defunct on-line journal Red 
Herring (www.redherring.com), the Washington Post (www.washingtonpost.com) 
and the Australian Financial Review (www.afr.com) in addition to ICANN “critic” sites 
such as ICANNWatch (www.icannwatch.org). 
102 The criticisms are comprehensively encapsulated in the Lynn Proposals for reform 
and subsequent reports by the Evolution and Reform Committee at 
http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm. 
103 For example, the ITU at http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/tsb-director/itut-
icann/reservations.html and the Information Technology Association of America 
http://www.itaa.org/govt/cong/c19990722.htm. 
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ICANN’s responsibilities are specifically identified on its 
website and include the following: 
Specifically, ICANN coordinates the assignment of the following identifiers 
that must be globally unique for the Internet to function: 
 Internet domain names 
 IP address numbers 
 Protocol parameter and port numbers  
In addition, ICANN coordinates the stable operation of the Internet's root 
server system.   
As a non-profit, private-sector corporation, ICANN is dedicated to 
preserving the operational stability of the Internet; to promoting 
competition; to achieving broad representation of global Internet 
communities; and to developing policy through private-sector, bottom-
up, consensus-based means. ICANN welcomes the participation of any 
interested Internet user, business, or organization. 104 
The words in bold are important.  They are priorities 
which are, in many circumstances, contradictory.  For 
example, operational stability and the introduction of new 
gTLDs creates tension as does the introduction of 
competition.  The economic friction of competition can be 
seen most obviously in the number, type, location and service 
offerings of registrars and the tightly held market share of the 
largest registrars105.  There are inherent tensions between a 
commitment to a global Internet community consultation 
process and the development of consensus-based policy.  The 
global rules for managing a technical network are not the 
same as the creation of a global community or the rules for 
the engagement of that community.  The size and nature of 
                                   
104 http://www.icann.org, emphasis added. 
105 The list of ICANN accredited registrars is at 
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html. 
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the Internet community has not been defined.  For example, 
it has always been unclear whether the community is anyone 
with an e-mail address, anyone registering as an At-Large 
member of ICANN or anyone with a domain name, or anyone 
who uses the Internet106.  The development of consensus 
policy across vastly divergent cultural, linguistic, philosophical 
and commercial factors presents challenges for any 
organisation, not least ICANN. 
Some of these contradictions are contained in the 
equations which have emerged from this research.  These are 
stewardship and ownership; trusteeship and control; non-
commercial and commercial use of Internet resources and 
international and national treatment of regulatory problems.  
ICANN operates under philosophies of stewardship, 
trusteeship and the international treatment of regulatory 
problems in an environment where commercial use of the 
Internet now far outweighs its non-commercial utility.  The 
philosophies and the usage are, sometimes, diametrically 
opposed.   
I turn now to a brief examination of the historical 
documents which led to the formulation of ICANN and which 
explains some the tensions within the equations. 
                                   
106 The relatively new At-Large Advisory Committee says that the ALAC “is responsible 
for considering and providing advice on the activities of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), as they relate to the interests of individual 
Internet users (the "At-Large" community). ICANN, as a private sector, non-profit 
corporation with technical management responsibilities for the Internet's domain 
name and address system, will rely on the ALAC and its supporting infrastructure 
(At-Large groups all over the world) to involve and represent in ICANN a broad set of 
individual user interests”.  Emphasis added.  Found at http://alac.icann.org. 
 94 
Foundation Documents107 
The RFC series provides a comprehensive picture of 
how Internet protocols evolved and developed into a 
formalised regulatory system108.  The RFC series is still active 
and is constantly changing.  The RFCs show the technical 
backdrop from which ICANN has drawn its co-ordinating 
functions and from which it draws its mandate. 
The policy documents that are the basis for the 
formulation of ICANN and its implementation are found in full 
in the Supplementary Material to this dissertation.  The first is 
the US Government’s Framework for Global Electronic 
Commerce which provides the policy context from which 
ICANN was derived.   At the time, the Clinton Administration 
had followed from the Reagan and Thatcher administrations 
which emphasised, amongst many other things, small 
government and a commitment to more effective industry 
self-regulation.   
The role of the US Government cannot be understated 
in the formation of ICANN.  Indeed, ICANN continues to 
report to the Department of Commerce about its progress and 
its achievements.  The general policy framework in which the 
establishment of ICANN took place is identified by Braithwaite 
and Drahos as the tension between national sovereignty and 
global rules.   Their work can also be mapped onto the 
involvement of other governments (particularly those in the 
European Union) and agencies (such as the ITU).   However, 
                                   
107 Christine Borgman’s 2000 book, From Gutenberg to the Global Information 
Infrastructure:  Access to Information in the Networked World, places the 
development of the Internet in context.  
http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ provides an interesting timeline of 
broader developments that have had an impact on the construction of the Internet. 
108 Found at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc.html. 
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the agenda for the formation of ICANN; its role and 
procedures; its constitution and governance and the main 
participants were clearly from the United States.   
As this work is about the orderly development of 
globally applicable standards and norms for managing the 
critical technical infrastructure of the Internet, it is helpful to 
see the broader policy continuum in which the institution 
responsible for that development exists.   The five principles 
stated in the Framework109 refer to two critical points.  The 
first is that the public sector would take the lead in 
determining regulatory outcomes for electronic commerce.  
Whilst the document does not specifically refer to the DNS, 
the overt theme of the Internet as a medium with minimal 
government regulation is clear.  The Framework stresses the 
need for governments to understand the uniqueness of the 
Internet, as a global system and one that should be treated 
differently from other network industries.  It also states that 
“. . .the Internet is emerging as a global marketplace” and 
argues for consistent legal principles at a global level.  
Section 9 on technical standards argues that “standards are 
critical to the long term commercial success of the Internet as 
they can allow products and services from different vendors 
to work together”.  This statement formalised sentiments 
developed over many years through the RFC process. 
The second foundation document is the US Department 
of Commerce’s 2 July 1997 Request for Comment on DNS 
Administration110.  The document reflects a policy 
                                   
109 The document does not have page numbers.  For reference purposes, I have 
referred to the closest section number. 
110 Found at Part B, Supplementary Material. 
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environment in which the Global Information Infrastructure 
policy was being pushed from the United States to other 
countries (taken up in NII policy frameworks) and which 
demonstrated a commitment to minimal governmental 
intervention in electronic commerce.  The document 
expresses concern that “. . .the enormous growth and 
commercialization of the Internet has raised numerous 
questions about current domain name registration systems” 
and recognises that the arrangements between Network 
Solutions and the National Science Foundation were due to 
expire in 1998111.   
Whilst it was recognised that the Internet had been 
derived from research priorities, there was support for 
“private sector leadership for the Internet and a [belief] that 
the transition to private sector control should continue”.  This 
thinking aligned with the Framework document, the GII and 
the NII.  This trend towards smaller government and greater 
private sector initiatives for industry self-regulation was also 
occurring in the concurrent deregulation of the 
telecommunications sectors. 
The 1997 Request for Comment document posed many 
questions and sought suggestions as to how best to proceed.  
Most notably, and reflected in the development and early 
structure of ICANN, the document focused on principles, 
organisational issues, expansion of the gTLD space and 
registry policy.  
On 20 February 1998, as a result of feedback and 
commentary on the Request for Comment, A Proposal to 
Improve the Technical Management of Internet Names and 
                                   
111 The document does not have page numbers.  This discussion is found in the 
Background section. 
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Addresses was released.  This document took into account 
substantial public comment, from governments, corporations 
and the broader Internet community. 
The momentum towards the development of a new 
system illustrates a fundamental and irrevocable shift away 
from centralised government regulation to private sector- 
driven regulation which is the third part of the hypothesis 
being tested here. 
That momentum, both in a US domestic political context 
and more broadly in international forums, coalesced around a 
series of principles which included stability, competition, 
private bottom-up coordination and representation.  These 
four principles are manifest in ICANN’s mission statement. 
Movement from policy principles to the formulation of a 
structure for the organisation took place through a US 
Government policy statement.  The 5 June 1998 Management 
of Internet Names and Addresses (or White Paper) reflected 
the views of the US Government and the broader 
international community.  It solidified the move towards 
private sector regulation of the technical resources of the 
Internet. 
The White Paper provides the historical background, 
policy context, political and commercial environment and 
operational framework for the construction of ICANN as an 
organisation. 
The Paper also reflects the involvement of other 
international organisations such as the Internet Society 
(ISOC), ITU and WIPO that had earlier participated in the 
International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC).  The IAHC had been 
vitiated by claims it was dominated by business or non-US 
interests and thus had failed to produce a workable solution 
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to the representativeness required for a global regulatory 
organisation.  
The White Paper identified the four coordinating 
technical functions that would be ICANN’s responsibility112.  
These were setting policy for and directing the allocation of IP 
number blocks; to oversee the operation of the Internet root 
server system; to oversee policy for determining the 
circumstances under which new top level domains would be 
added to the root server and to coordinate the assignment of 
other Internet technical parameters to maintain universal 
connectivity on the Internet. 
Aside from the articulation of policy and the 
identification of key technical functions, the White Paper sets 
out the operational priorities of the new corporation.  These 
should be “fair, open and pro-competitive, protecting against 
capture by a narrow group of stakeholders. . .Finally, the 
commercial importance of the Internet necessitates that the 
operation of the DNS system, and the operation of the 
authoritative root server system should be secure, stable, and 
robust”113. 
The November 1998 Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the US Department of Commerce and the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Number (MoU) 
demonstrates the intention to make the transition proposed in 
the previous papers.  As the final foundation document, the 
MOU indicates that, despite the commitment to private sector 
management of the DNS, there would be a test-bed phase 
prior to formally handing arrangements to the private sector. 
                                   
112 Found at the end of Section Two. 
113 This section is found just prior to the discussion on Transition. 
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The reluctance to immediately shift to the new system 
was evident in the DoC’s need for “assurances that the 
private sector has the capability and resources to assume the 
important responsibilities related to the technical 
management of the DNS”.  This meant, in practice, whether 
there would be a consistent supply of funding to enable 
ICANN to do its work.  These significant budgetary constraints 
are discussed in more detail below because they form the 
core of why ICANN has struggled to implement its mission.  
The early budget estimates of $750,000 - $1 million were 
provided by loans and assistance in kind from a variety of 
sources114. 
To revise quickly, the discussion in Chapter Two pointed 
to a clear set of historical regulations of the DNS.  It became 
obvious that the responsibility for the DNS had rapidly 
become too much for the legion of volunteers, most notably 
Dr Postel, to manage effectively115.   It was clear that those 
who had taken the lead in managing the technicalities of the 
DNS, the IETF within the ISOC structure, were under some 
pressure to broaden the base of constituents with some say 
about the nature of DNS management.   
At the same time, “…Like the Internet itself, the IETF 
has no official governmental charter or formal membership 
requirements.  Rather it comprises a series of working groups 
formed to deal with specific technical problems and to come 
up with implementable solutions to them”.  (Baer 1997:  542)  
This situation became untenable and, in addition to internal 
                                   
114 These donors are identified in the Glossary.  The budget for 2002 shows that 
expenditures and revenues have grown markedly 
(http://www.icann.org/financials/budget-fy02-03-28jun02.htm) 
115 In the Australian context, this is discussed fully in Chapter Seven. 
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US Government policy directions, there were growing external 
pressures from other governments to share the management 
of a set of global resources, as policy about the Internet 
moved to the fore in some key administrations.  For example, 
Australia established the National Office for the Information 
Economy (NOIE) which focuses specifically on electronic 
commerce, the Internet and encouraging, amongst other 
things, the adoption of on-line applications116. 
The US Government was under some pressure to 
spread the regulatory responsibility (and commercial 
advantage) around to other parts of the world.  The 
documents listed in the Supplementary Materials provide a 
clear outline of the policy context, the US Government 
response and the resultant early structure of ICANN.  Baer 
discusses, in a comprehensive table, the international 
organisations which have responsibility for technical 
coordination (Baer 1997: 544).  They include the ITU and the 
ISO but he notes that “the bureaucratic structures and formal 
processes of these agencies [and others like the OECD, WIPO, 
World Bank and WTO] hamper their ability to keep up with 
rapidly changing technologies and markets” (Baer 1995:  
544).  It is moot whether ICANN’s processes are more 
efficient or yield better results but the clear intention has 
been to shift regulatory responsibility to the private sector.  
That much has been achieved. 
Lance argued that “Over the last few years much 
attention has focused on the DNS, as its functionality, so 
essential to Internet integrity, seems to have shifted from 
engineering utility to controversial cash cow. . .”  (Lance 
                                   
116 The NOIE website provides an indexed list of their project priorities.  
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/index.htm. 
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1998:  1).  The four foundation documents discussed here are 
evidence of responses to the commercial criticality of the 
Internet as a communications system, identified in the early 
1990s and evidenced in the dot com boom during the late 
1990s and early stages of 2000. 
The foundation documents also explain why “. . .the 
commercialization and globalization of the Internet…initiated 
a debate of privatising and distributing internationally the 
responsibility for coordinating name and address assignment.  
It also initiated intense economic conflicts about the principles 
governing the assignment of domain names”  (Mueller 2000b:  
5). 
ICANN’s structure is governed by a set of By-Laws 
which guide the everyday running of the organisation and its 
ability and authority to make decisions117.  The By-Laws 
enshrine a commitment to open and transparent procedures; 
set the structure of supporting organisations; the 
establishment of special committees; determine who can be 
Board Directors, where they should be from, how much they 
should be paid (and specifically exclude government 
representatives from being on the Board) and the nature of 
ICANN staff.  
Whilst ICANN was tasked with technical management 
functions, those functions have, very often, policy and 
political implications.  Mueller argues that 
“…commercialization transformed the nature of domain 
names as much as the business of registering them.  Domain 
names before had been nothing more than user-friendly 
addresses.  In a commercial marketplace, however, they 
                                   
117 The By-Laws have undergone substantial revision since early late 1998.  The full list 
can be found at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/. 
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came to be seen as marketing tools and brand names, the 
catchier and more advertisable the better” (Mueller 2000b:  
9).  This has meant that ICANN does not just make technical 
decisions.  It determines the fate of many commercial 
enterprises and is a critical driving force in the economics and 
potential of electronic commerce.  This commercialisation is 
the motivation for the corporate strategy discussed in Chapter 
Six.  I turn now to a discussion of the key actors which, on 
the basis of the foundation documents, enabled ICANN to 
operate. 
People & the Constituencies 
The culture of volunteerism in Internet governance is 
traceable from the late 1960s.  The committed group of 
volunteers came from a small pool of academics and research 
professionals118.   Jon Postel119 typified the personalities that 
have dominated the development of the Internet.  In the 
Australian context, Robert Elz was another of the core group 
of technical experts given responsibility for portions of the 
Internet hierarchy.  Elz’ role is discussed in detail in Chapter 
Seven on Internet governance in Australia. 
One of the most interesting features of ICANN is the 
wide diversity of individual actors120 who have dominated the 
                                   
118 The summary at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml gives an overview 
of some of the earliest individuals responsible for developing portions of protocol 
which, when taken together, form the Internet system. 
119 Comprehensive information can be found through the ICANN website at 
http://www.postel.org/jonpostel.html. 
120 The average number of ICANN meeting attendees is approximately 611, based on 
the figures in Appendix Two.  This is a very small number of people compared to the 
numbers of Internet hosts or e-mail addresses or domain names registered.  For 
example, according to the OECD’s Measuring the Internet Economy 2002 “between 
July 1999 and January 2002, the number of secure servers in OECD countries 
increased by 223%”  (p60).  
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constituencies.  The statistics show that, in the main, 
business representatives dominate the meetings.  However, 
ICANN is very much a collection of businesses, technical 
experts, academics and individuals with an interest in 
Internet governance.  During the life of the research, it was 
found that the structure and processes under formulation 
were dominated by a small group of personalities121 and 
organisations122. 
The early implementation of the ICANN structure 
depended, not least because of budgetary restrictions, on a 
wide range of people volunteering their time, not unlike the 
earlier Postel days.  The critical difference is that the 
volunteers were no longer members of academic and research 
institutions but those with a commercial interest in managing 
the DNS and its potential.  In Chapter Five, I discuss some of 
the motivations of government actors and in Chapter Six I 
discuss corporate strategy.  For the purposes here though, I 
have identified some key motivations and the costs 
associated with that volunteering.   
The first is that people were very enthusiastic about a 
new regulatory experiment, even though they may not have 
perceived the experimental nature of the formation of a 
hybridised regulatory body at the early meetings.  The 
challenge of building a global, consensus-driven organisation 
                                   
121 Identifying a broader range of key actors is part of ongoing research. However, 
there are some notable individuals who stand out across the constituencies.  For 
example, AT&T’s s Marilyn Cade in the Business Constituency; New Zealand’s Peter 
Dengate-Thrush and the UK’s Dr Willie Black in the ccTLD Constituency; Steve 
Metalitz in the Intellectual Property Constituency; Elliot Noss from TUCOWS and 
Michael Palage from the Registrars’ Constituency.  In addition, Wilmer Cutler & 
Network Solutions Attorney David Johnson and other activists on specific issues such 
as Milton Mueller, Kathy Kleiman, YJ Park and Eung Hwi Chun should also be 
included. 
122 Appendix Two lists the companies and institutions. 
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has attracted many divergent views and generated a great 
amount of conflict.  The formation and implementation of 
ICANN in such a contentious environment is an extraordinary 
achievement123.  Outstanding individuals believed it was 
possible to achieve compliance through a combination of 
irrational exuberance124, voluntary contracts and, perhaps, 
moral suasion and commitment to an unspecified Internet 
ideology.   
A July 1999 ICANN staff paper stated that “It [ICANN] 
has no power to force any individual or entity to do anything; 
its "authority" is nothing more than the reflection of the 
willingness of the members of the Internet community to use 
ICANN as a consensus development vehicle” 125. 
  Secondly, there is a core of people who believe that 
the Internet should, somehow, be free.  The civil society 
advocates volunteer their time to achieve goals that range 
from free speech and privacy protection to more diffuse 
objectives such as the creation of a global Internet 
                                   
123 ICANN has only marginal enforcement and compliance mechanisms at its disposal.  
Whilst registrars are accredited by ICANN, ICANN’s power to do anything significant 
about registrar misconduct, such as misleading and deceptive conduct, false 
advertising or customer poaching is limited.  The ICANN website specifically refers 
complaints individuals may have about registrar behaviour back to the registrar or to 
other agencies responsible for consumer complaints.  See 
http://reports.internic.net/cgi/registrars/problem-report.cgi. 
 Registry operators, like registrars, are accredited and managed by contract rather 
than rules or regulations such as those that govern telecommunications companies 
(such as specific licensing conditions).  In both cases, it is unclear what significantly 
persuasive penalties are available to ICANN to enforce contractual compliance, in the 
face of consistent breaches of contract. 
124 The title of Robert Shiller’s book and, prior to that, US Federal Reserve Bank 
Chairman Alan Greenspan’s questioning about the rise of the stock market during 
1997 and 1998. 
125 The paper’s author, Andrew McLaughlin, is another key individual in the formation 
of ICANN.  http://www.icann.org/general/background.htm. 
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community126 or the restructuring of global markets.  The 
energy from that quarter has forced ongoing discussion of 
and commitment to openness and transparency. 
Thirdly, other individuals are motivated by the priorities 
of the corporations that pay them to attend ICANN meetings.  
These individuals are found, most often, in Domain Name 
Supporting Organization meetings and their work is illustrated 
in detail in Chapter Six on corporate strategy. 
Finally, government representatives (identified in 
Appendix Three) have been involved in ICANN for a wide 
variety of reasons, not least to keep a watching brief on what 
other governments do.  
                                   
126 The latter point has driven the formation of the At Large Constituency and attempts 
to develop a mandate for globally representative election of Board Directors.  Much 
of the historic ALAC material has been removed from the ICANN website although 
the Membership Study Committee gives a flavour of the debate.  Found at 
http://atlargestudy.org/. 
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ICANN’s Organization Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The original organisation chart forms the basis for streaming 
bottom-up consensus based policy127.  The Address Supporting 
and Protocol Supporting Organizations are the ICANN 
manifestations of the original technical community organised 
around the development of technical standards and protocols, 
most notably the RFC process. 
The data found in the Appendices indicates that most 
participants fall into the DNSO grouping.  The GAC is, notably, 
                                   
127 This version of the chart was found in a 13 November 2000 orientation session on 
ICANN for the Marina del Rey meeting.  http://www.icann.org/presentations/mdr-
orientation-ajm.ppt. 
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not directly connected to the policy formulation process.  This 
is discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
There has been much disagreement about the 
constituency structure128, its representativeness and its 
effectiveness.  It is, in hindsight, a first attempt to develop an 
idiosyncratic regulatory structure that seeks to include 
everyone; to take account of enormously diverse opinions and 
also make decisions that are implementable within reasonable 
time frames.  
This chart reflects the initial interpretation of the MoU 
which is now undergoing considerable review as the Evolution 
and Reform Committee’s work takes effect129. 
Process within Constituencies 
The July 1999 ICANN staff paper stated “. . .ICANN was 
created and has developed under the full scrutiny of the 
public eye. The agendas, results, and minutes of the Initial 
Board’s deliberations are widely publicized, and posted in 
advance. The Board holds a quarterly public meeting where 
everything on the agenda is subject to full and open public 
discussion. In order to reduce costs for participants, ICANN 
broadcasts its public meetings live over the Internet, allowing 
remote participants to watch and send comments and 
questions by e-mail to the meeting room. The text of all 
resolutions adopted by the Board is immediately released, 
and the Board holds a public press conference. All decisions of 
                                   
128 For example, commentary such as this to ICANN’s External Counsel Joe Sims about 
the formation of a constituency for individual, rather than commercial, interests. 
http://www.icann.org/comments-mail/01apr99-30apr99/msg00098.html. 
129 For example, a current organisation chart is not available through the ICANN 
website. 
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substance are preceded by prior notice and a full opportunity 
for public comment”130. 
There are several additional points to make.  The Board 
Meetings take place at the regular physical meetings, for 
example, the meetings held between November 1998 and 
November 2001.  Even though the meetings themselves are 
open to the public, the public is not allowed to intervene 
whilst those meetings are taking place.  There are also inter-
sessional telephone conference meetings which are private 
and meetings held during the physical meetings which are 
closed to the public.  In essence, public input into ICANN 
decisions takes place during the Open Forum time slots which 
have limited time allocated to them in the agenda131. 
The commitment to open processes are a result of the 
four foundation documents discussed above and also, 
perhaps, designed to ensure no advantage is conferred 
without all parties knowing about it.  The downside of this 
laudable commitment is that decision making is slow. 
I will discuss as a case study the expansion of the 
domain name space through the introduction of seven new 
gTLDs132.   
New gTLDs – Nouvelle Decision Making 
During the course of the research, the ICANN Board 
made many decisions which are set out in the official Board 
                                   
130 Found at http://www.icann.org/general/background.htm. 
131 For example, the Melbourne meeting’s Open Forum discussion list can be found at 
http://www.icann.org/melbourne/ and includes discussion of the alteration of 
Verisign’s contracts, the new gTLDs and the Budget. 
132 An overview of the introduction of new gTLDs, from ICANN’s perspective, is found 
at http://www.icann.org/tlds/. 
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minutes133.  Between November 1998 and November 2001, 
the most critical decisions related to the procedures for 
choosing the new gTLDs and subsequently, the decision on 
the successful applicants.  The minutes of the March 2001 
meeting shows which of the applications were chosen134. 
The importance given to the expansion of the top level 
domain name space is evident through the Green Paper135, 
the White Paper (in Section 7) and in the MOU (in Section C, 
Part 9).  It was clear, for example, in Department of 
Commerce testimony to Congress that the growing size and 
scope of Internet related businesses depended, in part, on the 
expansion of the domain name space136.   The expansion of 
the domain name space was expected to achieve the 
following goals:  
 increased competition in the provision of registry 
services and in registrar services 
 expansion of the range and kind of names available 
for registration 
 mitigation of some of the effects of a perceived 
name shortage (and the impact of cybersquatters 
and speculative name registrations) 
 demonstration of ICANN’s capacity to make and 
implement policy  
                                   
133 The Board minutes are available at http://www.icann.org/minutes. 
134 http://www.icann.org/tlds. 
135 The discussion centres around the orderly introduction of new gTLDs, referring back 
to the principles of stability also to the introduction of competition.    
136 http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/congress/2002/icann6122002.htm 
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An objective set of criteria was established by ICANN 
staff to enable the ICANN Board to decide which, of the more 
than forty applications, would be selected137. 
The comprehensive criteria were set in August 2000138 
and took account of Internet stability and security; the proof-
of-concept capacity of the initial round of new gTLDs being a 
model for future additions to the DNS; enhancement of 
competition; enhancement of the usefulness of the DNS; the 
creation of diversity in the types of names within the DNS; 
protection of intellectual property and a demonstration that 
applicants could adequately fill in the application forms. 
Judging by the number and kind of applications put 
forward and the resources used to present those applications, 
it was clear that the Board’s decision had commercial 
implications.  Only seven were chosen and included .biz, .info, 
.pro, .name, .museum, .coop and .aero.  There was a great 
deal of dissatisfaction expressed about the application 
process; about the kind of gTLD chosen (for example, there 
was significant pressure to choose .kids as a way of satisfying 
a push towards a ‘safe’ Internet for parents and children) and 
about perceptions of bias and influence, even though Board 
members with an interest in any of the applicants recused 
themselves139. 
                                   
137 The DNSO was instrumental in setting the stage for between six and ten new 
gTLDs.  The full list of applicants is found at http://www.icann.org/tlds/tld-
applications-lodged-02oct00.htm.  
138 Found in full at http://www.icann.org/tlds/tld-criteria-15aug00.htm. 
139 Anecdotally, the public process for choosing the pre-cleared applications was an 
example of extraordinary decision making.  Sitting at the back of the room whilst the 
presentations from the applicants were made and then listening to the Board discuss 
what should be in or out was, at best arbitrary and, at worst, open to procedural 
challenge.   
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Once the new gTLDs were chosen, the long and difficult 
implementation process began, hampered by a small staff 
and the highly complex contractual arrangements.  Given that 
ICANN can only regulate formally by contract, this was a 
critical phase to enable an orderly start to the operation of 
new registries and, in turn, registrars to have new names to 
register.  This shift, from regulation by statute law or multi-
lateral treaty to regulation by contract is critical to the thesis.  
National jurisdiction, with its raft of statutes and laws, is 
shown to be supplanted by entirely different arrangements 
that manage business conduct anywhere in the world through 
an accreditation process and not via recourse of legislation140.  
During this introduction of increased competition, 
dramatic price reductions for domain names; a significant 
economic downturn and a complete ‘revaluation’ of the dot 
com sector occurred.  There was also significant consolidation 
within the domain name registrar industry141. 
                                                                                           
 A better alternative may have been the Australian model which, when calling for 
tenders for both registry (http://www.auda.org.au/about/news/2001102201.html) 
and registrar (http://www.auda.org.au/docs/Registrar_Accreditation_Appform.pdf) 
services.  The process was done much more smoothly, at least in public; with far 
less politics; with technically robust solutions and with most of political heat taken 
out of what became an administrative process to determine compliance with a 
defined set of technical, financial, marketing and operational criteria.  There were 
heated Board discussions about the nature of the tender process and the decision 
making but, publicly, the process was open and transparent. 
140 Further discussion is needed, in the context of global regulatory frameworks, about 
the impact of the reversion of US contract law.  Is this what we really mean by 
globalised regulatory frameworks; are we in the process of transition to frameworks 
that are manifestly global which manage technical resources with a global footprint? 
141 The May 2002 UN Bancorp Piper Jaffray Consolidation in the Domain Name 
Registration Industry report confirms this trend and illustrates the underlying 
reasons for significant change in the domain name registration industry, for example, 
a declining zone file for .com, .net and .org names and significant decreases domain 
name pricing.  
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According to data provided by State of the Domain for 
2002142, .biz had 768,857 names, .info had 951,018 names 
and .name had 85,633 names143.  Many of these names are 
not in active use but have, instead been purchased and 
parked as a defensive registration strategy to protect 
trademark owners from having to defend their rights to a 
name in a new gTLDs.  For all the fanfare about the 
expansion of the domain name space, the uptake of new 
names has been slow.  The millions of dollars spent by some 
registries promoting their application to ICANN and their 
product to registrars would have been a cause of concern 
investors and shareholders. 
Hypothesis and Concept Set 
Turning once again to the hypothesis and the concept 
set that guides the work, it is clear, through an analysis of the 
foundation documents that have enabled the establishment of 
ICANN as an institution that the first and second parts of my 
hypothesis have been tested and proven.  They are: 
That the regulation of disputes in this electronic marketplace is moving 
towards arrangements financed and enacted by the private sector and 
that, in return for the financing of that regulation, the private sector 
require a commitment from government to more flexible regulatory 
responses; and  
That the regulatory treatment of the DNS illustrates a fundamental and 
irrevocable shift away from centralised government regulation to private 
sector driven regulation  
                                   
142 The full report, with breakdowns of registrar market share across successive 
quarters, is at https://www.sotd.info/sotd/content/documents/SOTDQ302.pdf. 
143 Ben Edelman’s work, whilst outside the scope of the research here, is useful for a 
more extensive inquiry about the expansion of the domain name space and the 
barriers for doing that effectively.  http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/tlds/ 
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The concept sets show a definite trend towards the 
ownership, control and commercial use of Internet resources 
at an international level.  This trend runs counter to the 
historic treatment of the Internet’s technical resources on the 
basis of stewardship (of protocols and policies); trusteeship 
(of management and control) and a focus on non-commercial 
use of Internet resources available to everyone at limited 
cost. 
Organisational Strength 
It is useful to align ICANN’s structure, processes and 
procedures against an objective set of criteria for measuring 
organisational strength.  Baer developed a set of key 
questions to test an organisation’s effectiveness which are:  
“…(1) clear objectives and authority; (2) the support of major 
stakeholders; (3) timely decision-making processes; (4) an 
expert and results-oriented staff; (5) real enforcement 
powers; and (6) adequate financial resources.”  (Baer 1997:  
548).  I step through each of these key questions and test 
ICANN against them. 
Firstly, clear objectives and authority.  It is evident 
from the foundation documents, from ICANN’s By-Laws and 
from its mission statement that it has clear objectives with 
respect to its technical coordinating function. That clarity 
reduces when applying those objectives in a context of 
technical regulation with highly political, commercially 
sensitive and competing objectives.  
Whether ICANN has the authority to achieve its 
objectives, without formal binding powers, without effective 
compliance mechanisms and without an adequate budget, 
remains moot.  Relying on contracts, executed under 
Californian statute, and on an accreditation system for 
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registrars and registries is, I believe, flimsy ground upon 
which to operate.  Having said that though, ICANN has 
achieved its objective of introducing competition and 
expanding the domain name space whilst maintaining 
technical stability.  The core of ICANN’s strength is its control 
of the authoritative root server.  The economic value of a 
domain name depends intrinsically on a user ‘getting to it’ 
and if Mueller’s144 contention is correct, that “. . .domain 
names derived their value as a globally visible locator from 
the existence of a coordinated, authoritative root that kept 
track of where all names could be resolved and ensured that 
every name in use was unique”, then ICANN’s control of the 
root is fundamental to its ongoing success.  
Turning now to support from the majority of 
stakeholders.  Over the course of the research, there has 
been some discussion of supplanting ICANN, of starting from 
the beginning again or, for example, putting the ITU in 
charge.  A number of factors have ensured none of the 
possibilities emerged.  Firstly, cosmocrats like ICANN.  They 
may be frustrated by it or may not get precisely what they 
want when they want it but the attractions of the cosmocracy 
are many.  The stakeholders are, in general, technically 
articulate, well educated, commercially sharp and well 
supported by their institutions (as is illustrated in the data in 
Appendix Two).  The cosmocracy caravan, holding meetings 
in interesting places around the world, with people who 
generally do well at the job at hand and who are committed 
to the private sector management of the DNS, is loathe to 
make too many changes. 
                                   
144 (Mueller 2000b:   10)   
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Secondly, there are no fundamental impediments to 
anyone who is genuinely interested in participating.  There 
are obvious barriers such as the cost of the meetings (about 
$US10,000 per meeting per person) but that cost can be 
mitigated by on-line and web-cast participation. 
Thirdly, ICANN has genuinely attempted to engage with 
and respect the views of a wide range of participants.  This is 
evidenced in the open forums; in the e-mail discussion lists 
and in the wide variety of attendees.  The data on remote 
participation is difficult to verify but, in these early days, 
every attempt to broaden the consultative process is a good 
step. 
Lastly, the engagement and commitment of key 
stakeholders is evidenced by the consistent participation of a 
broad group of both business and government 
representatives.  The statistics in Appendix Two bear this 
view out. 
Baer identifies timely decision-making processes as a 
measure of organisational strength.  From a subjective view, 
some issues took far too long for decisions to be made and 
implemented.  For example, as at the end of 2002, the new 
.pro gTLD was still not active.  How much this is the fault of 
processes or a symptom of too little resourcing and staff is 
hard to divine.  A number of other issues such as the 
formalisation of policies for the transfer and deletion of 
domain names took more than twelve months to decide.  How 
much that was the fault of the institution as opposed to the 
contrary nature of opposing registrars is, again, hard to call. 
An “expert and results-oriented staff” is something with 
which ICANN has had to wrestle.  There is no doubt that the 
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ICANN staff has been under an enormous load145.  There is 
little doubt that the staff were, during the time of the 
research, expert lawyers, engineers, marketers and finance 
specialists.  However, there is little to be done when there 
aren’t enough staff to do the work and there is, conversely, a 
deliberate policy to have a small, lean administration to 
control mandate and mission creep.  It is in this area that the 
culture of volunteerism is most evident.  Key stakeholders 
rather than ICANN staff drafted policy, produced documents, 
drove the agenda, set up consultations and delivered on 
much of ICANN’s policy work.  It remains to be seen what will 
happen in ICANN 2.0 with a larger budget and more extensive 
headcount. 
Does ICANN have real enforcement powers?  I think 
not, in terms of jurisdiction, traditional regulation or multi-
lateral treaty arrangements.  It does, however, have 
accreditation systems for registrars and registries; a 
developing system of contracts for ccTLD registries and 
contracts for its registry service providers.  It also has 
intangible commitment to the process of Internet governance 
from key stakeholders (again, identified in the participation 
statistics).  It also has, from many people, a philosophical 
commitment to enabling the Internet through sensible 
management with clear, objective rules.  The management of 
the DNS is central to ICANN ‘s mandate.  There appears to 
be, despite all the criticisms, a clear commitment to ensure 
that the network is protected, in its broadest sense, because, 
if that fails, much else will fail as well. 
                                   
145 This is identified in early budget papers; in the 2002 ICANN paper on proposed 
reform; and in the Evolution and Reform Committee’s work.  The staff numbers have 
ranged, in the very early days from three or four, to around fifteen.  By any 
standards for a membership organisation, this is small. 
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Adequate financial resources have been a constant 
source of difficulty for ICANN.  The threat of withholding 
operational funds and commitments (particularly in the ccTLD 
constituency) has been used a fairly crude, but effective, 
leverage for change, for example, in Board representation.  A 
determination of what is adequate funding remains moot.  
Few want to see an overblown, global bureaucracy from 
ICANN nor the development of a new bureaucracy for the 
‘government of the Internet’.  On the other hand, a certain 
amount of funding is critical to ICANN’s success.  Between 
November 1998 and November 2001, there was not enough 
money to adequately staff the office.  That lack enabled 
stakeholder volunteers to fill the void; control the agenda and 
determine key policy outcomes.  Those stakeholders were 
various and are represented in the participation charts.  
Precise identification and mapping of individuals and 
corporate actors will be undertaken in future research.   
Conclusions 
The formation of ICANN and the implementation of its 
processes, procedures and decisions are evidence of globally 
sourced governance by the private sector of the DNS. 
The overview of ICANN’s operations provided here sets 
in context the analysis in the following two chapters on 
governments and regulatory relevance and on corporate 
strategy in modelling regulatory structures.   
ICANN’s mandate and mission are clear; its core work is 
set and its main work on the introduction of new gTLDs 
covers the period of the research between November 1998 
and November 2001. 
The allocation of new gTLDs demonstrates the “political” 
necessity to show that it could meet the commercial demand 
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for expanding the domain name space at the same time as 
processes and procedures for making those decisions were in 
train.  
Control of the root server is of utmost importance as it 
is on this that electronic business depends.  Where and with 
whom that control resides is crucial and, during the research 
period, ICANN had that control. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - THE SCRAMBLE FOR 
REGULATORY RELEVANCE:  DOMAIN NAME 
SYSTEM GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW ROLE FOR 
GOVERNMENTS146 
A new network governance paradigm must emerge to recognize the 
complexity of regulatory power centers, utilize new policy instruments 
such as technical standardization to achieve regulatory objectives, accord 
status to networks as semi-sovereign entities and shift the role of the 
state toward the creation of an incentive structure for network self-
regulation147  
 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out some early observations on the 
new role for governments in managing the critical 
infrastructure of the Internet DNS.  It discusses the tensions 
between national politics and the involvement of governments 
in the development of ICANN148. 
The structure of ICANN and the constitution of its GAC 
constrains national governments to a limited advisory role149.  
Efforts to bring the management of the DNS into the orbit of 
                                   
146 This chapter is to be submitted to Governance:  An International Journal of Policy 
and Administration http://ppm.ohio-
state.edu/PPM/about_the_school/governance1.html 
147 Reidenberg 1997:  100. 
148Full information about the mission and mandate of ICANN can be found at 
http://www.icann.org.  For the purposes of this chapter, the most relevant section 
of the website is that which relates to the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC).  
Most notable is the section at http://www.icann.org/committees/gac/gac-
cctldprinciples-23feb00.htm#3.9 which refers to the country code management 
principles. 
149The early paragraphs of the GAC principles bear this out.  See for example, 
http://www.icann.org/committees/gac/operating-principles-25may99.htm.  
However, this may change if the recommendations of the Evolution and Reform 
Committee are implemented.  This chapter is an historical examination to late 2002. 
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already established multilateral government entities such as 
the ITU and the United Nations have been spasmodic and, 
thus far, unsuccessful150. 
This chapter focuses on the development and 
construction of mechanisms for governments to participate in 
a global private sector industry self-regulatory body.  I 
address here the broad constitution of ICANN and the general 
consensus that governments don’t or shouldn’t or can’t have 
a substantive role in Internet governance in a global, multi-
jurisdictional environment. 
National governments around the world have been 
actively reconsidering their role in the domestic governance of 
their portion of Internet architecture. Two distinct camps have 
emerged.  In the first, those where the management of two 
letter country codes or ccTLDs151 has remained firmly in the 
hands of government agencies.  In the second, those where 
that management has been outsourced to self-regulatory 
organisations.  The research compares and contrasts these 
two governance styles and some of the outcomes of each as 
it relates to the relevance of governments at an international 
level.  There are shades of grey in both models.  Some ccTLD 
managers are located firmly in a government ministry whilst 
others are in more independent but affiliated government 
agencies or academic institutions.  In some examples of the 
                                   
150Recent correspondence with ICANN from the ITU can be found at 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/tsb-director/itut-icann/index.html.  A cynical reader 
would assume that the ITU was, rather than being helpful, looking for ways to 
undermine a nascent organisation in its process of self-reform and reflection. 
151 Country codes are a two letter symbol, adopted from the ISO, that identify 
geographic areas (some of which are countries, others of which are territories).  A 
full list of these codes is found at http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-whois.htm.  A full 
description of the responsibilities of ccTLD delegates is at 
http://www.icann.org/committees/gac/gac-cctldprinciples-23feb00.htm#3.9. 
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second model, such as Canada and Australia, the ccTLD 
manager is located in a self-regulatory setting, endorsed by 
government but operating independently.  At the other end of 
spectrum, the function is completely commercial with no 
government involvement of any kind, for example in Niue 
(.nu) or Tuvalu (.tv).  
Background 
This chapter discusses the shift to private sector 
governance, as opposed to governance by governments, of 
the critical infrastructure on which the global Internet 
functions.  It illustrates the changing interplay between 
governments and the private sector; examines the influence 
of governments on the development of ICANN as a hybrid 
regulatory authority tasked with responsibility for the 
technical management of the Internet; and makes some 
conclusions about the relevance of governments in the 
regulation of Internet architecture. 
There are two key findings for the research. 
The first is that national governments have been, in the 
context of ICANN and the technical management of global 
Internet architecture, consigned to an advisory role with little 
impact on the decisionmaking processes of ICANN.  
The second is that, in a domestic context, national 
governments have retained the right to and, in most cases, 
actively manage their country code. 
It is an important discussion because, as Taggart neatly 
states, “regulatory arbitrage. . . involves exploiting differing 
rules in different jurisdictions – for a profit. . .the net is now 
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being used to assault the leather-bound world of national 
regulations”.152 
A global system such as the Internet has changed, in a 
regulatory sense, where corporations go to determine the 
business environment in which they operate.153 Who and 
what to influence has changed; the price and currency of that 
influence has changed and national governments have only 
limited power to influence the outcomes at an international 
level.  
The ‘regulatory relevance’ test is done using three 
foundation documents.  The first is the 1 July 1997 Clinton 
Administration’s A Framework for Global Electronic 
Commerce154 (referred to as the Framework), the second is 
the June 1998 Memorandum of Understanding between the 
US Department of Commerce and ICANN155 (referred to as 
the MoU) and the May 1999 GAC Operating Principles156 
(referred to as the Principles). 
The GAC is the only formal way in which national 
governments are involved in ICANN’s decision-making 
processes.  An understanding of the structure and outcomes 
                                   
152 Taggart 2000: 2. 
153 The market for online services is much broader than the domain name registration 
sector.  However, for some quick analysis, statistical information about the domain 
name registration business, for example, can be found at US Bancorp Piper Jaffray 
Consolidation of the Domain Registration Industry 
http://www.gotoanalyst.com/piperpublic/goto/index.asp and State of the 
Domain at http://www.sotd.info. 
154Found at http://www.ta.doc.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm.  The 5 June 1998 
US Department of Commerce Statement of Policy, Management of Internet Names 
and Numbers, sets out the US Government’s intention to set up a private sector, 
not-for-profit organization for the implementation of that policy.  
155Found at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-memorandum.htm. 
156 Found at Section F in the Supplementary Material. 
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of the GAC is critical to assessing the relevance of national 
governments, in an international forum, and global Internet 
governance.157  The full GAC participation charts are found at 
Appendix Three. 
The research158 here has found that, structurally and 
practically, the policy, regulation and management of global 
Internet resources is manifestly global in nature.  It includes 
a wide variety of stakeholders, dominated by the private 
sector, with little attention given to the impact of national 
governments on ICANN’s decision-making processes.  There 
is no effective mechanism to allow national governments to 
be any more relevant than they have been to date.159  At a 
domestic level, however, many national governments actively 
exercise their rights to manage their country codes in 
general, in accordance with the technical principles and 
policies that enable the global Internet to function efficiently.  
Conceptual Framework 
Much work has been done on the impact of technology 
on regulatory arrangements and the shift in advanced 
economies from state ownership of networks (in particular 
telephone companies) to state regulation of privately owned 
                                   
157 Unlike the ITU where a large number of players are representatives of national 
governments and the decisions made by those representatives are binding on 
member nations, the majority of ICANN attendees are from the corporate sector and 
the deliberations of the GAC are not binding on attendee countries and the majority 
of attendees are representatives from corporations. 
158 The reverse analysis, which is testing the influence of corporations on the policies 
and processes of ICANN and Internet governance, is discussed in Chapter Six. 
159 This may change rapidly if the work of the Evolution and Reform Committee is 
implemented under the new Chief Executive Officer.  The ERC proposals deliberately 
involve national governments to lend legitimacy to ICANN’s work, to establish more 
reliable sources of funding and to better represent a wider variety of constituents.  
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/links.htm holds all the relevant 
documents on the reform process. 
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and managed networks160.  Whilst it is not a new 
phenomenon, understanding the impact of technology on 
regulation is particularly important in this work because the 
mandate and mission of ICANN and the involvement of its 
advisory committees, such as the GAC, is very specifically 
about the technical management of Internet architecture. 
In addition to considerations of the impact of 
technology on regulation, there are two other conceptual 
foundations for this work.  They are diametrically opposed.   
The first is the now somewhat outdated view that the 
Internet is necessarily free of government regulation.  For the 
purposes of the discussion here, the Internet is only 
discussed in the context of the underlying network rather 
than the application layer of the node-based resource that 
provides the basis for e-mail, web-publishing, procurement 
and payment systems utilised by end-users.  It has been 
argued by many Internet traditionalists that the Internet 
should be free of regulation161. This view has not been borne 
out in any comprehensive manner, although differing national 
efforts to manage a ‘borderless’ global resource have had 
varying degrees of success.  Content is regulated, 
broadcasting over the web is regulated, online gambling and 
commercial transactions and other activities are all regulated 
in one way or another in most jurisdictions around the world. 
                                   
160In particular, Lawrence Lessig’s work can be found at 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/lessig/.  Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace is the 
most useful. 
161 Most notable amongst those are the technocrats and civil society advocates such as 
John Perry Barlow.  See his work at http://www.eff.org/ and in particular the utopian 
1993 Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace 
http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html where issues of sovereignty 
and consent to be governed are canvassed.  
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The technical resources that make the Internet work 
have always been highly regulated but not in the traditional 
sense that governments have done the regulating.  Rather, 
there have been very clear rules about how to make a 
technical system of linked computers communicate effectively 
with each other.  These rules are contained  in the RFC 
documents162.  The function and management of these rules 
now rests with ICANN, assisted by such groups as the IETF163 
and the W3C164.  
The second underlying concept is that governments of 
many persuasions have changed, and continue to change, the 
way they think about their role as ‘governors’ 165.  The 
findings here track the approach and expectations of 
government, and the influence and attention they have 
received from corporations who play an active role in the 
governance of Internet architecture. 
Historically, it seems that the GAC was an afterthought, 
a condition without which the DoC and ICANN MoU would not 
proceed.  At a time when governments are, in many 
countries, shifting to self-regulatory models, the formation of 
the GAC is a puzzle. Even more of a conundrum was the 
formation of a body of government representatives who, prior 
                                   
162 These rules and the history of how they came about can be found at 
http://www.rfc-editor.org/. 
163Full information is found at http://www.ietf.org/. 
164Full W3C information is found at http://www.w3.org/. 
165Space limitations prevent a detailed discussion of the very extensive literature on 
changing conceptions of the state and government, evident in the ‘Thatcherist 
zeitgeist’ that saw privatisation of communication networks across the EU, 
Australasia and other regions. The writing of Anthony Giddens is a useful entry point 
into the literature, including notions of the ‘Third Way’.  Discussion of the Third Way 
of political evolution can be found at, amongst many places, 
http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ka.cfm?knlgAreaID=128.  
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to this time, had limited international clout and were 
responsible for domestic matters only.  Former ICANN Board 
Member Greg Crew’s view is that “. . .With the increasing 
importance of the Internet, national governments argued that 
they should have the authority to assign control of their 
ccTLD.  This was creating political problems, as existing ccTLD 
administrators were reluctant to concede authority, and in 
any case there is not a one-to-one relationship between 
country codes and national governments”.  (Crew 2000:  5) 
That was the case with respect to the .au delegation 
which, as explored in Chapter Seven, was re-delegated 
without the consent of the original IANA representative. 
The GAC is dealt with in close detail in Chapter 5 on the 
relevance of governments in regulation.  However, it is worth, 
in the context of this chapter on ICANN, to expand that 
analysis.  The GAC’s work is reproduced on their website with 
a full list of the meeting communiqués issued at successive 
ICANN meetings. 
Close study of those communiqués shows that the 
critical action of ICANN takes place in the DNSO and other 
constituency meetings and the GAC provides general 
advisories on issues of interest to national governments with 
little impact on the more commercial decision-making of the 
Board. 
National Governments & Internet Governance  
Governments have never been able to govern outside 
their clearly defined national jurisdictions, as they have no 
authority to do so166.  The management of global resources 
                                   
166 There is enormous disagreement about the validity of jurisdiction.  For example, 
with respect to the management of territorial waters, overfly zones and, as an 
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such as fishing rights, the allocation of international telephone 
numbers and international air safety standards has been 
achieved with the cooperation of governments through a 
variety of bi-lateral and multi-lateral forums.  The 
management of Internet addressing, now the core 
responsibility of the ICANN167, offers a new perspective on the 
globalisation of regulation.  It is a perspective that puts the 
regulatory relevance of governments under the spotlight 
when, historically, it was clearly the intention of the architects 
of the Internet to follow a course firmly within the realm of 
the private sector.168  The evidence for this flows through the 
early RFCs169, the Framework, and the subsequent 
development and implementation of the MoU between the US 
Department of Commerce and ICANN. 
National governments have successfully asserted the 
right to determine policy and implement regulations that 
affect their constituents such as the management of on-line 
content, the payment of taxes on electronic transactions and 
broader consumer protection matters as well as the need to 
provide for communications interception under appropriate 
authority.  Those assertions relate to the application layer, 
                                                                                           
extension here, the validity of global rules for all manner of disputes.  Braithwaite 
and Drahos’ work is helpful in unravelling the nature of many disputes in different 
kinds of industry sectors.  
167 http://www.icann.org 
168 Works such as Abbate (1999) and Berners-Lee and Fischetti(1999) demonstrate 
that the progenitors of the Internet (and to a lesser extent of the world wide web) 
envisaged those resources primarily as mechanisms for the exchange of information 
within quite small technical communities, borderless mechanisms that (unlike 
telephone companies in the EU and Australasia) weren’t owned by the government 
or (as in the US) needed to be closely regulated by the government.  They did not 
foresee the explosion of electronic commerce and other applications and did not 
anticipate the Internet’s rapid adoption by the general community in advanced 
economies. 
169The RFCs are found in full at http://www.rfc-editor.org/ 
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that is, what end-users do with the Internet, and essentially 
do not explicitly concern the overall architecture of the 
Internet or questions of naming policy. 
The Australian Government has charted a course that 
explicitly shifts the burden of regulation to the private 
sector170.  Other governments have done that as well, most 
notably in Canada CIRA171 and the United Kingdom with 
Nominet172.  The management of the .nz ccTLD is firmly 
within private sector responsibility and is managed by the 
Domain Name Commissioner, a part of the Internet Society of 
New Zealand173.  Despite this, the governments of Australia, 
Canada, the UK and New Zealand regularly send 
representatives to the GAC meetings. 
National governments have continued, in the context of 
matters that relate to Internet policy, to set frameworks and 
standards appropriate to their political systems.  For example, 
whilst some would not agree with the approach, the Chinese 
Government has successfully limited access to materials it 
judges inappropriate and harmful such as the Google search 
engine174. The Australian Government has enforced 
                                   
170 A paper was also prepared and presented to the March 2003 ITU Workshop on 
Member States’ Experiences with ccTLDs.  http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-
t/workshop/cctld/029r1.html.  The chapter is also being published by the 
Murdoch University Law School on-line academic journal. 
171 CIRA (http://www.cira.ca/) is similar in its constitution to the .au Domain 
Administration (http://www.auda.org.au) in that they are both private sector, not- 
for-profit organization that manage the ccTLDs for Canada and Australia. 
172 The Nominet website provides a full explanation of its functions and policies.  
http://www.nominet.org.uk/.  Its authority to act is found at 
http://www.nominet.org.uk/AboutUs/Authority/. 
173 http://www.dnc.org.nz/. 
174 See, for example, Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas Open Networks, Closed 
Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Regimes. 
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regulations on Internet Service Providers175 with respect to 
content regulation, on-line gambling and consumer 
protection.  Again, one might not agree with the method or 
policy, but national governments have avoided their predicted 
demise, continued to regulate as they wish and managed the 
changing business of government in accordance with their 
own policies.  Internationally, however, the picture is slightly 
different. 
National Governments:  International Context 
Governance by the private sector of a global network of 
critical infrastructure is acutely important to corporations, to 
governments and to ordinary Internet users who rely on 
Internet applications for their e-mail, access to online 
information and business transactions.  The protection of 
critical infrastructure is a matter of commercial imperative in 
addition to one of global network security.  However, national 
governments have had limited involvement in the 
management of the global Internet for three key reasons176.   
Historically, the Internet was the preserve of a private 
academic and research apparatus.  In cases such as Africa, 
Latin America and parts of Asia, there were few (and still 
aren’t many) connections to the Internet and, perhaps, no 
perceived need for governments to be involved.  In an 
incremental sense, responsibility for anything that 
                                   
175 The Internet Industry Association lists a full range of Codes of Practice 
(http://www.iia.net.au/contentcode.html) that manage on-line activities such as 
gambling, privacy protection and content regulation.   
176 The only exception to this is the close involvement of the United States Government 
who, as evidenced in the analysis below, have sought to shift their responsibility to 
the private sector, explicitly as a matter of policy and also in response to claims that 
the Internet was being controlled as the preserve of the USA when, in fact, the 
Internet had become a global, public resource.   
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approximated Internet policy typically resided in agencies 
tasked with overseeing general telecommunications or 
broadcasting legislation.   
Internet policy is a relatively recent phenomenon and 
one whose importance has increased as the global network of 
connections has grown.  The applications on and utility of the 
Internet have increased with businesses around the world 
now depending on Internet services as a critical part of their 
operations.  Universities and research institutions no longer 
constitute the greatest proportion of users; the ‘market’ for 
domain names now encompasses the general community in 
many countries. 
The research has identified the different ways in which 
countries have approached DNS governance.  These ways 
vary from the fully government controlled model to the fully 
private sector model where both industry-based organisations 
and not-for-profit self-regulatory agencies have been 
established.  The research also shows where the regulatory 
relevance of governments has been reduced to nil.  This 
occurs where an Internet country code has been re-purposed 
into an entirely commercial designation managed on a for-
profit basis, such as the .tv for the country of Tuvalu.  The 
application of the findings of the research to an understanding 
about internationalised regulation is constantly evolving.  The 
international system of Internet governance, particularly with 
respect to its technical management, is still under 
construction. 
The concept of regulatory convergence is important 
here as a means of understanding the interface between 
governments, their constituents and a global market place.  
Regulatory convergence can be characterised as the use of 
one set of regulatory instruments to manage previously 
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separated areas of government oversight such as 
broadcasting, telecommunications and information 
technology177. More importantly, the discussion in this work 
centres on the regulation of physical architecture rather than 
the services attached to it.  As a consequence, the role of 
governments in global Internet management is carefully 
constrained.   
In a 1999 article, Kahn and Cerf argue that “the reader 
should get a basic idea of the Internet, how it came to be, 
and perhaps even how to begin thinking about it from an 
architectural perspective.  This will be especially important to 
policy makers who need to distinguish the Internet as a global 
information system from its underlying communications 
infrastructure” (Kahn and Cerf 1999: 1).  The heart of the 
matter here is the final sentence, that is, that policymakers 
need to distinguish the Internet as a global information 
system, not one limited to national borders.178  
The Framework for Global Electronic Commerce179 
The next section examines the foundation documents180 
that illustrate the structural and operational embedded 
                                   
177 For example, in the Australian case, competition legislation is used to constrain 
market conduct across many industry sectors.  The Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (www.accc.gov.au) administers that legislation. 
178 Whilst the arguments for a regulation-free Internet have circulated and driven the 
debate, it is interesting to note that the engineers responsible for making the system 
work have been little involved in that debate.  One could argue that that is the case 
because, collectively, the technocrats believe that control of the architecture is 
governance and, in an implicit assumption, nothing further needs to be discussed.    
179 Found at http://www.ta.doc.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm. 
180 Following the 1 July 1997 Framework document, a Request for Comments on the 
Registration and Administration of Internet Domain Names was released.  On 30 
January 1998, a Proposal to Improve Technical Management of Internet Names and 
Addresses was released (also called the Green Paper).  Responses to the Green 
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irrelevance of governments in the management of the 
technical resources of the Internet. 
On July 1, 1997, the Clinton Administration released its 
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce.  The key 
principles set out in that document have driven the 
establishment of ICANN.  The Framework suggests that:  
 The private sector should lead development of 
electronic commerce; 
 Governments should avoid undue restrictions on 
electronic commerce; 
 Where governmental involvement is needed, its aim 
should be to support and enforce a predictable, 
minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment for 
commerce; 
 Governments should recognize the unique qualities of 
the Internet; 
 Electronic commerce over the Internet should be 
facilitated on a global basis. 
The paper recognises that “the Internet is being used to 
reinvent government…as the Internet empowers citizens and 
democratizes societies, it is also changing classic business 
and economic paradigms”.  It continues by saying that 
“governments must adopt a non-regulatory, market-oriented 
approach to electronic commerce, one that facilitates the 
emergence of a transparent and predictable legal 
environment to support global business and commerce”.  
Finally, “governments can have a profound effect on the 
growth of commerce on the Internet.  By their actions, they 
                                                                                           
Paper were incorporated into the Management of Internet Names and Addresses and 
released on 5 June 1998 (also called the White Paper).  The White Paper is a formal 
statement of policy from which the MOU was formulated between the Department of 
Commerce and ICANN and, subsequently, the GAC Operating Principles were 
adopted on 25 May 1999. 
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can facilitate electronic trade or inhibit it.  Knowing when to 
act and - - at least as important - - when not to act, will be 
crucial to the development of electronic commerce”. 
There are two threads of argument here.  Firstly, the 
US Government is urging other national governments to 
follow the policy principle of “hands off, let the private sector 
manage” in the domestic arrangements for the Internet.  
Most notably, it is recognized that governments, of whatever 
persuasion, are urged to develop stable, predictable, 
transparent regulatory regimes to facilitate electronic 
commerce.181 
The second is that all electronic commerce transactions 
rely on the Internet, which is to be managed by the private 
sector. 
The Framework document articulates policy principles 
that led to more detailed discussion of DNS governance.  To 
facilitate this further discussion, the DoC182 released the 
Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names 
and Addresses;  Proposed Rule183 and invited public 
comment.   
                                   
181 A cynic may argue that this line of argument has been taken as a pure trade play – 
the majority of Internet businesses, content creators and distributors, retail outlets 
and service providers are US businesses who would benefit from unrestricted 
domestic arrangements for electronic commerce transactions.  Further evidence of 
this view is found in Chapter 8 of the Framework document which presses for “no 
discriminatory taxation against Internet commerce” and “the Internet should 
function as a seamless global marketplace with no artificial barriers erected by 
governments” presumably things like content filtering, website blocking and 
expectations of technical standards that chill advances in technology. 
182 All the Department of Commerce’s documents are located at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/index.html. 
183 http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/022098fedreg.txt. 
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Memorandum of Understanding 
The November 1998 Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) between the US DoC and ICANN expressed the 
intention to establish an organisation that reflected the policy 
and principles of the global Internet community.  The MOU 
sets out some critical factors that guided the development of 
ICANN as an institution.  Firstly, it clearly establishes the 
purpose of the organisation and seeks assurances from the 
private sector that it “has the capability and resources to 
assume the important responsibilities related to the technical 
management of the DNS”.  It was clear that the 
developmental phase of the DNS Project was designed to 
forge policies and procedures that met the expectations of the 
DoC and which also responded to the input from the 
community about the nature and style of an organisation that 
was to reside firmly in the private sector. 
The Principles under which ICANN was to operate 
reflected the policy context of the Global Framework for 
Electronic Commerce and subsequent DOC documents on 
DNS governance.  The Principles focus on technical stability, 
the introduction of competition, bottom-up consensus policy 
development  and global representation.   
In the context of this chapter, nowhere in the sections 
on Responsibilities of the Parties (Section V A or in Section V 
C) is there reference to consultation with national 
governments nor the inclusion of the views of governments in 
any manifestation of the new organisation.  Instead, the MOU 
concentrates on the robust and stable technical management 
of the DNS.  The document was signed by ICANN and the DoC 
and forms the basis of the way in which the Corporation 
operates through its Constitution and By-Laws.  
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ICANN:  Structure and Operations 
National governments have an advisory role in ICANN 
through participation in the GAC184.  Membership is open to 
any government or recognised international organisation, 
such as the ITU and the EU. Members have no power to 
implement any binding resolutions (unlike the ITU); they 
have no power of sanction for misbehaviour (unlike the 
United Nations) and they have no global policy or standards 
setting power.  The ICANN CEO’s comments on the role of the 
GAC, set out below, acknowledge that ICANN expects the 
GAC to provide advice and channels of communication to 
national governments.  There is no implication that ICANN will 
necessarily take GAC’s advice. 
In ICANN’s current form, national governments have 
been deliberately and strategically marginalised185. This is due 
to a combination of an Internet ‘free for all’ tradition and the 
commitment, from the early 1980s onwards, of many first 
world governments to policies that foster industry self-
regulation or, where possible, pure market regulation. 
The establishment of constituencies, regulatory 
legitimacy and fiscal solvency have been significant 
                                   
184 At the June 2001 meeting of the GAC, in an open session with ICANN staff, the 
minutes of the meeting reflect some views of the ICANN CEO, Dr Stuart Lynn, with 
respect to the role of the GAC.   He said that he “sees the role of the GAC is to 
provide advice to ICANN adding that no one else can fulfil this task.  He assured 
members that their advice will always be listened to and will have an effect. . . . 
Other role for GAC are as a forum for ‘reverse advice’, that is advice to 
Governments.  He hopes that this is important to GAC as well so that the two-way 
channels of communication remain open.  He also sees GAC as an opportunity to 
discuss other than pure ICANN matters”.  
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/international/gac/meetings/mtg9/gac9min.html. 
185Whilst outside the scope of this chapter, it is interesting to read the results of a 
significant re-examination of ICANN’s mandate and methods found at 
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/proposed-bylaws-
corrections-23feb03.htm.  ICANN is going to change significantly if the Evolution 
and Reform Committee recommendations and those of the current ICANN CEO gain 
any practical, operational traction. 
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motivators for the way in which national governments have 
approached the regulation of international resources.  This is 
certainly the case with respect to ICANN.  The structure of 
ICANN deliberately establishes different areas of influence, for 
example, catering for representations from corporations, 
country code managers, the technical community and the 
broader Internet community.186 
GAC Operating Principles:  Embedding 
Powerlessness   
 
The May 1999 Governmental Operating Principles 
recognise the functions of IANA and ICANN and, even though 
the involvement of governments is not referred to in the 
MOU, ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation mandate the 
establishment of an organisation that “shall operate for the 
benefit of the Internet community as a whole and shall 
pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the 
burdens of government. . .”.   
The key to ICANN’s operational relationship with 
national governments is the operation of geographic country 
code identifiers such as .uk or .de or .au.  In Section 4 of the 
May 1999 introduction to the GAC Principles, specific 
reference is made to “. . .Country code top level domains 
[which] are operated in trust by the Registry for the public 
interest, including the interest of the Internet community, on 
behalf of the relevant public authorities including 
governments, who ultimately have public policy authority 
                                   
186A full explanation of ICANN’s constituencies is found on its website.  One of the most 
important issues for the constituencies has been the perception and reality of 
influence at Board of Director level.  See http://www.icann.org/general/support-
orgs.htm. 
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over their ccTLDs, consistent with universal connectivity of 
the Internet”. 
Whilst the GAC Operating Principles guide its operation 
and its effectiveness, Principle 1 of the Scope of the 
Governmental Advisory Committee is most important. 
In looking at governance of Internet architecture and 
questions about control of domain spaces, we can usefully 
differentiate two levels.  At the ICANN level, governments 
play a minor role. Corporations dominate the agenda, the 
production of documents, the consideration of issues and the 
outcome.  However, at the national level and within the 
management of ccTLDs, the situation is different.  The 
complicating factor is that quite often the delegate 
responsible for the administration of the ccTLD is not a 
government agency, never has been and never will be.  In 
others the ccTLD management remains a government 
function187.  As Taggart contends, “The nice thing about the 
Internet is that it allows you to link – cheaply – a number of 
jurisdictions with different characteristics”   (Taggart 2000:  
2).  It does not, however, simplify making conclusions, at a 
general level, about the impact of national governments on 
Internet governance. 
How does an understanding of the GAC contribute to an 
analysis of the shift by governments around the world to 
models of industry self-regulation, most notably in the 
telecommunications and Internet industries.  Policies that 
encourage competition and market liberalisation are the main 
                                   
187 Professor Michael Geist is doing interesting work in this area and has completed 
preliminary research on ccTLD managers.  See, for example, 
http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/frameset.html. 
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drivers of regulation and legislation within, for example, 
member countries of the World Trade Organization188.   
Most importantly, rather than the private sector 
advising government on regulatory models and regulation, 
the GAC has an advisory (and only advisory) role within the 
ICANN structure.  
This section of the chapter examines the structure of 
the GAC to illustrate that the relevance of governments in the 
deliberations of ICANN and the implementation of global DNS 
policy is moderate at best, inconsequential at worst.  This is 
so not because of failure on the part of many governments 
but because of the structure of ICANN, and the functions of 
the GAC under its clearly defined Operating Principles189. 
In addition to Principle 1, The GAC’s other operating 
principles190 include recognition that: 
. . .the corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet 
community as a whole and shall pursue the charitable and public 
purposes of lessening the burdens of government. . .  
It seems that governments have not yet able to have 
their burdens lessened by ICANN.191 Indeed, ICANN’s By Laws 
                                   
188 See, in particular, Jackson’s The World Trading System: Law & Policy of 
International Economic Relations, Hoekman & Kostecki’s The Political Economy of the 
World Trading System: From GATT to WTO and Drahos with Braithwaite’s 
Information Feudalism. 
189The Operating Principles are found in full at 
http://www.icann.org/committees/gac/operating-principles-25may99.htm. 
190 See 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/international/DNS/gac/GAC_OperatingPrinciples.ht
m. 
191Governments, the “weary giants of flesh and steel”, have not despite the urgings of 
Perry Barlow and others in the Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace, thrown 
to the occupants of cyberspace responsibility for managing the Internet generally nor 
its architecture in particular.  The burden of governments in this space has not been 
lifted.  It requires a burden of consideration to decide to actively pass authority to 
the private sector.  The experience of the Australian Government in determining its 
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make provision for the development of an advisory committee 
to: 
Consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to 
concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an 
interaction between ICANN’s policies and various laws, and international 
agreements. . . 
The remaining 54 principles of the GAC are without 
surprise.  The GAC is an advisory body with no lawmaking 
capacity which has specific meeting rules and procedures. 
What does Principle 1 mean in effect and what impact 
does the GAC have on ICANN Board Decisions? 
Analysis of the structure and function of the GAC is 
discussed here because it demonstrates where governments 
have ended up in the broader governance continuum.  It also 
demonstrates their relevance to the governance of Internet 
architecture at a global level. 
GAC is not a policymaking body but can reflect domestic 
policy imperatives and then have these recorded as part of a 
general communiqué.  Domestic constituents are one of 
many, probably competing, voices in an environment which 
has no policy setting authority and certainly no direct ability 
to change the course of events.  
There are, in the Recitals prior to the Operating 
Principles, some significant statements that frame the notion 
of a global Internet outside the boundaries of national 
jurisdiction. 
ICANN’s By-Laws enable the formation of a GAC and 
have the implication that the GAC is excluded from 
meaningful participation in the technical discussions which 
                                                                                           
role in the management of the broader domain name industry bears that out.  In 
addition, there is an ongoing commitment of resources to the GAC within ICANN. 
http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
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ICANN may have192.  Further in the Operating Principles it is 
noted that “the Internet naming and addressing system is a 
public resource that must be managed in the interests of the 
global Internet community”.  The phrase ‘global Internet 
community’ is, on its face, fairly innocuous.  However, it 
clearly establishes an undefined constituency, on whose 
authority ICANN must and does act.  That description forms a 
new problem for governments.  Their constituents, usually 
constrained by electoral rolls, voter registration cards or other 
state based methods of working out who is eligible to vote, 
have a new place to exercise their power.  Cyberspace has 
become a location for what’s asserted as a new community; 
an e-mail address the entrée to that space.  Who is entitled to 
govern, with what authority and in what way remain critical 
questions193.  ICANN has evolved, and governments are not 
involved in its work because many nation states do not, either 
actively or passively, consider the management of Internet 
architecture within their realm of influence. 
The fact that many millions of people around the world 
do not have an e-mail address now and are unlikely to have 
one in the mid-term, is a problem for those that claim 
cyberspace is a global community.  Access to that community 
requires electricity (which millions don’t have), as well as 
                                   
192A contrary view may be that governments could indeed regard the management of 
technical resources as part of their ambit of concerns.  They may also choose to 
express their power outside the forum of ICANN, for example, in the deliberations of 
the ITU.  However, it seems that their concerns are narrow and more a more specific 
understanding of this view would be possible of the GAC meetings were open to the 
public.  There remains then two critical questions – what are the interests of 
governments in this sphere and have governments deliberately chosen to withdraw 
from the discussion at an international level? 
193 Whilst outside the scope of this work, the history of the At Large Constituency, the 
failed global election system and the ongoing tensions in creating a global Internet 
community of individual users and addressing their perceived needs continues. 
http://www.icann.org/committees/alac/. 
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equipment, literacy skills and physical abilities beyond what 
many have. 
It is arguable that the constraints of the failure to more 
carefully define an Internet community (and to manage the 
capture of the process of, for example, the At-Large 
community) may, in themselves be the limiters of the power 
of that group.  Perceptions (and the reality) of national 
capture of the At Large process by the Chinese and Japanese 
during the first elections was an enormous issue both 
practically and from a broader policy perspective. 
The New Governance Continuum  
In Chapter Two, I outlined the equations for balancing a 
new paradigm of control.  These pairs of concepts are a 
mechanism for thinking about regulatory relevance – who and 
what have relevance where.  One can then map public sector 
influence flows in the small but critical world of Internet 
governance.  The environment is still evolving and is very 
volatile in terms of the key actors and personalities.   
We can, however, say that the GAC operates in an 
environment which is developing regulation with global 
impact; that technology is critical to the shape of that 
regulation and that policies about that regulation vary at a 
national level.   
Kolb and Schwarz argue that “the borderless world of 
the Internet is causing governments everywhere to re-
examine their policies and practices toward commercial 
activity”.194  I have found through this research that my 
                                   
194 Op cit, p2 
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central hypothesis, which is characterised by three 
components, has been proven correct.  I consider firstly:  
That national governments are losing both the right and the 
ability to regulate the domain name system. 
The notion that “the nation-state remains our 
fundamental unit of government” but that “transforming the 
business of government is now an accepted necessity” is 
central here (Ticoll 1999: 1).  It is clear that national 
governments have both lost the right and, in some cases, 
willingly ceded it to ICANN.  Even though the GAC has no 
formal, binding power, its meetings have been attended by a 
wide range of government representatives and international 
organisations195.  It has released a series of meeting 
communiqués on a wide variety of issues196.  These 
communiqués are made public and are received by the ICANN 
Board.  The content of the communiqués do not bind the 
Board to act in a particular way, they merely act as 
advisories. 
Further, the deliberations of the GAC are not binding on 
its members in the same way, for example, as decisions of 
the ITU bind its member states.   
In essence, the GAC provides a forum for governments 
to discuss, in a closed environment, all manner of issues but 
its deliberations are a mechanism for discussion not action. 
Moving to the second part of the hypothesis, I have 
argued:  
                                   
195 The accredited membership of the GAC is listed at 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/international/gac/contact/gac_representatives.htm. 
196 The communiqués are found at 
http://www.icann.org/committees/gac/communique-30oct02.htm . 
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That the regulation of disputes in an electronic marketplace 
is moving towards arrangements financed and enacted by 
the private sector and that, in return for the financing of that 
regulation, the private sector require a commitment from 
government to more flexible regulatory responses 
In the governance continuum this is, clearly the case.  
It is entirely why ICANN exists and why it is able to do what it 
does.  Internet governance cannot happen without the private 
sector contributing to the substantial costs associated with 
that governance.  The public sector and its national 
government manifestation, continues through the GAC, to do 
some of what it has always done without the power of binding 
multi-lateral decisions.  Threats to withdraw funding or failure 
to meet financial obligations with respect to ICANN’s budget 
have been used by some of the constituencies (most notably, 
the ccTLD group).  Governments have a financing burden with 
respect to the GAC and membership dues have been the 
source of some angst.  Typically, threats to withhold money 
have been used to focus ICANN on its mission.  Without 
money, it cannot hire staff, provide outreach activities or 
complete its work. 
That the regulatory treatment of the DNS illustrates a 
fundamental and irrevocable shift away from centralised 
government regulation to private sector driven regulation 
 
Finally, it is clear that that corporations have been 
obliged to take on an increasing regulatory load and have, in 
turn, forced the shift to industry-led, market dominated 
regulation at the expense of governments.  How much 
governments may have ceded and the private sector may 
have taken away still depends entirely on one’s perspective. 
Sassen argues that “…the new geography of global 
economic processes, the strategic territories for economic 
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globalization, have to be defined in terms of both the 
practices of corporate actors, including the requisite 
infrastructure, and the work of the state in producing or 
legitimating new legal regimes.  Views that characterise the 
national state as simply losing significance fail to capture this 
very important fact and reduce what is happening to a 
function of the global-national duality:  what one wins, the 
other loses.”197  This is still a process in transition. ICANN is a 
product of its time, with a larger political and policy agenda 
within which it operates.  It is indicative of the way in which 
technology affects regulation but the process is sufficiently 
immature that much work still needs to be done. 
Sassen is correct and the research here bears that out.  
The regulatory horse-trading that has taken place in the 
management of the DNS is momentous.  It encompasses the 
ceding of responsibility through deliberate policies of industry 
self-regulation; the loss of power because the Internet started 
from a non-regulatory tradition; to the shifting balance within 
nations on questions of how a global resource may be 
managed and the realities of actually doing that effectively. 
Conclusions 
Jayasuriya argues that “. . .Globalisation is reshaping 
the fixed and firm boundary between domestic and 
international spheres and changing our conceptions of the 
proper domain of domestic and international politics and law” 
(Jayasuriya 1999:  425). 
Governments are in a position to set policy and legislate 
or regulate whilst at the same time corporations like ICANN 
                                   
197Sassen 1996:  26. 
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are manifestations of a new type of structure, outside the 
scope of governments and their constituents. 
Connors argues that  “. . .A global medium like the 
internet requires a global law.  Right now there is no 
international legislation” (Connors 2000).   There are many 
who argue that the Internet requires no special legislation as 
what is illegal offline is illegal online and existing private law 
effectively addresses jurisdictional concerns.  It is clear that 
ICANN presents us with a different way of viewing matters.  
One can collapse the spectrum of views from Reidenberg and 
Giddens by recognising that ICANN is only concerned with 
architecture and not concerned with all law, all regulation and 
all Internet activity. 
It is not, in an operational sense, concerned with 
making the world a more civil space, even though much time 
has been spent on hearing the civil society advocates.   Some 
governments have recognized that ICANN is not designed to 
bear the burden of making information privacy easier or 
facilitating more democracy around the world. 
In summary, ICANN is not relevant to some regulatory 
purposes such as the management of content or developing 
answers to the many questions posed by civil society 
advocates.  This has been argued often and the fruits of that 
argument are now being found in the Evolution and Reform 
Committee implementation plan. 
The approaches of some governments consistently 
demonstrate that, as institutions, governments are 
strategically and of necessity rethinking their place in a digital 
world.  Definitive answers are not yet obvious although trends 
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towards recognition of global standards and solutions (such 
as those being developed in ICANN198) are emerging.   
Domestically, governments are recognising the 
inevitability that, in many areas, industry is taking the lead in 
developing regulatory standards and compliance regimes 
which reduce the relevance of government in direct 
regulatory involvement.  Where governments remain 
universally strong is the articulation of desirable social policy 
outcomes with respect to access to information technology.  
An important part of that picture is the development of global 
trade in goods and information.  The relevance of 
governments in the resolution of disputes in electronic 
commerce could usefully be examined further.  Governments 
may indeed find themselves completely marginalised, despite 
the best efforts of regulators and legislators to remain central 
to that debate, as corporations seek other solutions to 
commercial disputes.   Sassen, however, takes a more 
moderate view.  Governance, at this stage of ICANN’s 
development, is not a give or take equation.  It is, instead, a 
more fluid process but, under the current construction of the 
GAC rules, national governments have few mechanisms to 
influence the ICANN’s policy outcomes. 
 
I now focus on the influence of corporate strategy on 
the development of regulatory models for the management of 
the DNS. 
 
                                   
198 ICANN UDRP can be found at http://www.icann.org. 
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CHAPTER SIX - COSMOCRACY:  CORPORATE 
STRATEGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE MODELS199 
Introduction 
The chapter focuses on the globalisation of regulation, 
management of the DNS and the influence of corporations on 
regulatory structures.  It is particularly concerned with 
understanding the commitment of corporations to setting a 
new regulatory agenda.  It discusses the costs and benefits of 
engagement in self-regulatory authorities, such as ICANN, by 
the private sector.  It examines early data on the type of 
corporations and individuals that are key global stakeholders 
in the management of Internet architecture.   
The chapter makes some conclusions about the 
criticality of corporate engagement in the establishment of 
cosmocracy.  This includes identifying the mechanisms and 
global actors responsible for shaping a new regulatory 
economy around the architecture of the Internet. 
Background 
This chapter follows three key threads.  It presents an 
extension of the conceptual framework around corporate 
strategy and lobbying in the new environment of Internet 
governance.   
The chapter presents early findings from a set of core 
data on attendance at ICANN meetings from November 1998 
                                   
199 This chapter is to be submitted to Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/submissions.htm. 
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to November 2001200 which tracks the engagement of key 
corporations in the development of ICANN policies and in 
operational decisions about the expansion of the DNS.   
It points to some early methodologies for more 
rigorously tracking a new demographic of influence in the 
global management of the DNS in order to understand the 
success of corporations in influencing ICANN decisions on 
both the formulation of policy and implementation of that 
policy, for example, the rules for and selection of seven new 
gTLDs201. 
Some qualifications are necessary about the baseline 
data used for the analysis.  Firstly, the records of attendance 
at ICANN meetings are often inaccurate, with duplicate 
names, clearly false or bogus names, and registrations which 
may not necessarily reflect actual attendance.  For example, a 
person could register for the meeting and not attend or only 
attend for one session or the opening reception.  For three 
meetings, the Singapore, Berlin and Santiago meetings, only 
remote participation figures are available although physical 
meetings took place (evidenced by the meeting archives held 
on ICANN’s website).   
However, some very clear patterns have emerged which 
identify key corporations and their representatives who have 
consistently attended the meetings and who have been 
                                   
200 These meetings were held on 2-4 March 1999 in Singapore, 25-27 May 1999 in 
Berlin (Germany), 23-26 August 1999 in Santiago (Chile), 1-4 November 1999 in 
Marina del Rey, California, 7-10 March in Cairo (Egypt), 13-17 July 2000 in 
Yokohama, Japan, 13-16 November 2000 in Marina del Rey, 9-13 March 2001 in 
Melbourne, Australia, 1-4 June 2001 in Stockholm, Sweden, 7-10 September 2001 in 
Montevideo (Uruguay) and 12-15 November 2001 in Marina del Rey.  I attended 7 of 
the 11 meetings.  
201 The policy for the introduction of new gTLDs is found at 
http://www.icann.org/yokohama/new-tld-topic.htm. 
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actively involved in the Constituency working groups such as 
the Registrars’ Constituency202, the gTLD203 and ccTLD 
Registry Constituencies and the Intellectual Property 
Constituency.  For three reasons, I focus here on the 
Registrars and gTLD Registries.  Firstly, the data is most 
reliable.  Secondly, registrars and the registries are the 
corporations with the most to gain, commercially, from 
ICANN’s decision making both in the manner in which 
decisions are made and the actual decisions which are 
implemented.  Thirdly, Registrars and Registries have been 
the most publicly active in driving the ICANN organisation to 
formalise its procedures, especially in developing and 
implementing development of consensus driven policy.  
This early work204 is being used to develop more robust 
methodologies to determine the success of corporations in 
getting what they want, which is not always clearly 
articulated, from the organisation tasked with managing the 
critical infrastructure on which their businesses rely.  A new 
demographic of influence will be published in the near future 
which will include a matrix of key actors, both corporations 
and individuals and a map of the influence of those actors on 
decisionmaking within ICANN.   
The chapter contributes to the debate on the 
globalisation of regulation and provides some original 
conceptual thinking on the demographics of influence.  It also 
                                   
202 The Registrars’ Constituency website is found at http://www.icann-registrars.org/ 
203 The gTLD Registries Constituency website is found at http://www.gtldregistries.org/ 
204 The baseline materials are derived from publicly available meeting dates and 
attendance records at ICANN meetings.  The issues – both procedural and 
commercial – are sourced from ICANN Board meeting minutes which are found on 
the ICANN website.   
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presents data which has not been previously collated and 
analysed in any detailed way.  The charts and dissection of 
the data into categories are found in the Appendix Three at 
the back of the document. 
The Hypothesis 
I return briefly to the three key parts of the hypothesis 
for the broader work of which this chapter is a critical part.  
Firstly, that national governments are losing the right and the 
ability to regulate for the resolution of disputes in the DNS. 
Even though national governments are important 
domestically, the business of public sector regulatory 
agencies is changing rapidly. 
Secondly, that the regulation of disputes in an 
electronic marketplace is moving towards arrangements 
financed and enacted by the private sector.  In return for the 
financing of that regulation, the private sector requires a 
commitment from governments to more flexible regulatory 
responses.  
Thirdly, that corporations have been obliged to take on 
an increasing regulatory load and have, in turn, forced the 
shift to industry-led, market dominated regulation at the 
expense of public sector, government policy driven 
governance.  The normalisation of the technical management 
of the DNS illustrates a fundamental and irrevocable shift 
away from centralised national government regulation to 
global private sector regulation driven by the development of 
operating standards and other regulatory instruments such as 
accreditation procedures for registry operators and registrars 
To understand the impact of corporate involvement in 
not-for-profit private sector regulation of critical infrastructure 
such as the DNS one needs to map the intersection of 
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corporate capacity to pay for the determination of regulatory, 
and hence commercial, outcomes against the power of 
personalities in the absence of objective regulatory structures 
with clearly formulated policies and procedures. 
The broader Internet and, in particular, the regulation 
of the DNRI illustrates emphatically the way in which an 
industry has become globally accessible.  The globalisation of 
regulation is not a new phenomenon.  The shipping and 
aviation industries have global rules (for example, using 
English to communicate and international agreements about 
liability for lost luggage or personal injury); the financial 
service sector operates on global standards (such as the use 
of SWIFT codes) and there are global standards for the 
computer software industry (for example the use of character 
sets such as ASCII and open source software such as LINUX). 
The new research presented here indicates that the 
regulatory treatment of the technical management of the DNS 
demonstrates a fundamental and irrevocable shift away from 
centralised government regulation to arrangements funded 
and managed by the private sector.  The findings support the 
work of Braithwaite and Drahos in terms of identifying new 
models of global business regulation.  The work of Mueller 
and Lessig is also important here.  Mueller has taken the 
approach of analysing institutional innovation; Lessig the 
impact of technical regulation or the importance of code in 
determining regulatory outcomes.  The work of Sassen on 
globalisation, particularly with respect to the shifting balance 
of power between the private and public sectors, is also borne 
out by the research data. 
In essence, the control of rulemaking determines the 
nature and extent of business opportunities, both for the 
domain registration industry and the wider corporate sector 
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that relies on a physical and electronic market place.  Work in 
progress allows the formation of some conclusions about the 
success of corporate strategy on building Internet governance 
structures and the impact of domain name registration 
businesses on the formation of ICANN. 
Why is the work important? 
The criticality of the DNRI is set out neatly in an early 
ICANN document on registrar accreditation205.  It says, 
The Internet Domain Name System (DNS) provides functions necessary 
for virtually all Internet activities. If the Internet is to continue to grow, 
DNS services must be reliable, secure and cost effective. 
A major goal of an Internet registrar accreditation system, therefore, is to 
establish and apply criteria for the business and technical environment 
and processes of registration such that stability of the DNS is maintained 
while at the same time encouraging robust competition in the delivery of 
registration services. 
The following list of principles is intended to provide a basis for the 
development of specific accreditation guidelines. Public comment on the 
principles is solicited. 
1. The registration system should be convenient and easy to use from the 
perspective of individuals or organizations wishing to use domain names. 
The system should allow portability of domain name registration from one 
registrar to another without disadvantage to the domain name holder, 
and should put all registrars on a level playing field with regard to access 
to registries.  
2. The registration process should embrace standard principles of good 
business practice, including legally enforceable commitments by the 
parties to the registration agreement. To the extent feasible, it should 
contain procedures designed to prevent or minimize fraud or other forms 
of illegal behavior associated with the assignment of a domain name, and 
to ensure that the registrar's obligations to its customers and to the 
registry administrator will be fulfilled in the event that the registrar goes 
out of business or otherwise fails to perform.  
                                   
205 http://www.icann.org/singapore/draftguidelines.htm. 
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3. The registration agreement should protect legal rights (including 
intellectual property rights) of the parties, and of third parties where 
applicable. It should contain provisions that minimize disputes over rights 
to use of particular domain names, and in the event of dispute, it should 
contain provisions that enhance the orderly and timely resolution of 
disputes.  
4. The information obtained from applicants for domain names should 
include only the data elements reasonably needed for the assignment and 
use of the name. Registrars and other parties acquiring, storing and using 
such information should be bound by reasonable privacy principles, 
consistent with facilitation of dispute resolution and law enforcement. 
Domain name applicants should have an opportunity to register names on 
behalf of third parties who wish to remain anonymous.  
5. The registration system should promote worldwide access to domain 
name registration services and encourage the development of alternative 
business models for successful registration services.  
With many competing registrars206 and a self-organising 
model of policy development, it is predictable that registrars 
would both want to manage the environment in which they 
operate and be prepared to facilitate the most advantageous 
rules of engagement.  The same is true of registry operators. 
Cosmocracy:  Who, What and Where? 
Much work has been done to frame and understand the 
impact of corporate lobbying on regulatory institutions207.  
The literature is expanded here by some early analysis of the 
way in which corporate strategy has shaped Internet 
governance models and, in particular, the development of 
ICANN.  The data has elicited two special terms, the 
cosmocracy and cosmocrats.  The term cosmocracy is new.  
The cosmocracy is an ill-defined place populated by a loose 
group of cosmocrats, the new class of regulatory agents.  
                                   
206 The full list of approximately 120 ICANN accredited registrars is found at 
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html. 
207 Braithwaite & Drahos (2000), Arup (2000) and de Figueiredo & de Figueiredo 
(2002) are all useful starting places on global business regulation.  Sassen (1996, 
1998) is helpful in framing governance and accountability. 
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Cosmocracy supplants traditional public sector bureaucracy; 
cosmocrats replace government bureaucrats in a new 
regulatory economy. 
To make some determinations about cosmocracy, 
cosmocrats and the governance of the DNS, I have collated 
early data from a series of ICANN meetings.  This data is also 
used to understand influence flows and corporate strategy in 
the ICANN environment on two levels.  The first is the 
formation of procedures and rules of engagement in the 
process; the second is the making and implementation of 
operational decisions.   
This early data is interesting and important.  Interesting 
because it extends the literature on corporate lobbying into 
new terrain; important because Internet governance has a 
direct impact on the way businesses conduct their operations 
around the world. 
The data that supports this analysis is collated from the 
publicly available registration records from ICANN meetings 
between the 1999 Berlin meeting and 2001 Marina Del Rey 
meeting.   
The registration records have many flaws including 
duplicated names, names that are clearly false, inconsistent 
entries and missing data, for example, omission of a 
registrant’s affiliation or company name.  The registration 
records do not indicate actual attendance.  For example, a 
person can register for the meeting and, for whatever reason, 
not attend.  Registration also does not indicate the time at 
the meetings.  For example, a registered person can attend 
one session or an evening social event and participate no 
further.  The meetings are public and open to anyone to 
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attend208.  Some of the meeting records do not reflect GAC 
member attendance that may skew both the number of 
attendees and the allocation across key categories.  Finally, 
ICANN allows remote participation.  Capturing the on-line 
attendees and analysing their participation is difficult.   
Having said that, the information is stark in its 
illustration of the dominance of business interests in ICANN 
meetings and decision-making.  For this chapter, I have only 
focused on physical attendees but the 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/ archive holds all the 
remote participation information.   
Some key characteristics of the data are as follows.  
The first subset of the registration details is the Business (B) 
group.  This group includes commercial registrars, registries, 
law firms, content providers and trademark owners, 
journalists, technology companies such as IBM and CISCO 
and industry advocacy groups.  This group is generally 
represented in the DNSO constituency and is spread across all 
the various parts of the constituency.  The 
http://www.icann.org/dnso/dnso.htm is comprised of 
registrars, registries209, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and 
connectivity providers, business operators and the intellectual 
property community.  By far the largest subset of the 
Business group is the registrars.  There are 121 ICANN 
accredited registrars, many of whom regularly attend the 
Registrars’ Constituency meetings which are part of the 
broader ICANN agenda 
                                   
208 Until the post September 11, 2001 meetings, security and proof of identify were 
fairly loosely monitored so an unregistered person could attend the meetings. 
209 Both ccTLD and gTLD registries, although the formation of the ccNSO has taken 
ccTLD registry operators out of the DNSO. 
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For completeness, the remaining categories are (G) 
government and quasi-government agencies such as the 
European Commission, the WIPO and representatives to the 
GAC.  Group (N) are principally engineers and technical 
experts who are concentrated in telecommunications 
companies, hardware and software providers, the ITU, the 
ISO and ISOC.  Group (A) includes academic and research 
organisations and civil society advocates such as the Center 
for Democracy and Technology and the Markle Foundation.  
Group (U) are unidentified or have no obvious affiliation.  
Group (I) are ICANN staff.  
The data shows that, overall, more than half the 
participants are from North America.  Approximately one 
quarter of participants are women and, for the period of the 
data collection, this translated into either one or two female 
ICANN Board Directors.  There is some overlap between 
categories, for example, businesses such as IBM and AOL 
Time Warner are content providers and network operators or 
suppliers of network infrastructure.  Some of the academic 
institutions are ccTLD administrators as are some ISOC 
representatives.  Some law firm representatives (such as 
those from Shapiro Cohen) are also represented as ICANN 
Board members as are some telecommunications company 
representatives (such as MCI WorldCom).   
There is a consistent Australian and New Zealand 
presence, out of proportion to the representation from Europe 
which is dominated by the Scandinavians and Germans.  
There is only a small and inconsistent representation from 
southern Europe.  In the GAC context, this is perhaps 
explained by representation from the European Commission.  
India, despite its strong IT, software and call centre sector, is 
poorly represented.  Representatives from Korea seem to 
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outweigh their counterparts from either China (including Hong 
Kong) or Japan.  There is very little representation from the 
South Pacific, the developing South East Asian region or 
Africa.210  As is demonstrated later in the chapter, it is likely 
that the cost of participation limits the opportunity for 
representatives from poorer countries to participate.  The 
chart below illustrates the proportion of business 
representation over the remaining groups.211 
The data in the chart below also needs to be read with 
some caution.  For completeness, data was included for all 
the meetings between November 1998 and November 2001.  
However, for the Singapore, Berlin and Santiago meetings, 
only on-line participant data was available.  In future 
research, these three meetings will be removed and the full 
range of meetings through 2003 included.  The latter two 
years of meetings will give a clearer picture of who is 
participating in which groups and, over time, the 
establishment of demographic data which can identify, for 
example, education, experience and linguistic background. 
                                   
210 Further research has been done to dissect the GAC meeting attendance.  The data 
is found at Appendix Three. 
211 No comparison has yet been done on business participation within other 
international organizations such as the ITU, WIPO or the WTO.  This will be done in 
future post doctoral research. 
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ICANN 
To shift now from general data to specific, I have 
focused on the data which refers to registrars and registries.  
The data is verified by analysing the spread of the top 25 
registrars in the State of the Domain data212.  There is a 
consistent group of corporate representatives from a mix of 
countries who have appeared at consecutive ICANN meetings. 
From this data we can infer that corporations are 
committed to the ICANN agenda, in both the development of 
policy and influencing operational decisions.  The charts at 
Appendix B show the consistency of participation and the 
approximate size of each corporate delegation. 
The cost of participation is a key factor in the success of 
the bottom-up, consensus-driven policy formulation exercise 
which is undertaken.  I have estimated some of the costs of 
                                   
212 Found at http://www.sotd.info.  Archival information is also available which show 
that the top ten registrars have remained fairly static. 
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this participation as an indicator of the willingness (and 
necessity) of consistent participation.  Control of the 
development of regulatory processes, of procedure, of 
agendas, of the act of drafting consensus positions is critical 
to the success of any business wishing to engage in the wide 
range of potential operations that rely on the Internet 
network for their success.  I extend Mueller’s contention that 
“. . .Institutions channel human behavior into certain paths by 
affecting relative transaction costs; i.e., by making some 
kinds of interactions highly costly and uncertain while making 
others convenient and secure”.  (Mueller 2000:  2)   
There are, of course, many factors such as the views of 
governments, the influence of other peak bodies such as the 
ITU, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the broad 
Internet user community that have a great bearing on any 
outcome.  This chapter excludes consideration of these 
influences to focus particularly on corporate strategy and the 
development of robust Internet governance models that 
deliver the greatest business opportunities. 
In addition, the capacity for rulemaking determines 
business opportunity.  Where there is little government 
intervention and a new regulatory economy under 
construction, there is opportunity for commercial advantage. 
History - cosmocrats gather round 
To put the data in context, it is necessary to quickly 
back-track through some general Internet history.  Hafner, 
Berners-Lee & Reid trace the gestation, birth and early years 
of the Internet.  Quick references can also be found to the 
technical history of the development of the DNS and Internet 
Protocols at http://www.nic.at/english/rfcs.html.   
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In the context of this chapter though “. . .the 
management of the Domain Name System offers a kind of 
microcosm of issues now frequently associated with the 
overall management of the Internet’s operation and 
evolution. . . .It is helpful to consider separately [and then 
ICANN’s role] the problem of managing the domain name 
space and the Internet address space. . .   Domain names 
have semantics that numbers may not imply; and thus a 
means of determining who can use what names is needed…”  
(Cerf & Kahn 1999:  6). 
Most particularly, I am interested in the culture of 
“expert volunteerism” which is evident from the data.  The 
culture of volunteerism is not new to the Internet, illustrated 
by the system of delegation of responsibility for portions of 
Internet architecture started by Dr Postel.   
The added interest here is that now the volunteerism is 
done to determine, in large part, advantageous commercial 
outcomes.   
Driven in part by the Clinton Administration Framework 
and the ensuing discussion papers, the corporate sector, 
particularly in California’s Silicon Valley, saw the opportunity 
presented by more commercial arrangements for using 
Internet resources.  In 1999, Cerf and Kahn added that “. . 
.Other political and social dimensions that enabled the 
Internet to come into existence and flourish are just as 
important as the technology upon which it is based.”  (Cerf & 
Kahn 1999:  4)  There were significant political and social 
dimensions such data privacy, universal service obligations, 
access costs, civil society and governance.  
The official United States view was that  “ICANN has 
been designated by the US Government to serve as the global 
consensus entity to which the US Government is transferring 
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the responsibility for co-ordinating the management of the 
DNS, the allocation of IP address space, the assignment of 
protocol parameters, and the management of the root server 
system.”   All this was to be achieved in the context of the 
broader political and social dimensions which Cerf and Kahn 
referred to in addition to taking into account competing 
commercial objectives. 
Mueller’s work explains “a narrative about how the 
commercialization of Internet domain names led to the 
formation of a new international regime for regulation and 
dispute resolution” (Mueller 2000:  1).  The research here 
tracks the development of ICANN’s mandate, from the US 
Department of Commerce, to manage the technical aspects of 
the Internet and the policies and processes that surround that 
management.  The most important feature of this work is 
tracking the shift from government focused regulation, firmly 
within the purview of civil servants, to a privatised system, 
run on a minimal cost-recovery budget, managing consensus-
driven input and influence from the private sector as well as 
balancing the input of governments through the GAC.   
It is clear that ICANN is responsible for the coordination 
and control of the technical protocols of the Internet.  It 
manages the Internet address space, the DNS and the 
Internet root server213.  In practice, the most complex portion 
of ICANN’s work has been to balance policy and politics with 
sound technical management with input from myriad 
competing voices.  
                                   
213 See www.icann.org for the formal statement of ICANN’s responsibilities. 
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ICANN is a case study of new economy regulation, a 
hybrid of international regulation and corporate influence that 
has no precedent.   
On July 1, 1997, as part of the Framework discussions, 
the President directed the Secretary of Commerce to privatise 
the management of DNS in a manner that increased 
competition and facilitated international participation in its 
management.  This chapter focuses on one area of the 
mission to “. . .Collaborate on the design, development, and 
testing of appropriate membership mechanisms that foster 
accountability to and representation of the global and 
functional diversity of the Internet and its users, within the 
structure of the private-sector DNS management 
organisation”214.  There are two separate concepts here.  The 
formulation of appropriately representative membership 
structures (mechanisms for policymaking) and the creation of 
an organisation responsible for the implementation of those 
policies (a management organisation).  The conflation of two 
different concepts has, from the start made implementation 
of any scheme of global representation difficult215. In 
addition, inadequate attention has been paid to regulatory 
quality control issues such as investigation, compliance and 
enforcement and penalties beyond contractual arrangements.  
These contractual arrangements are separate from regulatory 
arrangements.   
Coupled with the identification of commercial 
opportunity, was the understanding that the Internet would 
be governed, in the broadest sense, on a user pays basis.  
                                   
214 This document is found in full in the Supplementary Material.  See page 1. 
215 Refer to the ICANN At Large Membership web page for further details. 
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This user pays, industry self-regulatory model is now manifest 
in the structure of ICANN where members of the various 
constituencies are charged a fee to recoup some of the 
expenses that ICANN incurs.  “. . .ICANN constituents 
benefiting from ICANN’s technical coordination and  policy 
development activities should contribute to its budget, 
whether individually or through intermediary fee aggregating 
organizations”216. 
In summary, ICANN is “dedicated to preserving the 
operational stability of the Internet; to promoting 
competition; to achieving broad representation of global 
Internet communities; and to developing policy through 
private-sector, bottom-up, consensus-based means.  ICANN 
welcomes the participation of any interested Internet user, 
business or organization” 217.  
The impact of ICANN on the development of multi-
jurisdictional, non-governmental policymaking and dispute 
resolution mechanisms is centred around “two principal 
issues:  how to support centrally administered Internet 
functions including name and number management, and 
secondly, how to allocate international name space.” (Kahin 
1996:  1).  The added complication is how to allocate the 
commercial benefit derived from the public governance of 
privately held resources which are now firmly in the public 
domain. 
                                   
216 ICANN Task Force on Funding, Draft Final Report, 30 October 1999, p 2. 
217 See further at http://www.icann.org 
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Regulatory Costs:  Who pays and what do they get? 
The DNRI is the core of the consumer usability of the 
Internet as it provides domain names and other related web-
based services such as hosting, website design and domain 
name portfolio management.  The DNRI is also critical to the 
operation of ICANN.  The analysis here is limited to those 
registrars which are ICANN accredited218 and those registries 
that have contracts with ICANN to provide registry 
services.219 
I will first examine registry operators.  An Internet 
domain name registry is an entity that receives DNS 
information from domain name registrars, inserts that 
information into a central database and propagates that 
information into Internet zone files on the Internet.  This 
functionality enables domain names to be found by users 
around the world via applications such as the World Wide Web 
and e-mail.  Registries are run on both commercial and not-
for-profit models.   
Verisign220 is the largest commercial registry, operating 
the .com and .net registries.  The Internet Society now runs 
the .org registry221.  New commercial gTLD registry operators 
include Registry Pro222 which offers .pro registrations; 
                                   
218 Found at http://www.icann.org/registrars/. 
219 Found at http://www.gtldregistries.org/aboutus.html. 
220 http://www.verisign-grs.com/registrar/. 
221 http://www.pir.org/. 
222 http://www.registrypro.com/. 
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NeuLevel223 which manages the .biz gTLD; Afilias224 which 
operates .info and Global Name Registry which runs .name225.  
New not-for-profit gTLD registries include .museum which is 
run by MuseDoma226, .coop227 which is used for co-operatives 
around the world, .aero228 for the aviation industry. 
These registries have approximately 30,054,723 names 
held in them according to the 2003 State of the Domain 
(SOTD)229 which holds the key details of each of the registries 
and updates that information regularly.   The market share 
across registrars for these names is also broken down in 
SOTD statistics.   If the 30,054,723 names were worth an 
average of $10 each to the registrar to renew the name, then 
the baseline industry worth would be $300,547,230, separate 
from any other business valuation of equipment and services.  
This analysis, however, is too simplistic as the zone file is 
shrinking as names are deleted or expire and the number of 
new names is declining.  This is despite the addition of new 
gTLDs which have, in the early stages, had a minimal impact 
on the size of the zone file.  
                                   
223 http://www.neulevel.biz/. 
224 http://www.afilias.info/gateway/index_html. 
225 http://www.gnr.name/. 
226 http://www.nic.museum/. 
227 http://www.nic.coop/about.asp. 
228 http://www.nic.aero/. 
229https://www.sotd.info/sotd/SubscriptionReports.aspx?sub=0&selection=1.  
The statistics are compiled using publicly available WHOIS data from the domain 
name system registries. 
 166 
Framing the market size of the registries is also 
important in understanding the impact of corporate strategy 
on the development of regulatory models to manage global 
registry and registrar businesses.  Over the life of the 
research for this chapter, from November 1998 to November 
2001, an additional seven gTLD registries were chosen, had 
contracts signed for the provision of services and partially 
activated so that registrants could buy the new names.  
During this period, the April 2000 NASDAQ market crash and 
subsequent sector wide economic downturn took place.  
If domain names are critical to businesses then it is 
helpful to understand a little more about Internet access and 
usage rates.  In Australia, the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics230 and the NOIE231 provide historical data on 
Australian use of the Internet.  In 1999, “21% of SMEs 
connected to the Internet were engaged in Internet based 
sales, and 22% were actively placing orders for goods and 
services as of February 1999”.  The 2000 NOIE report232  
provides more detailed analysis of the growing number of 
ISPs, of secure servers and the cost of bandwidth.  
Internationally, Australian trends mirror those of the United 
States, Europe and the UK.   
However, the market size and comparisons with other 
markets only tells half the story.  The influence of 
corporations on regulatory models in DNS governance is more 
detailed and complex.  That complexity is divided into three 
                                   
230 http://www.abs.gov.au 
231 http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/framework/Progress/ie_stats/state_of_play.htm 
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components.  The first is membership fees which are levied 
and paid via a variety of formulas.  These are essentially 
licensing arrangements for the right to provide services.  The 
second is the volunteering of expert services to draft papers, 
provide input on policy and contribute to drafting.  The third 
is through event sponsorship and hosting functions at ICANN 
meetings.   
To deal with the license fees first.  Registrars seeking 
accreditation to offer gTLD name registration services must 
follow the ICANN guidelines233.  This means that they pay  
US$2,500 non-refundable application fee, to be submitted with 
application; US$4,000 for the first TLD, and US$500 for each additional 
TLD yearly accreditation fee; US$70,000 in working capital requirement. . 
. . ICANN requires only that you demonstrate (by submitting an 
independently verified financial statement) that you have at least this 
much liquid capital (cash or credit) before your ICANN accreditation 
becomes effective. . .and Quarterly accreditation fee (variable portion) 
paid once you begin registering domain names. This fee represents a 
portion of ICANN's operating costs based partly on your share of overall 
domain name registrations in the TLDs for which you are accredited, so it 
will vary depending on your volume of names registered as well as the 
total volume of all names registered.  
 Registrars also have to pay fees to registries.  These 
fees vary for each different gTLD and for each ccTLD 
depending on the portfolio of names a registrar wants to 
offer. 
Registries have to pay similar license fees to ICANN.  In 
the case of the new gTLDs, these license fees were made up 
of several components.  The first was the non-refundable 
application fee of US$50,000 to submit an application to be 
considered for the round of new gTLDs.  This application fee, 
                                                                                           
232 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/framework/Progress/ie_stats/StateofPlayN
ov2000/readiness/readiness_6.htm 
233 http://www.icann.org/registrars/accreditation-financials.htm 
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paid to ICANN, was non-refundable and did not include any of 
the other costs associated with collating the formal 
application.234   Under Network Solution’s (NSI) 1999 
agreement with ICANN, NSI was required to pay a 
$US250,000 fee.235   According to ICANN’s proposed budget 
papers for Fiscal Year 2000-2001236, a total of US$4,314,000 
was identified as revenue from the mix of all gTLD registries, 
registrars and ccTLD registries.  The Transition Budget for 
Fiscal Year 1999-2000 identified approximately $US5,000,000 
in fees from registries and registrars.237 
The second portion of the cost of entry is the volunteer 
time, services and expertise provided by the representatives 
of various companies.  The table at Appendix Two provides a 
snapshot of some attendance figures over the series of 
meetings under investigation238. 
The table was constructed using the publicly available 
ICANN attendance lists and knowledge of the working groups 
within, for example, the Registrars’ Constituency.  Using this 
data, one can develop an analysis of the volunteer 
contributions to ICANN’s costs239.  The table includes, where 
possible, remote and physical attendees.  The selected 
                                   
234 http://www.icann.org/tlds/new-tld-application-instructions-15aug00.htm. 
235 The 1999 agreement is found at http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-registry-
agreement.htm. 
236 Found at http://www.icann.org/financials/proposed-budget-04may00.htm. 
237 Found at http://www.icann.org/financials/budget-fy99-00-27may99.htm. 
238 The full table is at Appendix B. 
239 For a light-hearted look at the commitment to the caravan, ICANN commentator 
Bret Fausett has worked out that if one had travelled from Chicago, Illinois to every 
ICANN meeting since 1998, one would have flown 272,845 kilometres. 
http://icann.blog.us/2003/04/14.html#a1284. 
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sample is not randomly chosen but does demonstrate a fair 
spread of large and small registrars and registries who have 
participated consistently in many of the meetings.  
Indicative Participation Costs  
It costs approximately $US10,000 per week per person 
for a corporate representative to attend an ICANN meeting.  
To arrive at this figure, I used a baseline cost of a return 
business class airfare from Melbourne, Australia, to the 
various meeting locations.  On average, between November 
1998 and November 2001, the flight costs are approximately 
$US7,000.  Hotel and incidental costs bring this total to 
roughly US$10,000 per week.  In addition, there is the cost of 
losing key personnel such as chief executive officers, chief 
technology officers and general counsels for the duration of 
the meetings. The participation figures indicate that most of 
the top registrars and registries send between two and 
fourteen staff per meeting, depending on the location of the 
meeting and the issues under discussion.  Without precise key 
staff salaries, it is difficult to determine exactly how much 
staff time is worth.  However, judging by the size and 
consistency of corporate delegations, one can see that the 
financial commitment by corporations to ICANN is significant. 
The final cost is that of sponsorship of ICANN 
meetings240.  Sponsorship opportunities have been made 
available at all ICANN meetings to offset the costs for holding 
the meetings, to provide an opportunity to showcase business 
services, to influence a particular outcome and, in the case of 
                                   
240 The most recent ICANN meeting provides up to date costings for sponsorship 
opportunities which are similar to other meetings.  
http://www.icannmontreal.ca/en/sponsorship.html 
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the new gTLD registries, to convince ICANN registrars to sell 
their names.   
A snapshot of events includes cocktail parties, opening 
receptions, registrar parties, river cruises and assistance with 
the cost of hosting the physical meetings241.  Whilst no figures 
are publicly available, the locations (such as the Getty 
Museum in Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Staples Centre 
for a rock concert) give an indication of potential costs.  The 
costs include entertainment (for example, parties at the Café 
Opera in Stockholm and the U2 concert in Los Angeles), food 
and drinks, give-aways such as CD-ROMS and other corporate 
promotional material.   
The expert services provided by registrars and registry 
staff to develop policy positions are diverse.  They range 
across technical engineering skills; legal and regulatory 
knowledge; agenda setting and meeting procedures and 
report writing.  Attendance at meetings adds legitimacy to the 
process.  The self-organising constituencies get on with the 
work at hand to determine consensus policy positions and 
provide guidance to the Board.   
The motivations for volunteers or, more precisely, for 
companies to provide their employees’ services to ICANN are 
varied.  They can be characterized as follows.   
Firstly, the chaos theory.  As an incumbent guaranteed 
to lose market share, it is in the interest of incumbent service 
providers to cause as much distraction and chaos as possible 
or, at the very least, to ensure that no real progress is made.  
This is seen in the telecommunications industry where 
incumbent companies use delaying tactics, fail to interconnect 
                                   
241 http://www.icann.org/riodejaneiro/#sponsors 
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on reasonable terms and conditions or abuse their market 
dominance.  The chaos theory is alive and well in the 
management of the DNS. 
Secondly, there is an element of commitment to the 
cause of good governance, the establishment of reasonable 
rules and the implementation of sound policy.  This is 
evidenced in the significant donations of both money and time 
in the early stages of ICANN’s establishment and the genuine 
efforts of many volunteers to draft documents, to devote 
hours to teleconference calls (often in the middle of the night) 
and to provide services which, in other professional 
circumstances, would be billed at commercial rates. 
Thirdly, there is an element of the cosmocracy caravan, 
of being part of a small and exclusive club, of collecting the t-
shirts and frequent flyer miles to different places around the 
world as part of the ICANN community.  Despite often 
diametrically opposed points of view, there is a definite 
collegial and cooperative atmosphere at the meetings and 
during the work that takes place between meetings. 
Lastly, participation in ICANN has been commercially 
critical for many on-line businesses, especially the registrars 
and registries, as they are the entities which have most 
directly benefited from and paid for ICANN decisions. 
Strategic Impact 
With a statement of the assumptions242 of the work and 
a brief outline of some key market demographics, I move now 
                                   
242 The three key assumptions are, firstly, that the creation of ICANN actively 
demonstrates regulation being moved away from governments; secondly that 
governments still take an active, but peripherally influential, role and thirdly that the 
private sector is forced to meet the costs from that regulation but it is they who 
derive the greatest benefit from it.  
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to understand more fully the impact of corporate involvement 
in not-for-profit private sector led regulation of critical 
infrastructure.   
There are two key elements to the analysis.  Firstly, 
that technical regulation has political and therefore policy 
implications. Secondly, that where there are policy 
implications with direct commercial impact, we can expect to 
see the vigorous involvement of corporations as they manage 
the environment in which they do business.  This is certainly 
the case here. 
From a political and policy perspective the DNS is highly 
complex especially because, in the last five years, the 
commercial attractiveness of on-line enterprise, in its many 
different forms, has increased. From a technical perspective, 
it works, like all good technology, with the average end-user 
not knowing the slightest thing about what happens at the 
network layer.    
However, the network layer is where the mission and 
mandate of ICANN resides. It is also where different business 
interests, national political objectives and cultural 
expectations about the utility of and access to the broader 
Internet coalesce.    
The impact of the Internet and, as a case study, the 
DNRI  illustrates emphatically the way in which regulation of 
an industry has been globalised.  Jayasuriya argues that 
“…Globalization is reshaping the fixed and firm boundary 
between domestic and international spheres and changing our 
conceptions of the proper domain of domestic and 
international politics and law”  (Jayasuriya 1999:  1).  This 
trend is certainly in evidence here. 
In the case of the work outlined here, little academic or 
popular work has been done to quantify the commitment of 
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corporations to the development of Internet governance 
models, at either a policy or technical level.  The early 
statistics collected for the research demonstrate significant 
financial and time commitment and the creation of a new kind 
of regulatory model. 
The Cosmocracy Caravan 
The DNRI, in parallel with a regulatory experiment of 
open DNS governance, remains a work in progress.  However, 
it is now possible to identify a set of factors that have enabled 
an orderly transition from a monopoly provided service, 
limited by highly restrictive policy, to a more open market 
place where opportunity for competition can be identified at 
several points.  These factors include:  
 flexible meetings; 
 online technology; 
 English language; 
 skills mix including legal, regulatory and 
commercial knowledge 
 commitment to the Internet as a forum for 
broader civil society goals243 
The global domain name industry is a test bed for the 
development of hybrid regulatory models.  Corporations are 
critical to that development not only because they pay the 
actual price of regulation but they also provide the staff and 
expertise to do the work.   
Private interest in public standards is nothing new.  
Examples abound in shipping, weights and measures, clothing 
                                   
243 Tolerated in many cases because it would be perceived as inappropriate to ask the 
civil society representatives to choose another forum.  They seem, though, to have 
done that by themselves, judging by the participation rates. 
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sizes and radio spectrum management and allocation.  That 
interest takes on a different dimension with respect to 
technical standards for the DNS and the influence that has on 
extremely sensitive commercial outcomes. 
The alphabet soup244 of corporate lobbyists make it 
their mission to ensure that governments do nothing to 
impede the environments in which they want to do business 
and the conditions under which they do that. 
Braithwaite and Drahos’ term ‘webs of influence’ is 
under examination here to assess the impact corporations 
have on the opportunity to set their own regulatory 
environments (or, better yet, avoid regulation completely). 
Mueller argues that, with respect to the regulatory 
structure surrounding the management of domain names the 
“emerging property rights regime in domain names would be 
shaped primarily by political bargains, and affected 
disproportionately by bargaining parties that are wealthy, 
homogenous in outlook, and well organized”.  (Mueller 2000:  
95)  In the relevant literature, Reidenberg argues that 
“network governance vs territory governance”  is the 
phenomenon which shifts most comprehensively the way in 
which the private sector interacts with governments. 
(Reidenberg 1997:  96)  This is manifest here.  Sassen’s work 
on globalisation and influence flows is particularly important 
with respect to the globalisation of business transactions and 
corporate responses.  In addition to key corporate actors, 
consumer groups, academics and the broader public are also 
engaged in DNS governance but not in as great a number of 
with the same degree of influence. 
                                   
244 For example, AT&T, BT, MPA, MPAA, INTA, ABA, AIPLA and RIAA. 
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The actual personalities require further work to unpack 
the skills, attitudes, linguistic background and cultural 
heritage, all of which have an impact on the way in which 
ICANN operates.  Methodology to refine the meaning of these 
statistics is under preparation and is the subject of future 
work.  It requires the development of a series of interviews 
and focus groups on a survey sample of corporate (and other) 
actors for both individuals and institutions.   
Decision Making:  Why does it matter?  
Control of decision making mechanisms or at least 
familiarity with the way the system works is critical to 
corporations wishing to influence regulatory outcomes that 
enable them to conduct their business with a minimum of 
limitations.  In the ICANN environment, decision making with 
respect to Internet governance depends on understanding the 
key policy issues AND the processes by which decisions about 
those issues are resolved.  Control of the process is, in the 
early stages of “regulatory construction” as important as 
control of the issue under discussion itself.   
The development of ICANN is a model of regulatory 
change.  Mueller has argued, that the technical management 
of numbers corresponds to the management of highly 
valuable and easily identifiable names.  As such, the 
regulatory and commercial stakes are high, even if one were 
only to use NASDAQ company valuations.  (Verisign, for 
example, acquired dominant registrar NSI for over 
$US17billion.) 
The composition of the Board reflects ICANN’s 
globalised nature.  Very deliberate battles are fought to 
ensure that non-North American interests are represented in 
everything from the location of root servers to ensuring that 
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small South Pacific nations are heard.  It is easy to see from 
the previous tables that those without commercial support, 
access to US dollars, English as their first language and 
affordable access to the Internet find it difficult to participate. 
The impact of the addition of seven new gTLDs is 
immense, not only for its commercial impact but for the 
impetus it has given to ICANN as an institution.  ICANN has 
become the honey-pot around which the bees gathered. 
Mueller’s work on property rights and institutional 
innovation is most instructive here.  The pressures of 
commercialisation of the domain name space are the key 
determinant of institutional development.  How much do they 
outweigh technical stability and redundancy – how far can the 
system be pushed? 
 “The meteoric rise of the World Wide Web made the 
possession of domain names and the business of registering 
them economically important”.  (Mueller 2000:  94)  When 
assessing the value of the domain name space, is the 
business of registering names important?  What is it worth?  
Mueller estimates something in the order of $US1billion 
annually.   
What is at issue is not necessarily the monetary value 
of the sale of domain names, as that is distributed to 
registrars.  What is important is power and control in a newly 
centralised, public organization that is global in its reach.  
Because it distributes power and control there are arguments 
about At-Large representation, about Board membership, 
about control of policy. 
The expansion of the domain name space or to use 
Kahin’s term, the allocation of domain names, has taken 
much of ICANN’s resources.  Why?  Because the monetary 
value of the industry is huge.  It also demonstrates the power 
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of a hybrid regulatory body which, because of the gTLD 
expansion plan, had something to offer its constituents.  
The gTLD application process is case in point245.  
Applicants for the new gTLDs had to deposit a non-refundable 
fee $US50,000 with ICANN.  There are no publicly available 
figures on the costs developing the bids.  Those costs would 
have included financial advice, marketing expertise and 
corporate lobbying resources. 
This microcosm of ICANN’s work demonstrates that it is 
a highly important organisation both technically and 
politically.  As Kleinwachter argues, “while the formal 
“recognition” of a registrar is a technical procedure, the issue 
is a highly economic and political one”.  (Kleinwachter 2000:  
557)  This is particularly true in the expansion of gTLDs246. 
The technology is rapidly developing and highly 
valuable.  The value ascribed to Internet real estate and the 
money to be made or lost is at direct odds with a cultural 
environment which has facilitated free and open sharing of 
information.   
As the key governance body in a highly specialised 
industry where the financial stakes are enormous, ICANN has 
to manage policy, politics and regulatory function, leaving 
aside any possible responsibility for achieving desirable social 
policy objectives like free speech, ubiquitous access and low 
prices for Internet access.  
The growth of ICANN, its charter of operation and key 
stakeholders are important in understanding the development 
                                   
245 See http://www.icann.org/tlds. 
246 Refer to the 16 November 2000 ICANN press release for full details of the gTLD 
process and successful applicants.  http://www.icann.org/announcements/icann-
pr16nov00.html 
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of dispute resolution mechanisms in wider electronic 
marketplaces.  This appears unrelated, of course, to ICANN’s 
central technical task of managing the allocation of unique 
identifying numbers to computers connected to the Internet 
which just happen to be most readily remembered as unique 
names. 
Regulatory Hybridisation 
Börzel and Risse-Kappen’s work illustrate some possible 
regulatory models247.  The management of the global DNS by 
a not-for-profit private sector corporation, based in California 
with a globally representative Board of Directors is a new 
example of a regulatory agency.   
The regulation of the DNS is complicated by a robust 
Internet tradition of freedom from the binds of government; 
an historical volunteer approach to the management of 
resources which have shifted from private to public but non-
government hands; the expectations of governments of all 
persuasions that they would be ‘allowed’ to have input into 
the way in which critical infrastructure, even if was principally 
driven by the USA, was managed and, finally, the 
corporatisation of the Internet and rapid commercialisation of 
Internet applications has had a direct bearing on the way in 
which corporations have created opportunity through change. 
The development of deliberate policies of broad 
consultation, openness and transparency of decision making 
processes and an underlying commitment to meeting the 
needs of end-users (or the At-Large community) has meant 
that, in many cases, ICANN’s effectiveness as an efficient 
                                   
247Börzel & Risse-Kappen 2001:  3,9.  
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regulatory body has come under attack.  However, any 
measure of ICANN’s effectiveness is not at issue here and 
forms part of other work under development. 
There is limited discussion in the academic literature of 
the role of corporations in the development of regulatory 
structures that normalise the way in which critical 
infrastructure is managed.  The key concepts which have 
guided the discussion of the globalisation of regulation and 
the development of a new regulatory economy are ownership 
and stewardship; trusteeship and control; legislation and 
regulation; and national governments versus international 
governance. 
Discussion 
This chapter sets out early conclusions on the 
development of a cosmocracy of control of the DNS and 
proposes some further work that maps the transition from 
regulation by personality to the development of robust 
processes that are far more objective and impervious to 
personality.  The central message of the work is that the 
application of global regulatory structures provides enormous 
opportunities for businesses, in particular, major businesses 
such as brand and content owners and domain name 
registration businesses, to shape the environment in which 
they operate.   This is particularly the case with respect to 
Internet governance and the critical network infrastructure 
upon which the Internet depends.   
The fact that Internet access is now ubiquitous in the 
vast majority of businesses and many businesses depend on 
the DNS (such as the DNRI) makes consideration of 
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governance and the withdrawal of the public sector from close 
regulatory control even more interesting248. 
Mueller’s view focuses on the creation of new “property 
rights” and the regulatory arbitrage associated with the 
formation of value, when domain names were not important 
and when IP addresses, as unique numbers, were all that was 
necessary to find Internet resources.  Kahn and Cerf (1999) 
explain neatly and simply what used to be the case “In order 
to work properly, the architecture required a global 
addressing mechanism (or Internet address) to enable 
computers on any network to reference and communicate 
with computers on any other network in the federation.  
Internet addresses fill essentially the same role as telephone 
numbers do in telephone networks”  (Cerf & Kahn 1999:  3).  
Of more importance here is that domain names are much 
more than a simple grouping of letters, as was discussed in 
Chapter Three. 
                                   
248 Measuring the impact and shape of the information economy has proved 
contentious. Particular challenges are highlighted in papers from the 1999  
Understanding the Digital Economy: Data, Tools, and Research conference (at 
http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/0262523302/ude.html), the OECD’s The Economic & 
Social Impacts of Electronic Commerce: Preliminary Findings & Research Agenda 
(at http://www.oecd.org/subject/e_commerce/summary.htm) and the US Government’s 
Measuring the Electronic Economy (at 
http://www.census.gov/eos/www/ebusiness614.htm). 
 For national perspectives see studies at the University of Texas (January 2001 
Internet Economy Indicators report at 
http://www.internetindicators.com/jan_2001.pdf) and Monash University with 
Allen Consulting (Built For Business: Australia’s Internet Economy, 2001 report at 
http://www.allenconsult.com.au/resources/Cisco_summary.pdf ) under the auspices of 
Cisco. 
We are on firmer ground with less ambitious measures of teledensity and counts of 
Internet hosts and domain registrations per capita (for which see the ITU’s 2001 
ICT at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/Internet01.pdf and the OECD’s 
2002 Measuring The Information Economy at 
http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-29-nodirectorate-no-1-35663-
29,00.html) or Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates regarding  the size of the 
online population and business use - Business Use of Information Technology - 
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs%40.nsf/b06660592430724fca2568b5007b8619/9c7742
890adec989ca2568a900139423 OpenDocument and Internet Activity 
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs%40.nsf/e8ae5488b598839cca256820001316
12/6445f12663006b83ca256a150079564d). 
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Fiscal Impossibilities:  Who controls the purse 
strings? 
 
There is no doubt that ICANN has had considerable 
budgetary limitations which have inhibited its ability to 
conduct the work it needs to.  It is interesting to review the 
Budget discussion material on the ICANN website such as the 
report of President’s Task Force on Funding249.  The report 
identifies 
ICANN's need for a degree of budgetary flexibility in light of the 
unreliability of ICANN's current budget figures, attributable to ICANN's 
young age, limited experience with the actual costs and expenses 
entailed in its policymaking and consensus-development activities, and to 
the lack of steady income from registry or registrar sources 
Other factors contributing to budget volatility include ICANN's inability 
thus far to rely on agreements for payments from registries and 
registrars, delays in hiring staff, and reliance on short term loans to meet 
working capital requirements. Taken together, these factors counsel 
against an overly rigid approach to budgeting, and in favor of some 
flexibility for year-to-year adjustments up or down based on operational 
experience, if coupled with an inclusive and transparent consultative 
process. 
According to Crew, in addition to the Board’s tasks of 
ensuring the stability of the Internet and introducing 
competition into domain name services (in which there is 
inherent tension), the Board was to “. . .identify a source of 
funds . . .it was necessary to quickly establish credibility and 
a degree of acceptance by the Internet community, and 
thereby make ICANN a credible organization”.  (Crew 2000:  
25) 
To this end, the ICANN Task Force on Funding (TFF) 
released its draft Final Report on 30 October 1999.  The TFF 
examined ways in which a robust budget could be developed, 
recognising that the creation of a large bureaucracy was 
                                   
249 http://www.icann.org/committees/tff/final-report-draft-30oct99.htm#3A. 
 182 
unlikely to garner any support in addition to understanding 
that there had to be a minimum amount of money in the 
treasury to perform the most basic of regulatory functions. 
The recommended allocating of funding responsibility 
has been spread amongst “three major groupings of (i) IP 
address registries, (ii) domain name registries, and (iii) 
domain name registrars on a proportional basis. . . .55% to 
gTLD registrars and registry, 35% to ccTLD registries, and 
10% to IP address registries.  Within each funding 
community, fair and proportional formulas will be 
developed…”.250  
The TFF stated clearly that a controlled budget was also 
one way of controlling mission creep.  “The philosophical basis 
for limiting ICANN’s budget is rooted in the notion that ICANN 
is a limited-purpose technical co-ordination entity; however, 
ICANN is likely to come under pressure to expand its reach 
into areas outside its narrow mandate.  Controls on ICANN’s 
budget are an important safeguard against ‘mission creep’ 
and the unrestrained budget bloat that might enable it”. 
(ICANN 1999:  7) 
In hindsight, seed funding should perhaps have been 
provided by all comers, in trust in a foundation as a 
transitional arrangement (beyond the reliance on donations 
and generous creditors).  Kahin had other ideas in his 1995 
paper which may have worked just as well.   This is even 
though “. . . ICANN’s mandate is to accomplish private-sector 
funding.  At the same time, ICANN staff observed that ICANN 
will gladly accept contributions from any legitimate source, 
including governments” (ICANN 1999:  14). 
                                   
250 See the full Task Force on Funding Report at  http://www.icann.org/. 
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The November 2000 ICANN staff paper, Cost Recovery 
Structure for Domain Name Registries, is also important.  The 
most important feature, for the purposes of tracking influence 
drift and the construction of new structures for governance, is 
as follows. 
. . .the goals of the revenue structure may be stated as, 
To produce the funding necessary to support ICANN’s mission and 
programs 
To allocate fairly the responsibility for providing that funding 
To develop a cost recovery, i.e., revenue, structure that is understandable 
and that can be administered without excessive costs. . . 
There are two main causes of delays in implementing 
what seems to be a straightforward structure.  The 
completion of negotiations with the many country code 
domain name registry organisations and the impact of the 
implementation of the new gTLDs.  In the former, the ccTLD 
managers want a larger piece of the power for their money.  
The latter is an ongoing process.  
The budgetary process for the funding of .auDA has 
mirrored that of ICANN and enables easy identification of the 
impact of deliberate budgetary constraints.  The dominant 
monopoly player (MelbourneIT) fought long and hard to avoid 
paying .auDA its contribution in much the same as Verisign 
did with respect to ICANN.  This is not, however, surprising, 
given that the main purpose of both .auDA and ICANN is to 
break monopoly control on the registration of domain names.  
It is in Verisign interests to make payment of ICANN’s 
invoices as long and drawn out a process as possible.  The 
same is true in the Australian case of MelbourneIT and .auDA.  
The process can also be seen extracting Telstra’s 
contributions to self-regulatory efforts in Australia’s 
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telecommunications industry.  The strategy is to take a long 
time to pay and cripple an organisation set up with the 
express purpose of breaking a lucrative monopoly. 
One of the most pressing problems of ICANN’s 
budgetary processes is that there isn’t an effective 
mechanism for enforcing collection of funds.  Whether this will 
change in any effort to reform ICANN’s operations remains to 
be seen. 
Conclusions 
The chapter demonstrates, in a preliminary way, the 
tensions between governments, regulators and the private 
sector as the globalisation of business transactions increases 
in volume and value particularly in the domain names and 
numbers industry.  The research draws some early 
conclusions on the “influence drift” to global regulators from 
national legislatures in the realm of digital transactions as 
issues of sovereignty loss take effect.  
 “Years ago, nations created the Law of the Sea to 
govern valuable ocean resources.  Similarly, ICANN is now 
creating a “Law of the Internet” via its contracts” (Livingston 
2000:  1). 
The model for global DNS governance is still under 
construction.  I believe we can expect to see, most critically, 
a devolution of the power of personalities and an increase in 
the status and effectiveness of regulatory process.  The 
opportunity for regulatory arbitrage through the use of 
personalities and personal connections will decline as more 
robust procedures, and objective measure of success, are 
gradually bedded down.  In the meantime, the shifting plates 
of regulatory influence have created a markedly different 
governance landscape for the management of the DNS.  
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One could expect that ICANN as an institution will 
settle, particularly as efforts to reform and refine its 
operations are now under way, as influence accretes around 
its ability to choose the process for the selection of policy 
topics, the creation of policy and the implementation of those 
policies in a timely way.   
The new gTLD issue, more than any other in ICANN’s 
short history, acts as the catalyst for demonstrable change.  
As Mueller argues,  “. . .Institutional innovation was the 
product of necessity, not choice, and of conflict and 
controversy rather than consensus and harmony”  (Mueller 
2000b:  13). 
I turn now to a discussion of DNS governance within 
national jurisdiction and how approaches to that governance 
map with the globally application principles derived from 
ICANN.  I identify though that there are different ways of 
approaching national DNS governance and the model adopted 
in Australia illustrates one possible permutation.
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CHAPTER SEVEN - INTERNET GOVERNANCE IN 
AUSTRALIA:  MODELLING SELF-REGULATORY 
STRUCTURES IN THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM251 
 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out the development of Internet 
governance in Australia. It describes the history of the 
administration of the .au country code and the formation of 
the private sector not-for-profit regulatory organisation 
responsible for the ongoing management of .au. It also gives 
some commentary on particular aspects of the establishment 
of new models for managing the technical resources of the 
global DNS in the context of national jurisdiction. 
The individuals in these developments are important – 
especially where personalities, rather than processes, have 
governed many of the regulatory outcomes. Some time is 
spent examining the input of the classic Postel ‘apostle, the 
Federal Government Minister and his views, the contribution 
of active consumer representatives and technical experts. 
Regulatory volunteers, from both the corporate and public 
sector, are well in evidence. They have played a critical role in 
developing consensus-driven policy now implemented by a 
not-for-profit regulatory organisation in a highly competitive 
market place.    
                                   
251 This chapter is to appear in the Murdoch University Law School Journal 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/ July 2003 issue. 
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There are direct parallels to developments that have 
occurred at the international level. The Australian process has 
been more disciplined, more time-bound and more capable of 
managing distractions than the experience of ICANN.  
Background 
The work here is a case study of how complex and 
multifaceted DNS governance has become in a national 
context. The .au domain name space provides an illustration 
of the evolution of geographic252 top level DNS governance at 
a critical point, at an international level, in the development 
of ICANN. The evolution of the .au domain name space is 
instructive in understanding the impact of hybridisation of 
regulation on a global scale. 
This discussion is important because it demonstrates a 
considerable shift in thinking about a technical resource to a 
naming system which has a policy and political life outside of 
its technical function.  In addition, whilst it is not discussed in 
detail here, intellectual property protection advocates (both 
owners of IP® and their lawyers) have done much to ensure 
that domain naming was included in the portfolio of IP® 
protection.  As discussed in Chapter Three, domain names are 
another dimension of branding and trademarks, for which 
protection and preferential policy treatment have been hard 
fought.  This fight has had substantial political and 
                                   
252 Whilst I have used the common ‘country code’ top level domain (ccTLD) throughout 
the text, the term ‘geographic’ top level domain better defines the difference 
between those two letter characters which are used to identify countries and those 
which are used to identify generic top level domains (gTLDs) such as .com, .net and 
.org. The term country code is not particularly accurate when some country codes 
are used for territories, for example, in the case of .cx for Christmas Island or when 
some have been re-purposed for completely commercial use, for example, in the 
case of .tv or when the control of a country code has been ceded, for example, in the 
case of .nu, to entities with no real connection to the country. The IANA website 
holds the definitive list of geographic top level domains at http://www.iana.org. 
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commercial implications beyond considerations of the 
technical capacity of the numbering system. 
The historical context for consideration of the Australian 
approach to DNS governance recognises that “Jon Postel used 
the ISO3166 code … based on a United Nations register o[f] … 
243 ‘recognised territories’ and asked individuals or academic 
institutions to overtake the responsibility for the management 
of the ccTLD … No governments have been involved in the 
definition of ccTLDs and the operations of the relevant 
registrars started without any legal foundations in the 
‘territories’ 253.   
Until the formal re-delegation of the .au space to .auDA  
in September 2001, University of Melbourne staff member 
Robert Elz254 was the ICANN/IANA delegate.  In 1996, the 
domain name management function for .com.au (which had 
outgrown Elz’ capacity to manage as a volunteer) was 
transferred to MelbourneIT as part of an arrangement with 
the University of Melbourne.255 
Others, in cooperation with Elz, managed closed 
domains (in that only those within particular organisations 
could register names within the domain) such as .csiro256 and 
                                   
253 Kleinwachter 2000: 559. 
254 Elz’s contribution to Internet governance in Australia is considerable.  See 
http://www.networksorcery.com/enp/authors/ElzRobert.htm for his technical work.  
Recognition of Elz by ICANN is at 
http://www.cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/montevideo/archive/res/elz.html.  Some 
anecdotal information is at http://www.peterpoole.info/files/ping.html and more 
formal treatment is at http://www.lib.unimelb.edu.au/collections/media/internet.ppt. 
255 .net.au was managed by connect.com (http:www.connect.com.au).  The Age article 
at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/07/06/1025667076935.html highlights 
the transition to a competitive market place. 
256 The 2LD, managed by the Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research 
Organisation (CSIRO), which is used to identify its national network of laboratories 
and other entities.  http://www.csiro.au. 
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.edu257 and the open domain .id.au. Information on other 
closed 2LDs such as .asn.au, .gov.au and .org.au can be 
found on the .auDA website258. 
The most immediate impact of the decision to re-
delegate the responsibility for .au, after the earlier transfer to 
MelbourneIT, was to separate the registry function 
(performed by AusRegistry in the new competitive regime) 
and registrar functions (now performed by a variety of 
domain name registration businesses). This achieved two 
goals similar to those set for ICANN which were the 
introduction of competition into the provision of registrar 
services259 and the opportunity to conduct an open and 
competitive tender process260 for the management of the 
registry. 
The evolution of the domain name market continues, in 
parallel with a regulatory experiment of open DNS 
governance at an international level. However, it is now 
possible to identify a set of factors that have enabled an 
orderly transition from a monopoly provided service, limited 
                                   
257 Geoff Huston’s considerable body of work can be found at 
http://www.potaroo.net/papers.html.  Most interesting is the 1996 reference to the 
Internet in Australia and other work in the RFC series. 
258 http://www.auda.org.au/register/.  Inactive 2LDs of historical interest include 
.telememo.au, otc.au and gw.au.  
259 The applications for accreditation as an .au registrar were assessed on a series of 
objective criteria such as technical capability and financial capacity.  Registrars must 
abide by a series of contractual obligations and must comply with the mandatory 
Registrar’s Code of Practice.   
260 The tender documentation is found at 
http://www.auda/prg/ai/about/news/2001102201.html.  Five companies – from 
Australia and overseas – submitted bids to provide registry services.  The 
AusRegistry tender and the subsequent contract to provide registry services have 
clearly articulated policies, rules and service quality standards.  This has improved 
the integrity of the data in the registry, secured that data, increased technical 
reliability standards and, most importantly, underpins the legitimacy of the 
management of the .au space by .auDA.  
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by a highly restrictive name registration policy and, more 
fundamentally, by uncertainty about policy rules and 
mechanisms for representation of community views.  In 
contrast, there are now clear methods in place to resolve a 
wide range of potential disputes, for example, with respect to 
registrar conduct, to the activities of re-sellers, to anti-
competitive conduct and the failure to meet suitable technical 
standards. 
The domain name industry in Australia has become a 
test bed for the development of a hybrid regulatory model. 
This model includes industry, consumer groups, the broader 
public and more traditional regulatory agencies engaging in 
open governance. Active involvement from the Government 
and legal practitioners, an outspoken and technically savvy 
Internet community and an influential public have created an 
environment which recognises the way in which the DNS has, 
historically, been managed and which has moved the industry 
to a more predictable and objective regulatory footing. 
Other country code administrators, such as those in the 
Pacific and members of the Asia Pacific Networking Group 
(APNG) now look to Australia for guidance on sound practices 
to manage their domain name space.   
The broader research seeks to understand some 
thinking which frames the development of hybrid regulatory 
models.  The equations of sovereignty versus stewardship; 
ownership versus trusteeship; national governments versus 
international governance and the commercial versus non-
commercial use of Internet resources are as relevant in the 
Australian context as they are internationally.  Balancing 
these, in the context of DNS governance, remains a challenge 
to orderly and technically sound management of critical 
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network resources, where the benefits of a globally connected 
network are only as good as the weakest link. 
Extra impetus was given to domestic developments by 
external pressure from ICANN to sign its ccTLD contract and 
to achieve the re-delegation of the .au domain.  At the same 
time, ICANN was trying to sign agreements with new open 
gTLDs such as .biz, .info, .name and .pro and new closed 
gTLDs such as .coop, .museum and .aero. This “signing up” 
process is discussed later in the chapter.  It was seen as a 
way to bolster ICANN’s legitimacy and mandate to manage 
the DNS on an international basis.   
This chapter also includes some objective measures of 
success of the transition to a private sector regulatory 
solution.  These include policy development procedures that 
are inclusive, open and highly sophisticated methods of 
achieving consensus (or at least tolerant acceptance of 
reasonable market constraints).  Licensing and tendering 
processes are open and, in terms of the number and quality 
of participants, highly competitive. The total number of active 
market players has increased dramatically and, perhaps the 
best measure of all, prices for domain names for end-users 
have plummeted.261  
Scope and Definitions 
On the NOIE website, a domain name as defined “… a 
means of identifying and locating an organisation or other 
entity on the Internet. Domain names … are a scarce resource 
which need to be managed to ensure the efficient allocation of 
                                   
261 An indication of competition as of February 2003 is provided in the price 
comparison at http://www.whatsinaname.com.au/, with registrations from some 
registrars priced at around 50% of those from their competitors. 
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web addresses” 262.  The definition recognised, consistent with 
international practices, that domain name is hierarchical and 
often conveys information about the type of entity using the 
domain. Domain names at the same level of a particular 
hierarchy must be unique; for example there can only be one 
‘smiths.com.au’ domain within the .com.au space. 
The Australian domain name industry includes entities 
engaged in the provision of domain name registration services 
such registry operators, registrars and their resellers, and 
dispute resolution providers. The prohibition of a secondary 
resale market for .au domain names means that, in contrast 
to some other countries, the Australian industry does not 
feature domain name auction and domain name valuation 
businesses. 
Understanding what domain names are and why they 
are important to individuals and businesses is critical to 
placing the discussion here in a realistic, usable context.  The 
discussion in Chapter Three identified that domain names are 
critical as navigation tools on the Internet, critical to brand 
identification and critical to the utility of Internet resources.  
In addition, domain names have an intrinsic ‘navigation’ 
value.  Without a domain name, finding resources on the 
Internet is highly problematic and relies upon remembering 
the base IP address as a number string rather than the more 
memorable name it matches. 
 As a product or service, the registration of domain 
names as a business in itself is attractive enough, in the 
                                   
262 NOIE’s website is found at http://www.noie.gov.au.  Arguments about the scarcity 
of domain names have served two purposes, to drive the price of domain names up 
and to invoke fear within the commercial community that their name may not be 
available, thus encouraging defensive registration strategies.  Further discussion of 
the purported scarcity of names is found at 
http://www.tbm.tudelft.nl/webstaf/henrikr/MaastrichtPaper.pdf. 
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Australian context alone, for eighteen companies263 to offer 
registrar services. This does not include over 1,000, or more, 
resellers who act on behalf of registrars to sell domain name 
registrations. 
In Australia, as in most other countries where Internet 
access is cheap and almost universal, domain names have 
also become part of the lexicon and roadmap of everyday life.  
One increasingly hears reference to a website (the domain 
name) in addition to a phone number. The appearance of 
domain names on the sides of buses, in media 
advertisements and in correspondence is now so frequent as 
to be unremarkable. Most major Australian corporations have 
domain names and use their websites to provide information 
to the public, to sell goods and services or to advertise a 
physical presence.   
There is little in the academic literature about the 
development of DNS governance in Australia.  There have 
been press articles about the delegation of the .au country 
code and particularly about the transition from Elz264 to 
.auDA.   There is much about intellectual property disputes or 
who has the right to use a domain name; much about 
privacy, censorship and the use of on-line information; and 
much about network security but a paucity of scholarly 
writing about DNS policy and its implementation in Australia. 
                                   
263 These are identified at http://www.auda.org.au/registrars. 
264 Interesting and quite emotional commentary can be found at 
http://www.auda.org.au/list/dns/archive/112001/0073.html.  Other background 
material can be found at 
http://www.auda.org.au/list/dns/archive/112001/0031.html, 
http://www.auda.org.au/list/dns/archive/112001/0063.html and 
http://www.lib.unimelb.edu.au/collections/media/internet.ppt 
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This chapter is a contribution to analysis of the .au 
regime from a policy and regulatory perspective. It examines 
the development of policy for the management of the 
Australian country code, the legislative basis for that 
management and the practical co-regulatory approach now in 
operation. It briefly examines the way in which those three 
aspects parallel international practices for self-regulatory 
models in general and with ICANN265 principles in particular. 
The industry has, over the last five years, experienced 
immense change.  Those changes include a technology boom 
and subsequent bust, a change in personalities and focus, a 
commoditisation of domain names266, the normalisation of 
online demographics and a contraction of speculative online 
activity which soaked up enormous amounts of venture 
capital but delivered little profit.  At the same time the need 
for new Internet addresses exploded as various common 
devices, including mobile phones, household appliances and 
motor vehicles can be connected to the Internet. 
The Market Landscape  
It is important to frame the market context of the 
Internet in Australia.  Again, we focus here on the usage of 
the underlying technical resources that enable the broader 
Internet to function effectively.  O’Donnell’s267 work on 
mapping money flows around the Internet is useful but his 
                                   
265 It is worth reading the early Memorandum of Understanding between the DoC and 
ICANN in the context of regulatory arrangements which developed in Australia.  See 
Section F – Supplementary Material – at the back of the document. 
266 This trend is principally evident in a great reduction in the price of domain names 
and the widespread acquisition of .au names by businesses, non-commercial entities 
and individuals. 
267 O’Donnell, 2002. 
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definition of the Internet is limited to the application and 
network providers such as ISPs and backbone suppliers. 
More useful here is an understanding of the money and 
influence flows around the domain name industry itself and 
the impact that the regulation of the network layer has on the 
way in which the industry operates commercially.  Mapping 
influence flows and framing the demographics of the global 
cosmocracy is part of the research in Chapters Five and Six. 
Internationally, the market context for this academic 
work is framed by the domain name industry’s rapid maturity 
through the 1990s and the broader dot com boom which 
drove share prices for online companies to stratospheric 
heights before a sustained crash in late 1999 and through 
2000268.   
Domestically, there was a significant push towards 
making the .au space more commercial in its operation and 
more transparent in its regulatory management.  From late 
2000 onwards, the .au management was re-delegated to the 
Australian Government269 endorsed self-regulatory body, 
                                   
268 Comprehensive global data on the numbers of domain names at the gTLD level, the 
number and ranking of registrars and the allocation of market share can be found at 
State of the Domain (http://www.sotd.info). 
269 The Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA) 
has official policy responsibility for the oversight of electronic addressing in Australia.  
The policy is given effect through bodies such as the National Office for the 
Information Economy (NOIE) and Australian Communications Authority (ACA).  The 
Commonwealth Government’s view is expressed at 
http://www.dcita.gov.au/Article/0,,0_1-2_3-4_107024,00.html.   
 A perspective on ccTLD re-delegation is provided by Hagen and von Arx, in their 
“Patriation of the .ca” article.  Further work on the role of ccTLD managers and their 
interactions with governments is taking place within the framework of ICANN’s 
proposed ccNSO (http://www.icann.org/general/support-orgs.htm) and within the 
ITU (http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/worksem/cctld/index.html). 
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.auDA270.  The policy and political significance of the re-
delegation of the .au country code is also found here. 
The most recent statistics for the .au registry are 
provided below.  They give a snapshot of how many .au 
names are registered, in which parts of the domain.  The 
auDA generic names auction is also a useful benchmark of 
both the popularity and utility of domain names in the .au 
space.271  Quoting .auDA’s 1 October 2002 press release on 
generic names, “1,612 generic names were allocated, either 
to a single eligible applicant or at auction.  The highest price 
paid for a generic name was $153,000 for flowers.com.au.  
The median auction price was $2,900.  Most names were 
allocated for the minimum reserve price of $100.  The process 
raised approximately $2,611,000 in total …”.   
In very bald and unscientific terms, one could read 
these windfall figures as equating to approximately 10% of 
the total cost of current .au registrations.  This assumes that 
there are approximately 300,000 names in the .au registry 
and that registrars charge approximately $100 for a two year 
registration. 
                                   
270 The .au Domain Administration’s website (www.auda.org) holds a comprehensive 
listing of policies, procedures, Board minutes and correspondence, regulatory codes 
and consumer information. 
 “A domain name (or web address) is a means of identifying and locating an 
organisation or other entity on the Internet. Domain names, like telephone 
numbering, are a scarce resource which need to be managed to ensure the efficient 
allocation of web addresses.  au Domain Administration Ltd (auDA) is responsible for 
the management and registration of domain names in Australia.  The Australian 
Government, through the National Office for the Information Economy (NOIE), 
maintains a cooperative relationship with auDA, and has observer status on the 
auDA Board, however does not obstruct in auDA's function as a not-for-profit, 
industry self-regulatory body.”  More information can be found at 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/international/index.htm.  A copy of the Minister’s 
formal endorsement of .auDA can be found at 
http://www.auda.org.au/docs/Endorse_Letter_Final.html. 
271 http://www.auda.org.au/about/news/2002100102.html 
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Broader statistics on Internet usage and penetration 
can be found in a variety of sources.272  Most notable is that 
the Australian DNRI is itself developing rapidly,  This follows 
the international trend where domain name registrations have 
become very price sensitive, commodity items. The use of the 
Internet as an information resource, as a mechanism for 
making consumer purchases and as a branding tool has 
grown significantly in the last five years, in spite of the 
significant economic downturn. This means that the 
development of mechanisms to properly manage and regulate 
the underlying network resources has moved from the realm 
of a desirable public policy objective to a critical infrastructure 
question which must be addressed in a sophisticated and 
robust manner. 
The Internet in Australia is approaching the ubiquity 
and importance of the telephone.  The sophistication of 
telecommunications regulation compared to that of the 
governance of Internet architecture illustrates significant 
progress has been made but that Australia still has some way 
to go.  
Historic Australian Network Information Centre (AUNIC) 
data can be found at http://www.aunic.net/changes.html.  As 
an indication of growth in the .au space, in 2001 there were 
approximately 257,000 names in the registry.  That equates 
to 229,339 in .com.au, 17,383 in .org.au and 7,841 in 
.net.au.  The most up to date figures for .au can now be 
                                   
272 Figures on uptake of the Internet by Australian households and businesses 
(including basic connectivity, hosts per capita, frequency of online sessions and 
aggregate hours online) are available on the Australian Bureau of Statistics site at  
http://www.abs.gov.au.  For international comparisons see the ITU 2001 ICT figures 
at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/Internet01.pdf and the OECD 
2002 Measuring The Information Economy study at 
http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/0,,EN-document-29-nodirectorate-no-1-35663-
29,00.html. 
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found at http://www.ausregistry.com.au/reports/index.php.  
2003 figures show that there 316,526 names in the registry 
which is distributed as 283,574 in .com.au, 11,498 in .org.au 
and 16,508 in .net.au. 273 
Rafferty’s Rules:  Australia’s rough consensus and 
running code274 
 
The disarray and disappointment of previous attempts 
at self-regulation275, restrictive domain name registration 
policies and the demand from the competition regulator that 
yet another monopoly be broken, have resulted in a structure 
which, it could be argued, is heading in the right direction. 
Indicators of regulatory success by .auDA include the 
respect of those subject to regulation, that the industry 
participates actively in regulatory decision making and 
tolerates the outcomes.  Elz made much of the necessity for 
support from the diverse Internet community (which was 
never properly defined) and, in the transition phase, argued 
that .auDA did not have the support of that group.  The 
construction of effective measures to incorporate the views of 
the broader user/consumer community is a positive sign 
illustrated by the development and successful operation of a 
number of .auDA policy panels which are constituted from a 
wide range of interest groups.  More broadly, compliance with 
                                   
273 These figures are drawn from the (former) AUNIC registry and from data supplied 
by AusRegistry (http://www.ausregistry.com.au), concentrating on the major 
‘commercial’ 2LDs.  
274 Zittrain, in his review of Mueller’s Ruling the Root, echoes Dave Clark in referring to 
“rough consensus and running code” (2002:  1) by way of explanation for the 
manner in which, in the early days, the computing scientists ran the DNS.  
275 The .auDA website holds archived information at 
http://www.auda.org.au/archive/adna. 
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legislative requirements such as the Corporations Law and the 
Trade Practices Act is now apparently accepted.  Perhaps less 
well defined is a commitment to the principles of openness 
and transparency of decision making which have guided 
Internet governance at an international level and which are 
intrinsic to the way in which ICANN is meant to operate.  
Whether those two principles actually make for better 
decisions, more efficient governance and more effective 
management remains moot. 
Prior to the formation of .auDA and the formalisation of 
self-regulatory structures with clear rules and objectives, 
there was little formal governance of the DNS.  That is not to 
say that there wasn’t a clear commitment by knowledgeable 
and very enthusiastic volunteers to the work of ensuring that 
Australia’s part of the Internet architecture worked 
effectively.276 
As mentioned above, Robert Elz was the delegate 
responsible for the IANA277 functions in Australia and worked 
with others on what became AARNet, linking universities and 
research bodies. 
Elz’ trusteeship of the DNS for .au space, in particular 
his development and administration of policy for .au domain 
name registration, was not the result of appointment by the 
Commonwealth Government or by Australia’s (then) 
                                   
276 MelbourneIT’s Chief Technology Officer, Bruce Tonkin, provides some interesting 
commentary on 'volunteerism' at 
http://www.auda.org.au/list/dns/archive/112001/0132.html  
277 A full list of the functions of the Internet Assigned Names Authority is found at 
http://www.iana.org/.  The most important of the IANA functions is to ensure that 
the country code top level domains are managed in a robust and consistent manner 
around the world.  This includes ensuring that the country administrators conduct 
themselves effectively…delegations, and the tensions surrounding re-delegations are 
critical.  Close relationship to ICANN and policy functions. 
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monopoly telecommunications carrier. Instead, as in other 
countries, responsibility reflected the delegation from one 
wizard278 to another in a network managed by a small group 
of engineers, often with close personal links, but with no 
commercial interests in what they were doing.  
A comprehensive public policy framework didn’t 
underpin delegation.  Indeed it predates by several years the 
publication of the key RFC on ccTLD delegations.  Equally 
important, given the shape of the early Internet, is that 
regulatory arrangements such as delegations were not 
reflected in a publicly available suite of policy statements, 
such as rules about .au name allocation and resolution of 
disagreements with the trustee279  .  
Uptake of the Internet by Australian government 
agencies, businesses, educational institutions, other 
organisations and individuals placed significant pressure on 
Elz and those volunteers to whom he had delegated 
responsibility for other 2LDs. That pressure was quantitative 
(handling ever-increasing numbers of registration requests) 
and qualitative (responding to criticisms about delays in 
processing requests for registrations or the perceived absence 
of comprehensive policy statements attuned to commercial 
realities as the dot com boom gathered pace).  
Both the pressure and the criticism were reflected in 
increasing attention from the Commonwealth Government 
                                   
278 The term “wizard” was popularised by Hafner and Lyon’s in their 1996 book.  
279 It is, perhaps, interesting to note that disputes about name allocation became much 
more prevalent when the use of domain names moved from an easy way of 
resolving the limitations of a number string to considerations of intellectual property 
protection.  Not surprisingly, the ‘first in, first served’ rule did not satisfy those who 
perceived they deserved preferential treatment in the allocation of rights to use a 
domain name, especially if a domain name was the same as a recognisable brand or 
trademark used in the off-line environment. 
 202 
and from business and community groups such as the 
Internet Industry Association (IIA) and the Internet Society’s 
Australian chapter (ISOC-AU) 280.   
During the early development of new regulatory 
arrangements, there is great opportunity for personalities 
(either individual or corporate) to exert enormous influence 
over the regulatory agenda. This has certainly been the case 
in Australia. 
Until the processes for objective regulatory 
management are in place, there is an ‘influence transition’ 
which takes place. Australia and the .au space are now at a 
point where the objective criteria for full range of regulatory 
functions are established. 
During the Elz years, however, arrangements were 
made on a “rough consensus and running code” basis that 
meant very little to those outside the technical community 
within research institutions. 
At the ICANN level, delegations for the management of 
country codes take up much of the resources of ICANN/IANA. 
Delegation arrangements are a major source of angst as it is 
perceived, in many quarters, that the management of the 
country code is a source of national honour, cash and control 
of a national asset. 281  
                                   
280 Background is provided in the discussion of ADNA and the Dot-Au Working Group in 
The Road To Self-Regulation – The Australian Experience, a 2002 NOIE paper at 
http://inet2002.org/CD-ROM/lu65rw2n/papers/g03-a.htm, and in the auDA & the 
dot-au space profile at http://www.caslon.com.au/audaprofile.htm. A history of 
ISOC-AU features on that organisation’s site at http://www.isoc-au.org.au, 
complemented by the discussion of ‘legitimacy’ in Werle & Leib’s 1999 The Internet 
Society and its Struggle for Recognition and Influence.  
281 This is certainly the case in small Pacific Island nations and in the developing 
economies of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. 
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In Australia’s case, ICANN was motivated to provide as 
much assistance as possible to resolve the issue because, in 
part, it needed to have the country codes inside the ICANN 
“tent”.  Australia was the first country code administrator to 
sign a contract with ICANN under the country code 
arrangements. In turn, Australia required the support of 
ICANN/IANA to break the deadlock between Elz and the 
Commonwealth to formally hand over management of the 
space to .auDA.   
The Minister of Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts282 is responsible for the direction of 
DNS policy in Australia.  The Minister retains the right, under 
the 2000 amendment to the 1997 Telecommunications Act to 
effect regulatory arrangements for DNS management. 
Even though Australia’s Internet governance 
arrangements are, internationally, with ICANN under 
Californian contract law, the Commonwealth clearly maintains 
arm’s length authority over the .au space. That the 
Commonwealth has devolved that authority to .auDA is 
evidence that the shift from government bureaucracy to a 
private sector model is now well underway. 
I have set out here a very brief history of the 
management of the DNS in Australia. It focuses particularly 
on the way in which it has been managed as a technical 
resource rather than what it has been used for or how it has 
driven many other policy decisions such as the development 
of on-line content regulation, e-commerce standards or 
prohibitions on on-line gambling. 
                                   
282 Senator Richard Alston has been the Minister for Communications since March 1996 
and is the longest serving Federal Minister for Communications.  He was Shadow 
Minister for Communications from 1989 to 1996. 
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The Internet in Australia mirrors the way in which the 
Internet evolved in the USA.  That AARNET developed the 
way in which it did is testimony to the impact of personalities 
on Internet governance. Those personalities have now been 
brought into a more institutional-like setting. 
Regulatory Models 
The work of Sassen, Braithwaite & Drahos and Arup has 
been particularly helpful in providing literature to support the 
discussion of the shift to a private sector, self-regulatory 
model for Internet governance in Australia. 
Börzel & Risse-Kappen have compiled diagrammatic 
representations of the ‘realm of governance’ which can be 
usefully employed to illustrate where the .auDA model sits 
(Börzel & Risse-Kappen 2001:  3,9).  The diagram reproduced 
here would have .auDA sitting near to middle of the 
illustration and is best described as “delegation to private 
actors”.  In their analysis, they argue that “private self-
regulation is often triggered by the very lack of effective 
international norms and rules”. 
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The Realm of Public-Private Partnerships283 
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 output control by public actors 
 
PRIVATE SELF-REGULATION 
(Purely private regimes) 
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increasing autonomy of private actors          increasing autonomy of public actors 
 
 
 
                                   
283 Reproduced by permission of the authors. 
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It is helpful to divert quickly into more general discussions of 
regulatory models.  The spectrum ranges from completely 
public sector government bureaucracies to completely private 
sector arrangements with no intervention from governments.   
 .auDA, like its international equivalent ICANN, is a 
regulatory hybrid that approximates the co-regulatory model 
one finds in the Australian telecommunications, financial 
services or food standards industries. In the DNS case, the 
Minister, in effect, retains the right to re-delegate 
responsibility for the management of the .au domain name 
space. Now that the arrangements for this model have 
settled, it is unlikely this power would be used. However, in 
the early stages of the implementation of .auDA much 
concern was expressed about the conditions under which the 
Minister could withdraw his support. 
The appointment of the two Independent Directors to 
.auDA, one of whom was appointed Chairman of the Board284, 
contributed greatly to a rapid increase in industry confidence 
that the organisation could indeed deliver on its mandate.   
There had been an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, most 
regularly expressed on the e-mail DNS list285.  The list is not 
                                   
284 Tony Staley is a former Federal Minister of Communications, former Federal 
Director of the Liberal Party of Australia and close confidante of the current Minister 
for Communications, Richard Alston.   Some concise background is found at  
http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/1999/staley0307.htm 
285 The DNS list is open to the public with, at December 2002, about 350 subscribers.  
Like most on-line lists, there is a core of around 20 subscribers. Like many such lists, 
it is noted for the vehemence and passion with which views are expressed rather 
than their cogency or any reflection of a broader community view.  The personal 
invective sometimes found on the list has been the source of some unhelpful 
destabilisation of the work of .auDA.  It could also be argued that the “robust” 
character of the DNS list has dissuaded people from participating for fear that their 
e-mail in-boxes will be flooded with off topic raves from those with personal 
agendas.  Recently, the list has undergone some changes and is now moderated to 
keep the debate on topic. 
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moderated and provides an open forum for comment on any 
DNS management issue in Australia.   At its best, it is a 
mechanism for hearing end-user views and facilitating the 
transparency of .auDA’s operations in a practical, timely and 
responsible way. At its worst, it has been a repository of 
personal invective, captured by a vocal minority who repeat 
their often unsubstantiated views loudly and often. 
One measure of effectiveness of the current 
arrangements could be that the Board, since the appointment 
of the current Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, has been 
very stable. There have been no attempts to spill the Board or 
to force resignations.  There has not been a major turnover of 
Directors and most have sought second and sometimes third 
terms.  At a Board level there is strong degree of 
cohesiveness and cooperation whilst also taking very serious 
account of the work of the Policy Panels.  It is interesting to 
note that the same situation exists at an international level 
within ICANN.286 
The process for the withdrawal of Ministerial support for 
.auDA would require, under the legislation, the co-operation 
of both the ACA and the ACCC287. 
                                                                                           
 http://www.auda.org.au/list/dns/archive/122000/0016.html.  This reference gives a 
slightly different slant on ‘independent’, ‘consensus’ and ‘mandate’ and is a balance 
to more positive coverage of .auDA’s operations. 
286 Bret Fausett’s website  (http://www.lextext.com/icann/), ICANNWatch (for example 
contributions by Michael Froomkin at http://www.icannwatch.org) and online 
intervention by ICANN At Large Director Karl Auerbach (http://www.cavebear.com) 
are noteworthy. 
287 The ACCC’s submission to WIPO’s discussion of domain name registration neatly 
sets out the competition regulator’s responsibility for and interest in .auDA’s 
activities. Note however that the focus of the submission is on intellectual property 
protection rather than the governance of Internet architecture and resources.  
http://www.accc.gov.au/ecomm/access1b.htm 
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However, it is now unlikely that either regulatory 
agency would exercise their power under the legislation.  This 
is particularly the case whilst .auDA continues to develop new 
polices for future second level domains, prepares to review its 
mandatory Registrar’s Code of Practice and continues to 
actively involve a broad range of interest groups in both its 
structure and decision making processes. 
.auDA:  Structure, Operation and Mandate 
With an understanding of the broader research, a sense 
of the historical position, some knowledge of market statistics 
and some discussion of regulatory models, we can now turn 
to a more detailed examination of the operations of .auDA.   
.auDA is a small organisation managed by a Chief 
Executive Officer, a Policy Officer and administrative staff.  It 
is funded by contributions from members, registrar fees ($11 
per domain name registration), registry fees and, most 
recently, by off-budget windfalls from the sale of generic 
domain names.  It does not receive funding from 
government.   
It operates under the Corporations Law and is managed 
by a Board of Directors (currently 13) eleven of whom are 
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elected by .auDA’s members288 and two of whom are 
appointed as Independent Directors289. 
A range of formal working parties has assisted policy 
development.  Members of those parties serve on a voluntary 
basis.  As such, the cost of regulation has been successfully 
transferred from government to those subject to the 
regulation in a similar way, for example, to the work of the 
Australian Communications Industry Forum (ACIF) which 
develops codes of practice for the telecommunications sector.  
Membership of .auDA’s policy panels is representative of the 
broader community with skills in information technology and 
engineering, telecommunications policy, intellectual property 
protection and consumer advocacy. The Registrar’s Code of 
Practice is a case in point.290 
The activity of the working parties is publicised by 
.auDA through public forums and the online membership list. 
The working parties typically seek community submissions, 
for example, on appropriate competition models or names 
policy.  Exposure drafts are released after regular physical 
meetings of the panels. These are refined after further public 
                                   
288 Membership is open to Australian organisations and individuals (details at 
http://www.auda.org.au) with voting in staggered Board elections across three 
membership categories.  This prevents Board capture by special interest groups.  As 
at December 2002, .auDA had approximately 380 members – a similar number to 
ISOC-AU – including individuals, small businesses, consumer advocates and 
corporate interests.  However, in compliance with the Australian Privacy Act, detailed 
demographics are not publicly available. Profiles of Board candidates published 
during elections suggest that candidates and, as importantly, those actually elected, 
are not restricted to major corporate interests of areas of expertise such as 
information technology and law. 
289 Currently the independent directors are former ICANN Board member Greg Crew 
(http://www.icann.org/biog/crew.htm) and Chair Tony Staley. The independent 
directors are paid for their work; the elected directors are not.   
290 The final version of the mandatory Code of Practice can be found at 
http://www.auda.org.au/docs/auda-2002-26.pdf.  I was Chair of the Registrar’s 
Code of Practice Committee, the membership of which was drawn from a broad 
spectrum of industry and consumer organisations. 
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consultation and input. The documentation is made public on 
the .auDA website and remains posted.291 The use of working 
parties and policy panels reflects a commitment to consensus 
policymaking and inclusiveness. It also ensures that policy 
development is delivered from the community to .auDA. This 
achieves three objectives.  It obviates the need for a large 
secretariat, it pushes the cost of regulation to the private 
sector and it ensures comprehensive compliance. 
.auDA’s legitimacy has not been successfully 
contested292.  As outlined above, .auDA is supported by 
Commonwealth legislation but its operation is independent of 
government agencies. It is well recognised by ICANN staff 
and by the various ICANN constituencies in which Australians 
are active. Its authority ultimately rests on its ongoing 
effectiveness as a ccTLD manager which is demonstrated by 
the development of codes of practice, consensus-based policy 
and the input of a range of stakeholders. Objective 
management of the views of all stakeholders is critical.   This 
objectivity is borne out in a policy environment which actively 
seeks to facilitate competition, which bolsters a robust 
internet services industry at both the registrar and reseller 
level. Operational objectivity is closely matched to 
international standards especially with respect to public 
                                   
291  The transparency of .auDA’s operation (through public forums, through online 
publication and through encouragement of participation in its working parties) has 
been little remarked. It is of interest in comparison to the operation of other 
regulatory bodies, where participation is difficult (eg restricted to a particular 
epistemic community) and where observers have access to outcomes rather than the 
deliberations that led to those outcomes. 
292 In contrast to ICANN it has not faced sustained criticism in legal, information 
technology or other publications and, overall, has secured the endorsement of bodies 
such as the Internet Industry Association, Australian Competition & Consumer 
Commission and ISOC-AU.  ‘Anti .auDA’ groups, such as the DNS Action Group, do 
not appear to have a major following and proposals for an .auDA Watch site 
apparently did not eventuate. 
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consultation and consensus-driven policy and including a 
broader range of talents and skills including legal, policy, 
regulatory and commercial experience.   
As a result, the regulatory load of DNS governance in 
Australia is spread across representatives from peak 
associations, registrars, the technical community and 
individual members. Regulatory capture is difficult to achieve 
and clearer business rules mean that investment decisions 
can be made in a relatively stable economic environment. 
Conclusions 
If the DNS had remained a pure technical numbering 
resource, it is unlikely that the discussion of Internet 
governance would have created any traction in political and 
policy circles.  The numbering system has been subsumed by 
discussions of naming, and who controls the system is a 
function of the politicisation of engineering.  This is termed IP 
versus IP®  elsewhere in the research and applies equally in 
Australia as it does internationally.  The control of the naming 
system is a critical policy discussion.  It is critical at the 
infrastructure layer; critical to users who rely on Internet 
resources for their businesses; critical to the consumer 
advocacy community as they discuss equitable access to the 
Internet and critical to those who wish to protect their brands 
and trademarks.  The tensions between the political camps is 
obvious.  With commercial importance comes the discussion 
of policy and then the enactment of mechanisms to govern 
fairly. 
The evolution of the .au regulatory space continues in 
both a domestic and international context. The most 
significant changes forecast for the .au space are a review of 
existing policies and the introduction of new second level 
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domains.  The latter is being considered during 2003 by a 
newly constituted policy panel.  
The .auDA has reached a level of maturity which makes 
it unlikely that the Minister would find any justification for the 
forced re-delegation of authority from .auDA to any other 
organisation.  The legislative and regulatory basis for the 
management of the .au DNS is stable with a small, solid 
administrative body running the policy functions and 
regulatory arm of the .au domain.   
The paradigm shift is, with some hindsight, obvious. 
Significant regulatory changes have been produced by 
economic conditions in a technology boom, comprehensive 
broadband rollout which facilitates efficient Internet access, a 
highly educated and demanding set of consumers coupled 
with active government engagement across the spectrum of 
domestic and international policy debates. Considering these 
changes in the broader context of the globalisation of 
regulation and the development of a new regulatory 
economy, it is clear that the Australian experience will do 
much to inform the development of hybrid regulatory 
structures to manage DNS governance in other countries. 
In the final chapter, I revisit the key findings of the 
research, make some predictions about future trends and 
identify future research areas.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT – CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
In research the horizon recedes as we advance, and is no nearer at sixty 
than it was at twenty.  As the power of endurance weakens with age, the 
urgency of the pursuit grows more intense. . .And research is always 
incomplete293 
 
The research here ranges across political science, 
technology and the regulatory treatment of the technical 
resources of the Internet.   
It examines the development of globally applicable 
standards and norms for managing the critical technical 
infrastructure of the Internet.  In doing so, the research 
applies the general study of globalisation to a new industry, a 
new regulatory agency and a new set of global actors. 
It is a technical work that demonstrates an 
understanding of the DNS and the commercial advantages 
which have emerged from the development of a simple 
directory service into network which supports a wide range of 
applications.  The research shows an understanding of the 
politics and policies surrounding the management of the 
technical resources that enable the Internet to function and 
the broader influences of the development of a hybrid 
regulatory agency. 
There are three key contributions to the scholarship.  
They are the application of the general globalisation literature 
to the domain name registration industry and the new 
regulatory economy spawned by the commercialisation of the 
DNS; the collection and collation of statistics on participation 
                                   
293 Pattinson, Mark (1875) Isaac Casaubon, Chapter 10. 
 214 
in ICANN and a hypothesis which has been tested and proven 
through textual analysis of the literature.   
The research also provides a comprehensive glossary of 
key terms and stakeholders that has not previously been 
done.  It delivers a comprehensive bibliography and provides 
a collection of fundamental materials which have disappeared 
from the Internet.  
New Concepts 
The global governance of Internet architecture by a 
wide range of disparately located private sector actors, in 
corporations and as individuals, is now well established 
through the ICANN’s processes and procedures.  Over the life 
of the research, four key equations have emerged from the 
work which illustrate the extent of influence drift towards 
international governance. They are the tensions between 
legislation and regulation; sovereignty and stewardship; 
ownership and trusteeship; national government and 
international governance and the commercial and non-
commercial use of Internet resources.   
Key Findings 
The research has examined three key areas of enquiry.  
The globalisation of the regulation of critical infrastructure; 
the global market for domain names and domain name 
registration services; and the development policies and 
processes for the global governance of the DNS. 
The globalisation of business regulation literature can 
now be applied to a new industry sector and regulatory 
model.  The governance of the Internet DNS is important 
because the Internet network underpins a critical 
communications system that lies outside the realm of national 
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jurisdiction and the multi-lateral treaty system that governs, 
for example, the telecommunications system. In addition, the 
entities that use the Internet network for the applications that 
are the core of their business operations (for example, the 
registration of Internet domain names and the broader suite 
of electronic commerce transactions) are intrinsically global in 
their nature.  This fact provides dimension to the application 
of the globalisation literature.  The key features of the 
Internet are that it is a global network, whose assets are 
derived from public funds, whose management is paid for, in 
the main, by private corporations and whose operations 
demonstrate a separation between the location of customers 
and the services those customers can purchase. 
I have collected and analysed data on a new 
demographic of influence in Internet governance.  This 
demographic has shifted away markedly from the historical 
case.  Technical experts, principally engineers and software 
code writers, took the lead in the development and 
implementation of a wide variety of protocols that make the 
Internet work.   
Key influence now resides with a broader spectrum of 
lawyers, commercial deal makers, regulatory specialists and 
marketing analysts who form the core of the cosmocrats.  The 
research has tracked the establishment of a new culture of 
control or, as I have termed it, a global cosmocracy which 
attempts to devolve the commercial advantages of the 
Internet network in a way which is transparent, fair and 
grounded in bottom-up policy development models based on 
consensus. 
I have described the impact of commercial 
developments in the DNRI on the implementation of a new 
system of managing critical infrastructure, outside the scope 
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of multi-lateral government sponsored and, therefore, binding 
arrangements.   
Understanding the involvement of national 
governments, the formation of new regulatory institutions 
and the influence of corporations on the structure of 
regulation are the core of this work. 
The development of the DNRI graphically illustrates the 
influence of politics, market size and corporate intent.   I have 
tracked the major global participants from both national 
governments and corporations, analysed their financial and 
time commitments to developing and implementing workable 
governance structures and developed some early 
methodologies for tracking a new demographic of influence. 
I have found that national governments have, despite 
ongoing control within their national jurisdiction, little 
effective influence over the management and governance of 
the DNS at an international level.  I have found that 
corporations have significant power to determine the way in 
which policies for the management of the technical resources 
of the Internet are discussed, developed to consensus policy 
positions, implemented and reviewed. 
Chapter Summary 
A review of the chapters summarises the key parts of 
the work.  Chapter One set out the context of the work and 
framed the way in which the work was undertaken.  It 
provided a brief history of the Internet, as that history relates 
to the technical management of the Internet network and the 
strong culture of regulatory volunteerism that developed 
around the RFC system.  Volunteerism has continued to be 
important in the newly constructed policy development 
mechanisms of ICANN.  Cost substitution is also important.  
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Whilst the Internet and the research that developed it was 
confined to research institutions and the military, the cost 
was absorbed by taxpayers in the United States and 
elsewhere.  Now that the majority of costs are met by private 
sector corporations, the motivation for the donation of time 
and expertise has shifted, the actors have changed and 
expected outcomes have altered.   
Chapter One also identified key individuals and 
corporations involved in the formation of ICANN.  This is 
important information because over the life of the research, 
whilst ICANN’s processes and procedures have been under 
development, personalities have been more important than 
objective rules and regulations.  Finally, the Chapter gave an 
overview of the market demographics of the industry in 
questions.  The statistics provide a snapshot of key data 
about the extent of electronic commerce, market 
capitalisations of domain name registration companies and 
others in the industry such as hardware and software 
providers.  
Chapter Two contained a comprehensive literature 
search across three key themes.  These were the globalisation 
of regulation, regulatory frameworks and the DNS and the 
multifaceted public policy debate about the management of 
the Internet’s technical resources.  The findings have 
contributed to the literature in three key ways.    They 
expand the discussion of the globalisation of regulation and 
provide some original conceptual thinking on the 
demographics of global influence patterns.  I have expanded 
the literature on the role of governments and their relevance 
in global regulatory structures and on the place of national 
governments as regulators of the DNS. 
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Chapter Two also contained an explanation of the 
research methodology employed here.  The challenge of much 
of this work has been that the Internet is a constantly 
evolving phenomenon.  To contain the research scope only 
data up to November 2001 has been used.   The broader 
thrust of the research seeks to understand some conceptual 
thinking which frames the development of hybrid regulatory 
models for the DNS.    
Chapter Three focused on a philosophy of naming as it 
assists in understanding the intrinsic value of the DNS and 
how that value has devolved to domain names.  It describes 
the shift from the use of number strings to names which have 
manifestly different values.  Control of the system which 
enables the resolution of Internet numbers to domain names 
and the policies enabling their effective use is critical to 
understanding the importance of the shift from IP numbers to 
the widespread use of domain names.  The chapter opened 
up some of the complex arguments surrounding domain name 
policy and its component parts of naming, ordering, ranking 
and labelling.  Understanding why names are so important 
and why effective but forgettable numbers are replaced by 
names gives insight into the underlying importance of the 
DNS, stressing the ‘name’ rather than the system.   
Understanding the value of names to individuals, to 
groups, to businesses, to the organisation of society resides 
in history and philosophy.   Chapter Four provided a general 
discussion of ICANN, its constitution and its by-laws.  It 
explored the core of ICANN’s mandate which is management 
of technical functions which enable the Internet to function 
reliably.    
Chapter Five discussed governance by the private 
sector as opposed to governance by governments.  It 
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illustrates, through data about the GAC, the changing 
interplay between national governments, a hybrid private 
sector regulatory authority and the broader domain name 
industry.  The chapter reached some conclusions about the 
role of national governments in the regulation of the global 
DNS and their relevance to ICANN.   In ICANN’s current form, 
national governments have been deliberately and strategically 
marginalised.   
Chapter Six discussed the nature of corporate strategy 
and the influence of corporations on the development of 
Internet governance models.  The chapter draws together, for 
the first time, a comprehensive understanding of the types 
and kinds of corporations, both large and small, US-based 
and non-US, that have been involved in the early stages of 
ICANN’s development.  The statistics in the chapter provide 
an early data set on which to draw some conclusions about 
the kind of influence corporations have exerted on both 
policies and procedures for making decisions and the 
decisions themselves, particularly in the expansion of the 
domain name space by introducing new generic top level 
domain names (gTLDs). 
Chapter Seven provided detailed examination of 
Internet governance in Australia.  It is the first detailed 
discussion of DNS governance in Australia and contributes a 
comprehensive historical review and analysis of the transition 
to an industry self-regulatory model.  It is a case study of 
how complex and multifaceted DNS governance has become 
in a national context whilst, at the same time, drawing direct 
parallels from the global experiences with ICANN.  The .au 
domain name space provides a very useful illustration of the 
evolution of geographic ccTLD DNS governance, at a critical 
point in the development of ICANN at an international level.  
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The process through which the .au domain name space 
evolved is instructive when trying to understand the impact of 
the hybridisation of regulation on a global scale.   
The evolution of the domain name market, in parallel 
with a regulatory experiment of open DNS governance, 
remains a work in progress.   
The thesis also contains a comprehensive glossary of 
key terms, stakeholders and abbreviations to facilitate an 
explanation of the research.  The appendices hold all the 
statistical data and charts; the bibliography presents all the 
materials used in the thesis, both on-line and off-line and the 
supplementary material provides some critical resources 
which are only available, sometimes unreliably, on-line. 
Future Research 
The key findings of the work have led to the following 
ideas for future research.  The extension of the 
comprehensive literature on global business regulation and its 
application to a new field of governance requires further 
examination especially with respect to the nature of 
cosmocrats.  I am developing methodologies to conduct in-
depth interviews with representatives of corporations, 
academic institutions and other entities to better understand 
who cosmocrats are as individuals.  This work will extend the 
understanding of the characteristics to cosmocrats including 
what languages they speak, where they live and work and 
what kinds of technology enable them to participate in global 
DNS governance.   
The protection of critical infrastructure by regulation 
and standards will form a key part of further work.  The focus 
on network security, communications reliability and the 
protection of infrastructure assets has been identified as a 
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crucial part of both a domestic and international set of policy 
priorities. 
The research has also identified significant 
disconnections between global policy development and the 
implementation of consistent standards of Internet 
governance within developing economies.  Developing 
consistent, objective methods to introduce robust regulatory 
models into developing economies that facilitates widespread 
access to the Internet will form a crucial part of further work. 
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SECTION C – APPENDICES 
This section contains the full charts and explanations for 
the data that was collected throughout the research.  
  I
APPENDIX ONE – ICANN MEETING RAW DATA 
This data is produced using publicly available meeting lists from ICANN’s 
official website.  Some qualifications are necessary about the baseline 
data used for the analysis.  Firstly, the records of attendance at ICANN 
meetings are often inaccurate with duplicate names, clearly false or 
bogus names and registrations which may not necessarily reflect actual 
attendance.  For example, a person could register for the meeting and 
not attend or only attend for one session or the opening reception.  For 
three meetings in Singapore, Berlin and Santiago meetings, we only have 
remote participation figures available although physical meetings took 
place evidenced by the meeting archives held on ICANN’s website.  The 
raw data has been categorised as follows: 
(B) BUSINESS 
Attendees include commercial registrars, commercial registries, law firms, 
content providers, journalists, e-commerce service providers, industry 
advocacy groups. The representatives from these sectors have been most 
active in the Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO).  
(G) GOVERNMENT 
Attendees include representatives of national governments and 
multilateral agencies.  The representatives from these sectors have been 
most active in the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). 
(E) ENGINEERS 
Attendees include telecommunications companies, hardware/software 
providers, network operators, and international organisations such as the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). 
(A) AT LARGE 
Attendees include academics, research institutions, civil society advocates 
and Internet Society members.  
(U) UNIDENTIFIED 
Attendees who have no obvious affiliation.  
(I) ICANN 
ICANN staff. 
There is some overlap between categories and some members of some 
organisations will appear in a number of different sub-meetings.  
Participation numbers may differ from those published by ICANN and 
there is no completely reliable set of attendance data.  In spite of the 
data quality, some very clear patterns have emerged which identify key 
corporations and their representatives who have consistently attended 
the meetings and who have been actively involved in the Constituency 
working groups such as the Registrars’ Constituency, the gTLD and ccTLD 
  II
Registry Constituencies and the Intellectual Property Constituency.  
Where possible, the gender of attendees has been identified. 
  III
CAMBRIDGE, MASS, 14 NOVEMBER 1998  
Category Physical Remote Total 
B 108 -- 108 
G 2 -- 2 
E 16 -- 16 
A 49 -- 49 
U 68 -- 68 
I 10 -- 10 
Gender 
Female 45 
Male 208 
253 -- 253 
 
SINGAPORE, 2-4 MARCH 1999 
Category Physical Remote Total 
B -- 46 46 
G -- 2 2 
E -- 12  
A -- 13  
U -- 11  
I -- --  
Gender 
Female 6 
Male 78 
-- 84 84 
 
  IV
BERLIN, GERMANY, 25-27 MAY 1999 
Category Physical Remote Total 
B -- 45 45 
G -- 3 3 
E -- 2 2 
A -- 17 17 
U -- 13 13 
I -- -- -- 
Gender 
Female 7 
Male 70 
Unidentified 3 
-- 80 80 
 
SANTIAGO, CHILE, 24-26 AUGUST 1999 
Category Physical Remote Total 
B -- 60  
G -- 7  
E -- 6  
A -- 14  
U -- 18  
I -- 2  
Gender 
Female 17 
Male 90 
-- 107 107 
 
  V
 
 
 
 
 
LOS ANGELES, USA, 1-4 NOVEMBER 1999 
Category Physical Remote Total 
B 317 58 375 
G 30 -- 30 
E 43 6 49 
A 51 18 69 
U 34 21 55 
I 3 -- 3 
Gender 
Female 
108 
Male 473 
478 103 581 
 
CAIRO, EGYPT, 7-10 MARCH 2000 
Category Physical Remote Total 
B 213 61 274 
G 39 8 47 
E 67 5 72 
A 59 28 87 
U 18 35 53 
I 16 -- 16 
Gender 
Female 96 
Male 452 
Unidentified 1 
412 137 549 
 
  VI
  VII
YOKOHAMA, JAPAN, 1-4 JULY 2000 
Category Physical Remote Total 
B 429 71 500 
G 72 1 73 
E 74 6 80 
A 123 26 149 
U 68 53 121 
I 10 4 14 
Gender 
Female 98 
Male 839 
776 161 937 
 
LOS ANGELES, USA, 13-16 NOVEMBER 2000 
Category Physical Remote Total 
B 677 212 889 
G 42 5 47 
E 67 8 75 
A 80 35 115 
U 40 126 166 
I 18 4 22 
Gender 
Female 204 
Male 1104 
Unidentified 
6 
924 390 1314 
 
  VIII
MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, 10-13 MARCH 2001 
Category Physical Remote Total 
B 590 91 681 
G 53 2 55 
E 57 5 62 
A 90 26 116 
U 72 55 127 
I 21 -- 21 
Gender 
Female 
182 
Male 880 
883 179 1062 
 
STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN, 1-4 JUNE 2001 
Category Physical Remote Total 
B 511 49 560 
G 66 -- 66 
E 61 4 61 
A 84 22 106 
U 27 34 61 
I 33 8 41 
Gender 
Female 
151 
Male 748 
782 117 899 
 
  IX
MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY, 7-10 SEPTEMBER 2001 
Category Physical Remote Total 
B 313 81 394 
G 26 1 27 
E 23 4 27 
A 54 17 71 
U 22 36 58 
I 33 3 36 
Gender 
Female 114 
Male 497 
Unidentified 
2 
471 142 613 
 
MARINA DEL REY, USA, 12-15 NOVEMBER 2001 
Category Physical Remote Total 
B 539 53 592 
G 35 3 38 
E 26 4 30 
A 73 13 86 
U 48 33 81 
I 30 6 36 
Gender 
Female 
137 
Male 726 
751 112 863 
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APPENDIX TWO – ICANN MEETING BUSINESS 
PARTICIPATION  
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GAC MEETING TABLES NOTES 
 
This information was collated using the publicly 
available minutes of the GAC meetings found on the National 
Office for the Information Economy website, the official GAC 
Secretariat for the period of the meetings.  
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/international/gac/index.htm 
 
These meetings were held on 2-4 March 1999 in 
Singapore; 25-27 May 1999 in Berlin, Germany; 23-26 
August 1999 in Santiago, Chile; 1-4 November 1999 in 
Marina del Rey, California; 7-10 March in Cairo, Egypt; 13-17 
July 2000 in Yokohama, Japan; 13-16 November 2000 in 
Marina del Rey, California; 9-13 March 2001 in Melbourne, 
Australia; 1-4 June 2001 in Stockholm, Sweden; 7-10 
September 2001 in Montevideo, Uruguay and 12-15 
November 2001 in Marina del Rey, California.  The author 
attended seven of the eleven ICANN meetings held at the 
same time as the GAC meetings.  
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APPENDIX FOUR – PROPORTIONAL 
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SECTION D – BIBLIOGRAPHY  
The bibliography lists information in the following way. 
 
• ICANN Public Meeting and Governmental Advisory Committee 
Meeting Minutes and Attendance Lists 
 
• Government and Industry Statements, Agreements and Proceedings 
 
• Government and Industry Discussion Papers, Reports and 
Information Sheets 
 
• Books, Monographs, Papers and Dissertations 
 
• Academic Journal Articles and Book Chapters 
 
• Newspaper and Magazine items 
 
• Government and Corporate Web Sites 
 
• Weblogs, individual web sites, news groups and personal 
communications 
 
Online content has been accessed over the past four years. As 
discussed in comments on the literature search, the volatility of on-line 
resources means that particular items may no longer be found at the 
listed URL.  The item may have been moved behind a firewall or been 
renamed during restructuring of a site or may have been taken down 
completely. Hardcopy of that content has, however, been made as part of 
research for the dissertation.  
 
ICANN PUBLIC MEETING MINUTES AND ATTENDANCE LISTS 
 
— Meeting 1 (Cambridge, Mass. US: 14 November 1998); at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/cambridge-1198/ 
 
— Meeting 2 (Suntec City, Singapore: 2-4 March 1999); at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/singapore-0399/ 
 
— Meeting 3 (Berlin, Germany: 25-27 May 1999); at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/berlin/   
 
— Meeting 4 (Santiago, Chile: 24-26 August 1999); at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/santiago/archive/ 
 
— Meeting 5 (Los Angeles, US: 1-4 November 1999); at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/la/ 
 
— Meeting 6 (Cairo, Egypt: 7-10 March 2000); at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/cairo/ 
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— Meeting 7 (Yokohama, Japan: 14-17 July 2000); at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/yokohama/ 
 
— Meeting 8 (Los Angeles, US: 13-16 November 2000); at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/la2000/ 
 
— Meeting 9 (Melbourne, Australia: 10-13 March 2001); at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/melbourne/ 
 
— Meeting 10 (Stockholm, Sweden: 1-4 June 2001); at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/stockholm/ 
 
— Meeting 11 (Montevideo, Uruguay: 7-10 September 2001); at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/montevideo/ 
 
— Meeting 12 (Marina del Rey, US: 12-15 November 2001); at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/mdr2001/ 
 
GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE (GAC) MEETING MINUTES 
INCLUDING PARTICIPATION RECORDS 
 
— Meeting 1 (Suntec City, Singapore: 2 March 1999) Executive Minutes; at 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/international/gac/meeting
s/mtg1/gac1min.htm  
 
— Meeting 2 (Berlin, Germany: 25 May 1999) Executive Minutes; at 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/international/gac/meeting
s/mtg2/gac2min.htm   
 
— Meeting 3 (Santiago, Chile: 26 August 1999) Executive Minutes; at 
http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/international/gac/meeting
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